Some speak of two, others of three stages. Even after the Council's favourable reception in principle, interpretations of the European Commission's strategy regarding enlargement negotiations are not uniform. And there have been many attempts to seek meanings over and above the written word. It seems obvious that, with certain precautions, the Commission recommends speeding-up negotiations. But all becomes complicated when one seeks indications as to timing. According to one interpretation, by refusing to pool the candidates into categories and considering each situation individually, the Commission is recommending successive and individual accessions, depending on the degree of preparedness of each. This however, runs up against one very simple consideration: it is materially impossible for the Union to welcome a new member every seven or eight months, as for every accession the composition of the Commission and Parliament and distribution of votes in Council need altering. This being an exercise that cannot be repeated over and over again, the requirement of a certain amount of pooling is inevitable. Which? Each has their own way of reading the Commission's intentions. According to some, its documents suggests that it is providing for two stages: eight candidates together in the first, Romania and Bulgaria later, separate. Another interpretation attributes the Commission with the idea of a three-stage process: Poland, Hungary and Estonia in the first, five countries in the second (we are still speaking of the applicants of Central and Eastern Europe), Romania and Bulgaria in the third.
Graphic separation. Most likely, the Commission has not made such quantified calculations; it knows full well that situations can evolve very rapidly, and some candidates apparently lagging behind have the resources and ability to rapidly meet the shortcomings set out in its reports. We at times have it say more than it actually does. Let's take the case of the Czech Republic: the Commission criticised its delays in both public administration and judicial reforms. Reactions in Prague were so strong that Mr. Verheugen considered it appropriate to stress that the Commission's judgement of the country was on the whole positive (even "very positive" if compared with the previous year) and that the Czech authorities have proven to be excessively susceptible. Most likely, the graphic presentation of the report's "conclusions" (1) played a role, presentation that separates Estonia, Hungary and Poland from the Czech Republic and Slovenia, whereas over and beyond the separation into two paragraphs, the texts are almost identical. Elsewhere, the Commission's report has been assessed especially from the point of view of its internal repercussions; for example, in Romania Brussels' severe judgement was considered to be a condemnation of the current centre-right majority, and as support, involuntary but powerful, for the left in the impending elections, considerations that are obviously foreign to the assessment made in Brussels.
The governments of the countries of the EU have on the whole just approved the Commission's strategy, placing emphasis on the "principle of differentiation" (defined "central principle to guide negotiations"), and implicitly sharing the two principles that Hubert Vedrine stressed a few weeks before: there can be no delay in negotiations other than in relation to certain demagogic promises made earlier; no timetable can be set for accessions, as dates will depend on the ability of applicant countries not only to accept but, more to the point, actually implement the acquis communautaire. Conclusion: there is no fundamental change to the EU strategy.
Avoiding belated regrets. Two weeks ago (2) we developed a few considerations in this section on the risk of the situation deteriorating in a certain number of applicant countries, through lassitude or frustration within public opinion, disappointment of the leaders and difficulty in reconciling two partially contradictory demands: longing for political breath and impetus up to the goal sought (reunification of Europe) and the demand that the EU does not jeopardize its institutional capability, nor the functioning of the single market or its common policies, nor prospects for development. This requirement demands that the Union be robust in its negotiations, something of which the candidate countries sometimes complain, having the impression that at times the grand design is getting bogged down in derisory technical details. But this rigour is inevitable if we do not want to the EU to be diluted.
Given these risks, the Commission is maintaining and reinforcing its enlargement strategy and scenario. Very good. We are prepared to consider cancelled the suggestions put forward in late October if the following conditions are actually met:
- the applicant countries in the most advanced phases of negotiations agree to the accession date being pushed backed to 2004 or 2005;
- other applicants are prepared to wait, without frustration or protests, until 2010 and even beyond, while witnessing the accessions of the avant-garde countries;
- all the applicant countries recognise that no accession is possible unless they have proved their ability not only to subscribe to, but also to apply the Community acquis and to give up requests for derogations that would call into question the working of the single market.
The laggards and the hesitant. None of the above conditions creates any difficulties for a number of applicant countries; some are even more enthusiastic than a few present Member States, i.e. more in favour of a highly integrated Europe with effective supranational institutions. It would be a shame to delay their contribution to European unity. The problem is with other candidates, namely the laggards and the hesitant: those that are not ready and will not be ready soon, and those with perplexities over certain demands and realities (existing or in the embryonic stage) of Community construction. It was for them that, in their day, Jacques Delors and François Mitterrand launched -albeit unsuccessfully- the idea of a broad confederation that would have covered the bulk of what the Central and Eastern European countries are seeking: security, free movement of goods, cooperation (political and economic) and EU support for reform and investment. Is this project, which would do nothing to delay accessions already close to becoming a reality, now without interest? Has it become obsolete? If so, all the better. All the better if the fear of disappointments, the weariness of public opinions and frustrations is groundless. With the hope of not having to regret tomorrow the conformism of today.
The political problems of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. So far, we have focused on Central and Eastern Europe. The situation is totally different for the three Mediterranean countries included in the list of applicants, i.e. the two already in negotiations (Malta and Cyprus) and the third waiting its turn (Turkey).
The Commission has voiced unreserved satisfaction over the economic performance of the two islands, writing: "Cyprus and Malta are viable market economies and should be able to deal with the pressure of competition and market forces within the Union". So the problems are exclusively political and institutional. The Turkish Prime Minister has just declared that there can be no solution in Cyprus other than the formation of two states. This solution is not accepted internationally and, moreover -in accordance with the rule of one Commissioner per Member State- it would give Cyprus two Commissioners! Someone would surely claim that Turkey would thus have a Commissioner in Brussels (and a presence in the Council and Parliament) without having to join, and others would doubtless reply that Greece would in practice double its presence. As for Malta, uncertainty about the outcome of the upcoming elections includes the risk that a new majority might withdraw its application for membership or that the new Parliament might reject it. Malta should take a decision, for or against full membership, irrespective of electoral vicissitudes.
Concerning Turkey, the recent vote in Parliament (2), by which a majority set political conditions that Ankara rejects, complicates everything. The problem is serious enough to require a specific analysis and commentary.
Ferdinando Riccardi
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1) Chapter III, 2, b of the document on enlargement strategy.
2) See this column in Europe of 30/31 October, pages 3-4.
3) See EUROPE of 16 November, pages 3 and 4.