Instructive indications. The definition of what tomorrow could be the EU's foreign and defence policy underwent two noteworthy developments last week. The first is the position taken by the European Parliament, the second the finalisation by the Convention Praesidium of the draft articles for the Constitutional Treaty in these fields. Two other events will be taking place by the end of the month: the presentation of draft articles to the Convention meeting in plenary (24 and 25 April) and the "defence Summit" between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg (29 April), so that things will become clearer. But last week's developments are already instructive pointers.
The European Parliament debate and the resolution on the European security and defence structure (summarised in our bulletin of 11 April, pp .7 and 8) are important from two points of view:
1. The text, approved by a very comfortable majority (almost three quarters of votes in favour) over and beyond a few affirmations of principle and the inevitable rhetoric, is on the whole remarkably concrete on several aspects: a) the numbers of permanent Union military forces are given with a timetable for realisation; b) a common arms procurement and production policy is called for; c) a mechanism to evaluate the Member State commitments is proposed, with criteria and indicators such as: a minimum ratio between the defence budget and the GDP of participant countries; the assessment of deployment capabilities for the armed forces of Member States and their interoperability. Charles de Gaulle's irony about the young goats jumping up and down shouting "Europe, Europe" but without doing anything is not applicable to the work done by this EP. It is sound, concrete, and it is also significant that the rapporteur, Philippe Morillon, of French nationality belonging to the current presidential majority - is to crown it all a General. On one point, the Parliament at first sight goes a little too far. It calls for a seat of permanent member at the United Nations Security Council to be attributed to the EU. France and the United Kingdom will not be intending to hand over their right of veto in any near future, although there is considerable talk about reforming the way the UN works. But the EP is perhaps right to ask for it nonetheless, looking to the future.
2. The vote and the debate will prefigure the stances held within the Convention. Opponents are essentially on the extreme left, rejecting a European military force (but nonetheless calling for the EU to intervene with greater energy in some situations …), or among the "sovereignists" (mainly members of the Europe of Democracies and Differences Group) for whom the power Europe is a "chimera that has never existed and never will". To this must be added a number of "Greens" and, what is more significant politically, British Conservatives. It is easy to foresee that, within the Convention, the arguments against a Defence Europe will be more or less those that we have already heard in the Parliament, and their political origin will not be very different.
Draft articles fine-tuned by the Praesidium of the Convention comprise a number of changes, some of them significant, to the drafts that had been prepared by the Secretariat (see our bulletin of 10 April, p.9), but the principles and the structure remain the same, as they are based on the reports of the Convention working groups on "external action" (chaired by Jean-Luc Dehaene) and "defence" (chaired by Michel Barnier).
A minister who dares to state his name. The chapter on CFSP gives a key role to the future "EU Foreign Minister", a name that has been adopted by all the articles of the Praesidium, whereas the Dehaene Report spoke of a "European representative for foreign affairs" and the Barnier report avoided giving a title to the person who would wear this "double hat" of the current CFSP High Representative and the European External Relations Commissioner. The Commission had suggested the name "EU Foreign Affairs Secretary", a term of American source which has no meaning for a European citizen. Even the Parliament's resolution uses the terms "European External Representative". No doubt it is a positive fact that the Praesidium had overcome the hesitations dictated by the fear of going too far and that it suggests the simplest, most effective definition that speaks directly to the citizens saying exactly what it means: European Foreign Affairs Minister. If such is the reason, why should governments not agree?
For defence, a three-tier structure. The finalisation of the texts resulting from the Praesidium deliberations is under way. The Praesidium will itself give them a quick look on 23 April and they will be officially available on 24 April, at the opening of the Convention's plenary session. However, it is an acquired fact that the "defence" chapter will in practice comprise a "three tier" structure (even if the term itself is not used). The first tier would be all the Member States, that, at the European missions level, would carry out tasks already set out in the Treaty (such as humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and restoration of peace), plus a certain number of new missions proposed by the Barnier report with broad consensus within the Convention, namely: joint actions regarding disarmament; advisory services and assistance in military matters; conflict prevention; stabilisation at the end of conflicts and also (a total innovation) support actions at the request of third countries in the fight against terrorism. Some of the missions decided in common could be conferred upon a group of member countries that have appropriate military capabilities and hope to deploy. These countries would manage implementation of the mission, which would have the political support of all Member States.
A restricted "solidarity clause" would come in addition to the provisions cited, covering terrorist threats: in the case of a terrorist attack against a Member State, the Union would mobilise all the instruments available to it, including military means, to bring assistance to the State under attack at the request of its political authorities.
The second tier is that of "structured cooperation" between the States that so wish and that can go further. They must fulfil higher military capabilities criteria and sign up to more binding commitments between themselves. The list of participant countries will be included in the Constitution, as well as the commitments of the capabilities that they accept. This structured cooperation will be governed by a restricted Council bringing the participant countries together. The European Foreign Affairs Ministers would attend deliberations. At a later date, any Member State would have the possibility to request participation in structured cooperation, and decisions would be taken by the restricted Council.
Member States subscribing to a mutual defence commitment will have access to the third tier. This could be called an "enlarged solidarity clause" as it means that any aggression on the part of a third country against a participant State would be equal to aggression against all Member States, and as such would therefore receive a united response from all. This commitment already exists between WEU member countries. It is therefore outside the Union. It would be transposed into the EU with obvious political significance by means of a declaration annexed to the Constitution. It would not, strictly speaking, be a third stage as countries not taking part in the "structured cooperation" could sign up to the declaration, although this case does seem unlikely.
Arms agency and strategic research must be serious. In the context of the "defence" chapter, a special role will be played by the Arms Agency and strategic research, an essential instrument for the effectiveness of ESDP, as well as for its industrial aspects and technological aspects, both of which are essential. I believe that the Praesidium will have strengthened the preliminary draft of the secretariat, which seemed particulary timid - just the name proposed ("European Agency of Military Capabilities") left production and research elements in doubt. And the Agency would be limited to helping the Council in assessing capabilities, proposing projects and "coordinating" research activities. The Convention's "defence" group had been far more incisive, not only in the name of the Agency (see above) but also and above all in the indication of its responsibilities. It states that the first tasks of the Agency would be to ensure operational needs are met, which would be translated by the promotion of a harmonised acquisition policy for Member States, as well as support to research. We are far beyond the simple task of assistance, assessment and coordination. It is a matter of satisfying the operational needs and strengthening the industrial and technological base. Also, efficacy requires that the status of the Agency and its operational arrangements be decided by participant States alone - those who do not take part have no decisions to take.
I am curious to see whether the Praesidium has corrected the shyness of the first drafts.
Safeguarding the Commission's collegial nature. Given that the package covers the Union's external action as a whole, separate chapters are devoted to common trade policy, cooperation with the third countries and humanitarian aid as well as to international agreements in general. All the agreements would be negotiated, with a Council mandate, by the European Foreign Minister who, in his/her capacity as a member of the European Commission (the result of the "double hat") would also act in the Commission's name (except of course when it is a matter of CFSP). At first sight, this formula is a little simplistic, for example for possible agreements concerning single currency. The Commission's collegial nature and the specific competence of Commissioners must be safeguarded. Here too, it will be necessary to read the articles finalised by the Praesidium with great attention.
(F.R.)