Political imperatives and timetable. Is the Convention at a turning point? I'm not talking about the content of its papers but of its timetable and the importance of this in relation to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which will have to confirm the results. The schema, which appeared settled, was that of an IGC organised very rapidly at the end of the Convention's work and being particularly brief: without beginning negotiations again, it is expected to look at the conclusions of the Convention and make decisions on the pending issues. Convention Vice President, Jean-Luc Dehaene had declared that the real negotiation was already happening between Convention Members and that the IGC wouldn't change anything very much. He even reckoned that if the Convention failed, there would be no point arranging an IGC because it would have no chance of succeeding. Several Member States have delegated their Foreign Ministers to the Convention, which wasn't the case to begin with. Some Member States, notably the United Kingdom, were not really happy with this schema but have not opposed it openly.
Now, everything seems to be changing because of the demands of the timetable (no-one believes in it any longer, except for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing who pretends to believe that the Convention can come up with a draft Constitution by the end of June) and political developments: the "letter of the eight" and the position taken by the Vilnius group would have brought to light the impossibility of a political Europe of 25 (see this section of 22 Europe).
Some striking facts. A few striking facts bear this impression out. 1) London has again requested a "pause for reflection" of several months between the end of the Convention's work and the IGC, with the support of the two Nordic capitals; a six month deadline, could, according to the opinion of some Community sources, break the momentum and lead to the IGC beginning negotiations. 2) Around fifteen Convention Members from Central and Eastern Europe, led by the Hungarian government representative Peter Balasz (but with the co-signing of the MEP Alain Lamassoure), have adopted the idea of a deadline for reflection between the Convention and the IGC and they have requested: that from 16 April Convention Members from Central and Eastern European countries obtain an identical status from that of Convention Members from current Member States (by getting rid, therefore, of the Laeken declaration according to which they cannot "prevent consensus gained between Member States"); that the IGC does not begin before their access becomes effective or at least that it does not finish before their accession. 3) According to European Commissioner Michel Barnier, we should not "limit ourselves to respecting at any price, the date of June 2003 for the conclusion of the Convention, which could quickly appear unrealistic and artificial". 4)This week the Convention has taken off the debate on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from its agenda until an undetermined date.
These timetable incidents are not entirely new. A passage on the "conclusions" of the Copenhagen Summit (13 December) already affirmed it in paragraph 9: "New Member States will participate fully in the next IGC"…The new treaty will be signed after their accession." The importance of this passage and its predictive character, which is a little strange, was only highlighted in January by Professor Xavier Delcourt from the University of Strasbourg, who stressed that the European Council would thus give the candidate countries (which at the time had not yet concluded accession negotiations) the right of veto on the Constitutional treaty which Member States had and which could change to a certain extent the nature of the "coalitions" that could be built at the Convention.
Mr Barnier thinks CFSP and ESDP are not possible with 25. Timetable considerations would not in themselves be so important if they weren't accompanied by a change of tone in elation to the Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security Defence policy (EDSP). The article published in Le Figaro of 19 February written by European Commissioner Michel Barnier (who chaired the Convention "defence" work group) was new. Having mentioned the divergences in the Iraqi affair in a quite dramatic tone ("Europe is being divided and is changing, from one side of the Atlantic to the other, letters and petitions, approaches and invective…"), he strongly rejects the thesis according to which these divisions could lead to an adjournment in the work of the Convention: "this would in this case mean, in an irrevocable way, the twilight of European unity". The contrary should be done as, "the most serious fractures are also and sometimes tragically, a strong incentive to go forward". Mr Barnier believes that, "current tensions being experienced are going to leave traces: more time will be necessary", but with the objective to move forward resolutely "towards more Europe, more unity and more solidarity". He also emphasised both the CFSP and ESDP because he "profoundly believes that we will only have a foreign policy once a genuine European defence capability is constructed", which will give Europe "the means of its power". We now get to the situation, which in the present circumstances, are the key point in Mr Barnier's position and I quote, "Union Member States, current and future, do not share the same ambitions in European defence and security". Political will varies strongly in Member States ..should it therefore be renounced? How many years or decades should we wait to try and gain an unlikely consensus? No-one can believe in it". And after having recalled the Franco-German positions from last Autumn and the Franco-British position of 4 February, the Commissioner is expecting that the European Parliament will be able to in turn, go in the direction of support for an initiative by one group of countries": "The European Parliament, with the report currently being prepared by General Philippe Morillon, also appears to recommend that the voluntary approach of some Member States would show the way and open the road up to those who are not yet ready to follow it".
It is clear that for the Commissioner, this should be done by the Convention, "EU Member States which seek to cooperate and have the capability to do so, should be able to deepen their cooperation in the framework of the future European Constitution". How, "On the model of the Euro and the Schengen area, with the quantitative and qualitative indicators, Member States would be able to make commitments in a credible way to construct defence and, in the same way, a common diplomacy and ultimately a Political Europe".
How else should we describe this windy discourse, other than an invitation to the Convention to build the structure of the "two Europes" itself? Should we conclude from this that the European Commission (of which Michel Barnier is, together with Antonio Vitorino, the official representative at the Convention) has concluded that "two Europes" are indispensable if the level of ambitions and objectives are to be maintained?
The Lamy/Verheugen project. We should not forget that last month the European Commissioners, Pascal Lamy and Gunter Verheugen had already published together (simultaneously in the German newspaper "Berliner Zeitung and the French daily "Liberation") an article proposing "Franco-German unity" in which all EU members that shared the same goals were invited to take part. This Europe of two (or several) would have its own institutions: a Congress composed of representatives form the two Parliaments, weekly Ministerial meetings, a permanent secretariat and a civil society forum. The objectives would be both: a) economic. Elaboration in common of the budget and tax policy guidelines; rapprochement of the tax systems (with the aim of getting rid of unfair tax incentive systems); identical positions at the Council of Europe; b) policies. Objectives will be the creation of a common armed force, the merger of diplomatic representations, common defence of the interests of participating countries at the United Nations Security Council.
If such a "hard core" does see the light of day, it will initially appear to have an inter-governmental character, without supranational institutions that are independent of governments and representatives of common interests. That's why, I prefer Jacques Delors' vision, which I looked at in this section on 22 February and which would mean that the EU institutions would be composed of differentiated competencies in which they function in the context of an enlarged Europe or that in which differentiation is applied. There would be no line of separation between old and new Member States, with the latter having the facility to participate in the most ambitious kind of Europe, if they share these ambitions and are capable of facing up to them.
But it is not yet the moment to worry about how these "two Europes" would work. I want to emphasise what appears to me to be a turning point in the work of the Convention, which: a) would extend its work; b) prepare to give Conventional Members from candidate countries an identical status to that enjoyed by Convention members from Member States (which would involve an amendment to the Laeken declaration"); c) it would be called on to direct its work in the direction of taking into account the formula of "two Europes" (or that of "differentiation", according to the terminology preferred by Jacques Delors), which could greatly influence the very text of the Constitutional treaty.
A new political initiative if the Convention fails? The option of the "two Europes" could increase the risk of the Convention failing, in the sense that the most ambitious countries, which reject the evolution towards a "Europe area" (because they want a political Europe) make their positions more radical. The French Foreign Affairs Minister (and Convention member) Dominique de Villepin declared on the radio that, "Europe is more than a market and cash register, there are also common values and principles…whatever happens, Europe will move forward". We are able to deduce from this that if the Convention does not succeed, a certain number of countries will launch a new initiative open to those that can and want to participate in it, in order to end the divergences and differences regarding the goals and objectives of the united Europe, without putting what already exists in question but in sweeping away the elements that appear to be excessively federalist.
(F.R.)