The Chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe was quite right in letting the European Parliament have the first taste of his ideas and ambitions on some of the subjects to be tackled by the Convention. Earlier, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had mainly insisted on the need to listen to the opinions of all the Members before anything else. He obviously felt he had already obtained indications (through a general introductory debate - see our bulletin of 23 March, pp.3-6) allowing him to express his views on the substance of the issues (see our bulletin of 28 March for his dialogue with the Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs). Some of these affirmations are particularly worthy of note.
1. The future European Commission: no more than a discussion forum? VGE considers that, after reform, the European Commission should no longer be able to vote. He favours a radical solution to the problem, already mentioned on several occasions under this heading, because of the fact that, in a future Commission composed of around thirty Commissioners, the relative weight of the Member States could not be correctly reflected. I remember having already cited the example of the republics that sprung up from the former Yugoslavia. Today or some time hence, they would have the same weight in this Commission as all the founding EEC members put together. Then there is the case of the three Baltic States plus Malta and Cyprus, which would carry more weight than Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy together. The founding fathers had foreseen that there should be two Commissioners for each "large country" at the Commission, but the "one Commission per country" solution would even eliminate this modest balancing provision. In a Commission voting by simple majority, no majority would still have real legitimacy, except for introducing the rule of double majority (country and population), but this would be incompatible with the principle whereby Commissioners do not represent their own countries. Then, of course, there is the solution of a closer Commission formed of a fewer number of Commissioners than Member States, but VGE does not believe this is realistic given the attitude held by most Member States on this point.
2. Seeking an Executive. The idea that the future Commission will not be able to vote obviously poses the question of substance: What would be the Union's future executive body? According to VGE, Europe has twice had an Executive that worked: first of all the European Commission and then the European Council. But, in his view, a European Council with 28 or more members is no longer an Executive. At this stage of the work, VGE obviously did not wish to give an answer to this question. It will be up to the Convention to come up with it. He simply pointed out that the Solana report on Council reform is along the same lines as his own reflections. But he does certainly have some ideas brewing in his mind, as can be guessed from his response to a question on the choice to be made between the intergovernmental and the Community method. "I believe we need both, and perhaps more original cooperation between the two" (see also point 4).
3. Consensus does not mean unanimity. The Convention's ambition, according to VGE, is to "work along the lines of a single text that would legally be a treaty but which would be of a constituent nature (…) that the IGC could accept as such". It is logical that the Eurosceptics should raise the problem of consensus at this point. If the draft Treaty takes the direction that VGE is hoping for, they will not approve it, and there will therefore be no real consensus. It seems obvious that the Chairman is reasoning in terms of a "broad consensus" and not unanimity. The Eurosceptics obviously have the right to present their texts, but VGE is "not so sure that these texts have a chance of being adopted". In saying this, he bases his argument on the results of the first debates in which there were very few "extreme" positions voiced. The challenge is therefore to define a project likely to gather very broad consensus, by avoiding double opposition: from those who find it insufficient and from those who find it excessive. These two oppositions together could prevent the "broad consensus", which could therefore only be won through considerable tact and patience.
4. Seeking a third solution. The institutional structure resulting from the Convention therefore remains to be defined. VGE seems to have reached a decision on just one point (after hearing what the Members have to say), and that is, that the future Union should have a legal personality. The answer to the fundamental question set out in point 2 remains completely open. The best known preliminary answers (in that they had raised a large number of reactions in 2000 and 2001) do not appear to have resisted criticism, on one hand because it practically eliminates the Council as a branch of the Executive by transforming it into a branch of legislative power (the "German" formula), and on the other because it goes a long way in the opposite direction by scrapping the role of the Commission as an institution independent of governments (the "Juppé" formula). The International European Movement's search (within the EPP, which appears to have chosen the German formula but is in the process of having a re-think) for a third way is actively continuing, as is the search within the Party of European Socialists and other bodies. The European Commission has announced the publication of its first basic document on 30 April.
Meanwhile, the ice has been broken by Robert Toulemon, President of the French association for studies on the European Union (AFEUR) who orally presented a detailed project with innovative formulae last week in Brussels at the Fernand Herman's Cercle populaire européen. It is an important contribution, the fruit of profound research, which I will soon be outlining to my readers in this column.
5. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's concept of the avant-garde has changed. VGE has given no clues to his views about the need for an avant-garde in the enlarged Europe, but I have the impression his concept has moved on since the time he launched the idea of two Europes - Europe area and Europe power. He has said that "strengthened co-operation" has been used in practice even when not set out in the Treaty (like with the euro and EMU) but that nothing has been tried since the mechanism has legally existed. Calling on Members to consider a mechanism of temporary, partial get-out clauses, he seems to be moving in the direction suggested by Robert Toulemon, that no group of countries could decide on its own initiative to set up an avant-garde, but that some countries could self-exclude themselves from a project defined and approved using the normal institutional procedures - the idea of self-exclusion rather than a "second" category of Member States. We await clarification.
6. Voting will have no importance in the Convention. VGE has confirmed that the Convention he chairs will not vote. This is a reasonable decision since the way it is made up, the Convention could not express any valid majority. To make this clear, consider the fact that the European Commission only has two votes out of 105, heads of state have 15 votes and national parliaments all have equal numbers of Members, whether they represent countries of 60 or 70 million or just a few hundred thousand. In such conditions, voting would not provide a valid way of assessing the predominant trends.
7. Other operational issues. Several MEPs and VGE himself have stressed that Members do not speak on behalf of the "component" that appointed them (there are four components - the European Parliament, national parliaments, Commission and heads of state) but firstly as Members of the Convention along the lines of the Philadelphia Convention. Does this also go for Members representing the European Commission and heads of government? Especially since the latter are not fixed in stone - the results of the upcoming elections could lead to changes. Meanwhile, Members who share the same political views will make an effort to co-ordinate their positions, giving rise to "transversal co-ordination" across all four components; and the "parliamentary component" (the EP plus national parliaments) does not rule out searching for common positions on various subjects (and VGE sees no problem with this). No doubt these areas will be cleared up "on the chalkface" as work progresses.
Public opinion and the institutional debate. A concluding remark. When he opened the debate last week with VGE, the President of the European Parliament's Constitutional Committee Giorgio Napolitano challenged the idea that institutional debate could not be of interest to citizens. I felt that to some degree this remark was aimed at myself since I remember having expressed a degree of scepticism on several occasions on the possibility of inspiring public opinion through discussing the "Community Method" and such like. Mr Napolitano noted that citizens needed to feel represented and have the impression their voice was heard; and this was tightly bound up with the nature and operating of the Institutions and the decisions that will be taken in this connection. I hope with all my heart that he is right and that the institutional debate will be understood by public opinion in its true significance as expressed by Mr Napolitano since even these "short chronicles" would have everything to gain from it. (F.R.)