Sombre prospects, if… We should hope that tactics play, for the time being, a significant role. If the positions outlined by the member states and by the European Commission with regards to the draft Constitution that the intergovernmental conference (IGC) inherited from the Convention were firm and final, prospects would be sombre. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs who announced their country's intention to noticeable modify Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's draft, or at least reopen the debate over fundamental aspects, are impressive. It is true that the Heads of government have been, in general, less talkative, and that the IGC is in their hands. Though, it seems difficult to imagine, except in specific cases, that there are serious differences of opinion between the two levels in one or other member state. This is why I hope that the present situation is largely determined by the negotiating tactics: when the IGC opens, each pushes to ensure the best position.
If this was not the case, Europe would not have its Constitution before the European elections next June. The scenario that would follow would not be reassuring. We would enter into the reign of the Treaty of Nice, with its well known weaknesses, notably institutional. Negotiations over the financial perspectives open under very bad conditions, as the major budget contributing countries would not entrust much money to managing a Commission with 25 members voting through a simple majority. The disappearance of provisions relating to defence would lead the countries, firmly in favour of progressing in this field, to do so outside the treaties. Europe would be enlarged, but without a Constitution it would have neither cohesion nor effective institutions, and would be unattractive to citizens, resulting in elections that are a near failure. Is it towards this that we are heading?
The Italian Presidency's list. Thankfully the game is not over, as the IGC has not yet begun its works and each will have to take on its responsibilities. The Presidency played its role, confirming its intention of not reopening all the negotiations; it is a political issue, as, from a legal point of view, in an IGC all the states have the right to speak. It is important that the thesis favourable towards an IGC that does not return to the start of the Convention has been accepted by the six founding countries, which have the longest running experience of the Community system and which represent all the categories of countries: the large, medium and very small. Thus, nobody can claim that it is a position of the large states alone. It is also important the Great Britain has aligned itself with this agreement in principal.
However, it is not a question of closing the debate. Even if the seven countries that share the Presidency's direction do not accept it, as they also have their demands (Luxembourg is not hiding). The preliminary list of points to be debated, which the Presidency sent to all the participants, is not thin. It includes three categories: a) points for clarification: rotation of the Presidency of various Council bodies, status of Minister for Foreign Affairs, details concerning 'structured cooperation' in terms of defence and the 'mutual defence clause,' b) points to be decided: calculation of qualified majority in the Council, scope of qualified majority, minimum number of seats per member state in the Parliament, possibly inclusion of a reference to 'Christian values,' c) points requested by one or other member state during the preparatory meeting in Riva del Garda: composition of the Commission, creation of a legislative Council, procedure for the revision of the Constitution itself.
The difference. We see it, all the problems (or nearly) raised by one or other member state are present. Thus, what is the difference between the Presidency's position and that of the governments which agree with it, and the position of those who want to reopen the debate? It concerns the meaning of the IGC itself. For some member states, this IGC has a nature and meaning that clearly distinguishes it from all those that preceded it. By creating the Convention, the EU wanted to change the method for the creation of a new European treaty, by introducing among the actors, the parliamentarians (national and European) and the Commission and by associating representatives from 'civil society'. For other member states, the fact that the IGC was preceded by the Convention changes nothing: the Convention is a finished exercise which has its use, but now we return to the traditional method.
I feel that only the first thesis recognises the Convention's true meaning and reflects the importance accorded to it at its creation. According to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the IGC which will open represents a phase of the constituting process which, opened by the 'Laeken Declaration', continued with the Convention, will extend with the IGC and end with national ratifications (see bulleting of 19 September, pp. 4-5). The Presidency adopted the same thesis, as explained by the Italian Secretary of State Roberto Antonione before the European Parliament (see bulleting of 25 September, p. 4): we are in the presence of a unique constituting process that now enters the stage of intergovernmental negotiations (…) thus we are faced with substantially different negotiations from those that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam and Nice. The negotiations must end in December in order for the constitutional treaty to be signed next May, as its' extension would provoke the progressive dispersion of the constituent heritage of the Convention. At the start of the week, still before the EP, the President of the Republic Carlo Campi made a speech of equal stature to the historic role of Italy in the creation of a united Europe, by underlining that the six founding countries do not form a 'superior hierarchy', but represent the crucial 'historical memory' of the European building process, whose foundation is the pooling of sovereignty (see bulleting of 1 October, p. 4). On behalf of the Commission, Michel Barnier stated: the IGC that will open cannot be, it is not and will never be an IGC like the others, comparable to those of Amsterdam and Nice, which led to a little progress and many regrets (which thankfully corrects, at least in part, the impression left by President Prodi of considering as given the fact that the IGC should be 'authentic' because several Ministers for Foreign Affairs spoke of it in Riva del Garda).
For the Belgian formula. What is the dividing line separating the possibility for each to raise the subjects cited, and the requirement not to restart the Convention's debates? The happiest formula to define, seems to be that included in the Belgian position over the IGC. Guy Verhofstadt and Louis Michel wrote: the Belgian government feel that for lack of finding a consensus within the IGC over alternative formulas that will improve the draft Constitution, the text from the Convention applies. This principal does not prevent discussing all the issues cited by the Presidency. Belgium itself has taken position over these subjects, by moving against the reference to 'Christian values', in favour of the calculation of qualified majority as presented in the draft, in favour of the 'lateral clause' allowing certain votes by qualified majority without revision of the treaty, in favour of the Commission's formation as defined by the draft as a 'transitional formula' (on this point it confronts Luxembourg's positions) and in favour of a future simplification of the constitutional treaty revision procedure. However, at the same time, Belgium feels where a lack of agreement over what it demands exists, the Convention text applies, and that this rule should apply to all.
Spain/Poland agreement. This is not, by a long shot, everybody's opinion. Spain and Poland reject the principal of conferring a constitutional power to the Convention. According to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ana de Palacio, this attempt is without any legitimacy, both legal and political. Spain accepts the results of the Convention in the fields where it had an explicit mandate, but feels that this is not the case for the institutional aspects that, in practice, abrogate certain elements of the Nice Treaty, in particular the calculation of qualified majority within the Council. It is undeniable that the new system (majority of state representing at least 60% of the population) is less favourable towards Spain (and Poland) than the Nice mechanism, which gives these two countries 27 votes, close to that of the most populous countries (which have 29), and we understand that Madrid wants to discuss this. However the arguments of Ana de Palacio, whose European commitment is without doubt, seem to exclusively take into account the 'population' aspect of the method adopted by the Convention, neglecting the 'number of states'. How is it possible to assert that through this method 'power is concentrated in the hands of a small number' (that is to say the most populous countries), when no decision would be adopted in a Europe of 25 if it did not have the support of at least 13 member states, and that the countries whose hegemony Spain fears are only four? Poland is on the same track; it asserts that the 'allocation of votes agreed in Nice forms part (for the Polish people) of the contract for accession to the EU. Defence of national interest is licit and understandable, and a solution must be found, but without casting doubt over the institutional reform drafted by the Convention.
The other subject. The second major subject of the discussions is the composition of the Commission, and I maintain that the two drafts at present are both bad (the fact that certain failings are common is not an argument in their favour), and that the times are not ripe to define, in detail, the correct formula. It is necessary to leave the accession countries time to 'live' the Community method, without forcing them, and not wanting all the details of the Constitution. A few years are available.
The remainder, that is to say the bundle of demands from such or such member state or from the Commission, is to be discussed. It is possible, even certain, that several improvements are achieved by consensus, for example over the description and the functioning of the common policies. However, in the absence of an agreement, it is the 'Belgian formula' which must prevail. Otherwise, the result of the IGC itself will be compromised.
(F.R.)