Serious stuff may now begin. The Treaty of Nice was signed last week according to its merits, in other words, without fanfare. These merits, we know, do not lie in its contents, but in the two possibilities it opens up: politically rekindling accession negotiations (although there is nothing to say that it will facilitate the process) and triggering the wide-ranging debate on Europe's future, avoided for years. Now, serious stuff may begin. It's obvious that the "wide-ranging debate" will define European construction, with the danger that what has been built over half a century may be placed back into question. The Community method, that enabled us to go beyond the historic but ineffective system of alliances, is the only guarantee of the perennial nature of what has been achieved. It is not easy to get public opinion to understand the risk of certain tendencies, nor the ambivalent nature and, consequently, insidious and ambiguous nature of some developments.
Ambivalence of the European Council. Ambivalent nature? One example for all: the increasingly preeminent role of the European Council is both salutary and dangerous. Salutary, because the heads of state and government have indisputable democratic legitimacy, are "visible" to the public and may provide the EU with the political impetus it needs. Dangerous, because the European Council could slide towards a "G8"-type mechanism, in which some essential elements of a community are lacking: the largest powers dominate, and no independent institution prepares decisions basing itself on the "general interest", nor manages the follow-up to directions decided upon. To slide along that path would be the end of Community Europe. This is why, without disputing the now unavoidable role of the heads of state and government, the functioning of the Council, the method of preparing its meetings and the role of Community institutions are defining.
The broad debate on Europe's future is therefore both the place for all hopes and the place of all dangers. It would, however, be illogical to complain about the opening of this debate, having for many years deplored its absence. What needs doing, is to constantly monitor the way it unfolds and denounce its deviations; all opinions are obviously licit, but people must know where we are heading and what is being prepared. We shall therefore regularly continue our "little chronicle of the debate on the future of Europe".
France officially breaks the silence. Let's begin by stressing that France seems, at least partially, to have broken the official silence of which it has so often been accused. In a speech on the occasion of the signing of the new Treaty, President Chirac declared that: a) the Commission "will remain the supranational and central institution of our Union. And this fortunately distances us from plans to transform the Commission into a pale secretariat; b) "enhanced cooperation" is a new way to guarantee that, whatever happens, the Union will be able to continue to deepen. This phrase seems clear: if one Member State or another steps back from moving along the path of integration, the other won't wait for it. These two statements, should they be confirmed and become political acts, would indicate a change in direction on the part of Paris, or at least a clarification. For his part, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin declared his intention of participating in the debate on Europe's future, that has to "allow us to go further and with other ambitions". If the next presidential electoral campaign in France arouses among the candidates a race in terms of European ambitions, who wouldn't welcome that?
Three attitudes taking shape. Second significant element: the three attitudes regarding the Treaty of Nice are taking shape and their supporters are clarifying the reasons for their choice. The first is the official attitude of the institutions: ratify the treaty without setting preconditions, while at the same time moving forward in the debate on the future. Both President Chirac and President Prodi have urged national parliaments to begin the process without delay, so that the Treaty is ratified throughout before the end of next year. This idea also has the backing of political forces and Member States for whom the only goal that counts is that of rekindling accession negotiations.
The second attitude consists in not rushing to ratify the Treaty of Nice but to wait for the debate on the future to come up with clear guidelines. In practice, we shall first have to wait and see if the future Belgian Presidency will be able to submit an already substantial draft declaration at the Laeken Summit in December. The European Parliament seems to be moving in that direction, which would mean two operational guidelines: delay taking a stance until such time as, without claiming to be Nostradamus, it will have a clearer insight into the future, and recommend the same wait and see attitude to national parliaments. This tendency also seems to have the backing of both Mr. Poettering, the President of the EPP Group, and Mr. Napolitano, of the Socialist Group, chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. And if these two main political groups of the E.P. back it …
The third attitude is the most radical: reject the Treaty of Nice. The first to firmly recommend this was Jean-Louis Bourlanges, who denounced the breach in the institutional balance between France and Germany, breach that would have smashed the foundations of Community Europe and, in his opinion, led to the "inevitable dysfunction of the Community system". Mr. Bourlanges synthesizes this development in one of his striking formulae: "Community Europe died in Nice at 04.24 a.m. of 11 December 2000". He has now received a backing of substance in Francois Bayrou, according to whom, in Nice, rather than a powerful Europe, an impotent Europe was built, gnawing away at its ambitions and reducing its ability to decide. Mr. Bayrou has no confidence in the possibility of this disaster finding a remedy, as it will be more difficult to achieve among 27 what 15 were unable to achieved. Another significant text, very critical of the Treaty of Nice, even though it does not explicitly recommend not ratifying it, was drawn up by Franklin Dehousse for the Belgian Senate: we shall turn to this in the next "little chronicle" of the wide-ranging debate.
Socialists define and name the point of arrival. Third significant element, the manifesto of a substantial group of members of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament for a "New European Federalism". This text (published in No.2231 of our EUROPE/Documents series) is foremost an attempt at clarifying definitions and words, a concern that has nothing futile about it. The differences in terminology and the different meanings of the same word or the same opinion from one language to the next, have had an incredibly negative effect on European construction, by creating misunderstandings and leading to at times absurd disputes. The word federalism in Germany means a structure in which the federal entities are not absorbed into a centralised state, but on the contrary, retain their autonomy, competencies devolved to the central power being clearly delimited. But for the English, this word means that a country gives over its autonomy to a single central power, thus exactly the opposite. Under these conditions it is difficult to understand each other, except by clarifying terminology.
The Socialist initiative also defines the final goal, point of arrival of European construction: "a Federation of States and peoples". Reading the text, one understands that this term covers the same reality as Jacques Delors' "Federation of nation-States", which was not taken on board as such because the principle of "nation" does not have the same meaning in all languages, or at least it is difficult to explain (according to the manifesto, "our languages and historic cultures have difficulty in translating the same notions identically"). A similar effort of clarification concerns the notion of "subsidiarity"; to express in one formula the "greatest possible decentralisation of decisions, by involving in European construction the regions, territories and organisations of civil society", the manifesto states that "the new European federalism, is the Europe of proximity" (in relation to the citizen). This for the form. As for the content of the future federation, the Socialists' document places special emphasis on the need to develop European values, a European way of life, a European social model, explicitly citing the quality of services of a general interest and the high degree of social protection. As we can see, we are far from purely doctrinaire debates. This is not to say that institutional aspects are neglected; the fundamental Treaty to be established, aimed at replacing the current eight treaties, will have to define the Union's aims, set out the values, rights and responsibilities on which it rests and clearly describe the institutional architecture. The legislative procedures and functioning of the institutions must be radically simplified and the Union must be "personalised": the Commission would call itself "executive", the President of the Commission would call himself "EU prime minister", Commissioners would be ministers…Don't smile, the President of the Council would at the same time become "Union president".
Furthermore, nothing has been set in stone: the signatories to the draft stress that it "is a text open to debate". We thus note that the broad debate, hardly begun, has already given birth to a plan for a future Europe, following the recommendation by Napolitano, according to whom the debate must not be "reticent, evasive, diplomatised", but answer fundamental questions. The draft of the signatory Socialists (remains to be seen what the British Labour members will think of it) has made preliminary choices: choose as final objective the Federation of States and peoples; strengthen Community procedures and supranational institutions; draw up a new Treaty with a constitutional character. The tone has been set. (F.R.)