The two errors to correct. Two conditions are essential for the Franco-German institutional project to be considered as positive. It's not the fact in itself of the double presidency that is a problem: it has always existed! The president of the European Council and the President of the European Commission were not invented at the Elysée Tuesday night over dinner. The two conditions I believe to be essential are the following:
- the role of the president of the European Council elected by heads of government must not be "full-time". He has to retain his national duties, and his European competencies must not be altered in relation to the current situation. Should that be the case, neither the method of election nor the lengthy duration of his duties would in themselves jeopardise the balance of the "Community method";
- The Commission must not only retain its total autonomy (even in relation to Parliament), its exclusive right of initiative and its task of representing the European collective interest faced with national interests, but also prepare Summits and ensure that its decisions are carried out.
If, on the other hand, the "new style" president quits his national duties, the project would mean the end of the Community method and triumph for the intergovernmental method, as the president's duties would overlap those of the president of the Commission, he would be responsible for preparing Summits and would automatically have the tendency to surround himself with an administrative staff. The Commission would then be reduced to a kind of Council Secretariat. The British immediately understood the radical difference between the two possibilities, as, announcing his country's support for the Franco-German proposal, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was careful to stipulate that this meant "a full-time President of the European Council which is the governing body of the EU".
Yet, the Franco-German text is unfortunately clear on this point: it speaks of a president of the European Council who "performs his duties full time throughout his term of office", prepares the work of the European Council and "ensures the execution of his decisions". True, the text does then describe the duties of this president essentially as representative, states that the role of the Commission and its president is in no way affected and adds that the daily conduct of the common foreign and security policy "is the responsibility of European foreign ministers". But, with the two details of "full-time" and preparing Summits, that's where it hurts (and one may well wonder how and why Chancellor Schroeder agreed to these two provisions, incompatible with the traditional German attitude).
The Convention must play its role. If the Convention, responsible for the final text, corrects these two mistakes and if the objective remains that of giving greater stability and visibility to the president of the European Council, going beyond the rule of half-yearly rotation., the Franco-German initiative must be assessed in the light of other fundamental aspects that characterise it, and especially:
- the confirmation of the role and responsibilities of the Commission and the strengthening of its democratic legitimacy. The text (which we send our readers as an annex to this bulletin) states that the Commission must remain "the motor of European construction, the guardian of the treaties", and retain "its role of incarnating the European general interest … and the right of initiative". Its president would have the dual legitimacy of the people (he would be elected by the European Parliament through "qualified majority voting", not stipulated) and the States (his election would be approved by the European Council through qualified majority voting);
- resolving the problem of the composition of the Commission and the number of Commissioners, by handing its president the responsibility of constituting his college "taking account of geographic and demographic balances" (Parliament and Council then having to approve his choices).
- the creation of a "European Foreign Secretary", who would depend on the Council but at the same time would be member of the Commission. The unification of the jobs of Javier Solana and Chris Patten would thus have occurred, with increased powers (of which the right of initiative in matters of CFSP).
We see, therefore, that the Franco-German document contains several innovative and positive elements, by rationalising and strengthening the three components of the "institutional triangle" (even if the election of the president of the Commission by the EP comprises some dangers as previously set out in this section), and contains several other interesting elements concerning the stability of the presidencies of the Council, the role of national parliaments, etc.. But the Convention absolutely must remedy the two aforementioned errors. That's its role and its responsibility.
(F.R.)