Foreign Affairs Ministers defend their powers. The institutional decisions approved by the Seville Summit do not correspond entirely to that suggested by the Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana. The idea of splitting up of the General Affairs Council, for example, into two bodies, one responsible for external relations (including trade questions) and ESDP (defence), and the other with the preparation of the Summits and horizontal questions, has been abandoned. The formula that's been kept (point A of Annex II in the Seville conclusions), is limited to the new (why "new"?) General "Affairs and External Relations Council" holding distinct sessions, with separate agendas and on "possibly" different dates. What does this bizarre new formula really mean? Nothing at all, it is simply the result of the fact that certain Foreign Affairs Ministers did not want to give up their overall powers in European affairs. If the second Council formula becomes totally autonomous, it will escape from them and slide into the hands of the Vice Prime Ministers or the Ministers of European Affairs (in countries where this post exists). The latter are sometimes dependent on Foreign Affairs Ministers but not always. There is a trend among some Heads of Government to keep them attached by a direct line of dependency. This is an internal problem in some Member States and particularly pronounced in coalition governments where the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs belong to different political parties. These internal struggles have caused large-scale reform to fail. It remains to be seen how many Foreign Affairs Ministers want to take their seats in one or other of the compositions of this bicephalous chamber. If there are a lot of them, the change in relation to the current situation will be insignificant.
Rationalisation that is purely "cosmetic". Neither is it easy to see what interest there is in the new "list of Council formations" (point B in Annex II), because experience of the first exercise of this kind demonstrated that the operation is purely cosmetic. Legally, the Health Council is part of a unique group incorporating social policy and employment; legally, the Research Council is now part of the "Competitiveness" Council, which also covers the internal market and industry; legally, the Energy Council has become part of the Transport and Telecommunications Council. In reality, the Presidents and even the Ministers change during the sessions according to changes on the agenda and the result is neither real rationalisation or simplification. On the contrary, initial experience demonstrates that there are additional complications.
Two aspects could, all the same turn, out to be important, a) The "Budgets" Council has been swallowed up by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council. It is important that Finance Ministers are directly responsible for Union spending, which over the next few years, will give rise to a number of epic battles. It remains to be seen whether they'll really do it or whether they'll leave the room as soon as the budget is discussed; b) The Co-operation for Development" Council has been absorbed by the Council in charge of external relations. It is obvious that the attitude of the EU with regard to developing countries represents a very important part of its foreign policy. European Ministers responsible for this area, as well as ACP countries and numerous organisations specialised in development aid have protested, in the belief that foreign policy only represents one aspect of EU relations with poor countries. These relations must, in their opinion, constitute a global and coherent policy in itself that responds to certain specific demands. It now falls to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to prove that they're up to taking charge of this policy effectively, in liaison with their colleagues who manage aid and development (and who obviously participate in the work involved in this subject).
Real improvement. Point C in the same annex is perhaps the most concrete in the sense that it could have positive consequences on how the Council functions. But it has a character that is too "administrative" to attract the attention of commentators and the public. The "multi-annual strategic programme" that the Council is committed to set up in 2003, as well as further "annual operational programmes" covering two Presidencies, represent an initial response (very partial, admittedly) to the controversial issue of the length a Presidency should be. It's the same but even more explicitly with Point D, which introduces the principle on which work undertaken on the budget in the following year is immediately conferred to the Presidency, which will make the decisions. The budget is adopted at the end of the year, therefore under the second semester of the Presidency but the preparatory work begins in the first semester. The Summit decided that all the work will be overseen by the Presidency responsible for concluding the work. The same system applies to other cases. The sacred principle of the Presidential semester is, therefore, in some fields, abolished. At the same time, the number of working groups chaired by the Secretary General of the Council (replacing the rotating "national" Presidency) has increased considerably - modest but real improvements soon to be applied.
The paradox of transparency. Provisions regarding the transparency of Ministerial debates should not be forgotten. It is rather paradoxical, we shout and protest a lot if it is forgotten but if measures are taken, no-one will say anything. When the Council acts as a co-legislator with the European Parliament, the public will be able to attend the Commission's presentation of proposals at the debate which follows and at the vote and explanation of the vote. I tend to believe in the effectiveness and impact of these measures, they'll be no crowds rushing to the room to hear the Council's deliberations on them before it immediately conveys them but they could prove interesting even if they have few admirers.
The importance of maintaining informal sessions. Nothing has been decided regarding the "informal" sessions of the different Council structures. There are positive and negative point involved. Guidelines proposed by Ministers do not always reach Brussels very clearly and it is sometimes difficult to reflect upon them in the formal work of the institutions. But these session enable an open exchange of views between Ministers, without minutes being taken and too many ears listening. The advantages outweigh the disadvantages. This was the opinion of several Heads of Government, given that the informal sessions are here to stay.
A success and a failure. The measures decided at Seville on how the Summit itself works (Annex I of the "conclusions) almost look like an internal European council regulation by establishing the number of yearly sessions, extraordinary meetings, rules for session preparation, agenda, session proceedings (getting rid of fringe meetings), the composition of delegations and updating of "conclusions" (no longer indicated as "Presidency" conclusions). These new rules, if they are adhered to, should clearly improve the sometimes chaotic functioning of the Heads of Governments' work.
Consensus remains the rule. The Seville Summit's most important project failed - introducing majority qualified voting at the European Council in order to decide the main guidelines or principled decisions (it does not have the power to adopt formal Community papers). This idea was thrown out (although Mrs Thatcher had been placed in a minority in certain important cases). Belgium considers it acceptable that the Council gives an opinion on the Commission's proposal representing the general interest (see our bulletin 22 June p 4), other Heads of government (including Mr Chirac) are firmly opposed.
Small countries must consider. The Commission President presented his initiative on changing how the future enlarged Commission works (see this section 20/21 June). The Summit decided in this context, that it would not intervene in measures that were within the remit of the Commission itself. Meanwhile, leaders in certain small Member States reacted negatively to the Prodi project because it differentiates between European Commissioners. Small countries are naturally very sensitive to anything that could create distinctions between Member States according to their size but they must not automatically distrust all institutional rationalisation. They will be obliged to choose between a reduced Commission (fewer Commissioners than Member States) and a more numerous and more flexible Commission enjoying effective decision-making procedures.
Two bomb-shells. While approving the different measures mentioned in the current Treaties (the Danish Presidency has already taken the first application measures, see our bulletin 26 June p 4), Heads of Government also dealt with some future provisions, namely, the future Constitutional Treaty. There has been no encroachment on the Convention, as the provisions only involve procedure. The Danish Presidency had been requested to present two reports to the December Summit. One on the "debate on the Presidency of the Union", the other on use of languages. Two bomb-shells. The first involves the Chirac/Blair/Aznar suggestion of a Union President appointed for three years (negative reaction from small countries). The language question stirs up a real hornets' nest. I don't think the two December documents will contain clear and explicit positions on either subject. One doesn't have to be Nostradamus to realise this. (F.R.)