Pour sa défense, l’Europe a besoin d’un marché unique de l’armement
As the European Commission prepares a communication and proposals aiming to streamline trade in defence equipment within the EU (a consultation of the stakeholders launched on 9 January is due to conclude on 6 February), Bertrand de Cordoue, whose CV includes the post of Director of Research at the European Defence Agency and who has also worked for Airbus, sets out an argument in favour of a single armaments market in this paper, written for the Institut Jacques Delors.
“In 2025, spending of the member states of the EU on the development, acquisition and maintenance of armaments is estimated to have reached a total in the region of 130 billion euros. Exports outside the EU are in the order of 60 billion euros, giving a total turnover – theoretically accessible to European industry – in the neighbourhood of 200 billion euros. Less than 20% of this spending is carried out cooperatively. Just 20% is put out to open competition to all EU suppliers and in three quarters of cases, these tenders are won by a domestic supplier. Furthermore, we know that acquisition outside the EU constitutes a huge share of the total, in excess of 50%”, de Cordoue points out, observing that “however approximate they are, these estimates highlight the predominantly national nature of the states’ procurement policies, with the share of their non-domestic acquisitions benefiting non-EU businesses in the past majority of cases. This means that the European defence market is currently hugely open to external suppliers whilst access to it remains extremely limited to European companies” (our translation throughout).
Two directives of 2009 on public defence procurement and intra-community trade in defence materials “have met their objectives to only a very limited extent, due to their complexity, their uneven transposition into the national laws and the ability for the states to opt out of them citing article 346 TFEU (which protects their essential security interests)”, the author goes on to explain. Additionally, “European enterprises are at a huge disadvantage compared to their American counterparts, who have protected access to a domestic market which is more than twice the size of that the EU”. The various forms of leverage available to the states, such as those put in place by the EU to improve profit margins on defence investments, are now seeing their effects hampered by the cost of intra-European trade and numerous administrative barriers, he explains. Hence the imperative need finally to create a functioning single defence market.
While de Cordoue acknowledges that “efforts to open up the defence markets are currently facing resistance on two fronts: the member states’ reluctance to abandon part of their freedom of choice in equipping their armies and the concerns of their industries over the effects of competition”, she also stresses that “it is these same major players who have the most to gain: the states would be able to pool their domestic procurement with those of their partner countries and clients and the industry would, subject to competition, have access to new market shares. Their reluctance to play the game of intra-European competition is therefore, in many respects, a paradox”.
To reach the objective of a single armaments market, “three actions are necessary: the creation of a transparent and reliable database of intra-EU trade in armaments, a revision of the 2009 directives to streamline these and require member states and stakeholders to open up their calls for tenders, the creation of safeguards to ensure that this benefits only EU businesses”. In conclusion, he stresses that “it is ambitious, but it is urgently necessary”. (Olivier Jehin)
Bertrand de Cordoue. Pour sa défense, l’Europe a besoin d’un marché unique de l’armement (available in French only). Institut Jacques Delors. The paper is accessible on the website of the Institute: https://aeur.eu/f/ked
La fabrique de la politique européenne de l’Allemagne
In this study, which has just been published by the IFRI under the aegis of its research committee on Franco-German relations (Cerfa), Jeanette Süẞ analyses the problems caused in Brussels and Germany’s loss of credibility, with the country often seen as an unreliable partner due to the extreme complexity of the German decision-making system. The matter in hand is what many people call the ‘German vote’, namely how difficult it is for its partners to get any idea of where Germany’s position is likely to fall, given that no hints will be dropped, or contradictory positions may be taken by different stakeholders, often leading to a result or a U-turn only at the last minute.
“Unlike France, in Germany, neither the Foreign Affairs Ministry nor the Ministry of the Economy has the final say in the event of an inter-ministerial difference of opinion. In such cases, it is common practice for the country to use a ‘scrutiny reservation’ (Prüfvorbehalt), indicating that Germany has not yet reached a common position and reserves the right for further scrutiny of the dossier, in the hope of subsequently reaching an agreement. It is this reticence of the ‘German vote’ that represents the major shortcoming in a system leading to a situation in which, very often, ‘Germany is nowhere’, as a former senior French diplomat summed it up. This situation leads not only to an inability to indicate any kind of position during the decision-making process within the various working groups, then at COREPER and the Councils of Ministers, but it also deprives Germany of the ability to put forward ideas proactively in ‘non-papers’ upstream or when new initiatives are presented by the European Commission. By being forced to include so many different players in the process of coordinating European policy, Germany is often prevented from clearly expressing its position”, she writes.
To a certain extent, the arrival of Friedrich Merz in power has helped to reinforce coordination in Berlin. “Taking the view that the stability and efficiency of the EU can be vouchsafed by a firmer hand on the wheel from Berlin, the Christian Democrats set out to reinforce the coordination of European policies by giving the federal chancellery more capacity to anticipate and orchestrate major political orientations. The CDU/CSU has sought to centralise coordination on certain key dossiers, such as the multi-annual financial framework (MAFF) within the chancellery, in order to take on this prerogative. However, the SPD, which was initially supposed to take responsibility for the Foreign Affairs Ministry, opposed the initiative, out of concerns of being marginalised in decision-making on European matters. Instead, the Social Democrats wanted to introduce deadlines (‘Stichtagsregelung’) to arrive at an inter-ministerial position earlier in the coordination process. Ultimately, neither party managed fully to impose its vision: the chancellery ended up with a slightly weightier role, by setting in place a system of weekly monitoring of European dossiers (the so-called ‘EU Monitoring’), but all coordination continues to be shared between the ministries of foreign affairs, the economy and find. The Conservative party, which is responsible for chancellery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy, was nonetheless given a predominant role in European policy, as it holds three of the four governmental bodies responsible for the coordination of European dossiers. Only the Ministry of Finance is held by the Social Democrats, even though this is a key ministry by anybody’s reckoning. To avoid or resolve potential conflicts between the ministries upstream of the process, these are discussed every week under the chairmanship of the head of the chancellery (Thorsten Frei) at the meeting of the secretaries of state (‘Staatssekretärsausschuss’) and, if necessary, at the level of the Council of Ministers (‘Kabinett’)”, Süß explains.
She goes on to describe a major institutional change: “the first time since 1963, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is led by the political party which also holds the chancellery, in this case the CDU. This has a positive effect on the coordination of European policy, as there is now a greater alignment between the chancellery and the ministry of foreign affairs. Even so, the colleagues from the ministry of foreign affairs regard the involvement of the chancellery and the management of European dossiers with ambivalence, as the chancellery is encroaching upon their competence over Europe and foreign affairs. The most revealing project of this development is unquestionably the creation of a Security Council (Nationale Sicherheitsrat) within the chancellery. Taking inspiration from the American National Security Council and the French and British models, the purpose of this council is to coordinate foreign policy, defence, cyber-security and intelligence, with the involvement of the chancellery, the Defence Ministry and security services. Behind the stated objective of ‘streamlining’ strategic decision-making, a major institutional change is taking shape. The centre of gravity of German security policy is shifting permanently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the chancellery. This change indicates Friedrich Merz’s desire for a more direct political steering of defence matters, but also raises questions over how these dovetail with the existing European structures, for instance the role of the German ambassador to the Political and Security Committee (COPS). Too much centralisation in Berlin may negatively affect the coherence of COPS, just as it is trying to adopt a proper decision-making centre”. As accurate as the strategic lead described by the author may be, the ‘proper decision-making centre’ of the European security and defence policy looks unlikely at this stage. As for the Political and Security Committee, it is but a shadow of its former self.
Apart from “a structural review of the normative cadence and returning certain decisions to the national level”, which have greatly accelerated the Commission’s legislative simplification efforts without noticeably slowing the production of new regulations and directives, “Friedrich Merz is trying to create a German vision of European sovereignty, with particular emphasis on the security and defence policy as a prerequisite of European strategic autonomy”. “Friedrich Merz has positioned himself as a defender of SAFE as a financial pillar of European rearmament, whilst ensuring the rules remain flexible enough not to close Germany off within excessively rigid protectionism. In his addresses, he has stressed three imperatives: a rapid increase in capability, priority to European suppliers and compatibility with commitments within the NATO framework, which will require some margin to be reserved for certain components or systems of American origin. He regards SAFE and EDIP as industrial consolidation instruments which will both structure a European defence market and stabilise Germany’s production base”, the author stresses, adding that “the turning point in defence policy comes at a decisive moment for Europe’s leading industrial power, Germany. In the short and medium terms, the development of German industrial development capacities is likely to change the economic landscape profoundly, by helping to maintain production and employment levels. If Germany succeeds in concentrating its efforts on future defence technologies on the basis of its existing industrial assets, this stimulus could even support a long-term growth dynamic. The German armaments industry will also play a key role in the construction of Ukraine’s deterrence capabilities. This repositioning will open up prospects beyond the NATO framework alone and give Europe, and Germany in particular, the opportunity to offset the risk of deindustrialisation by shaping a true mass defence industry. Against a backdrop in which the military threat has become once again a central parameter of European geopolitics, the concrete rearmament of the continent is looking like a condition of the spirit of ‘Zeitenwende’, followed by Merz’s ‘Epochenbruch’ into a future-proof industrial and strategic reality. On matters of foreign and security policy, Lars Klingbeil (SPD), Vicce-Chancellor and Minister of Finance, and Boris Pistorius (SPD), who keeps his job in Defence, broadly agree with Friedrich Merz in defence of a stronger Bundeswehr, resolute support of Ukraine and a leading role for Germany in matters of European security and defence. Singing from the same hymn sheet seems easier for the federal government in this area than in other political fields such as the economy or ecology, which show the extent to which the exercise of European power in Berlin is a prerequisite for internal coalition balances”.
“Since his arrival at the chancellery, Friedrich Merz has sought to redefine Germany’s place within the European framework. Over the last few months, he has succeeded in playing the part of a reliable crisis manager in a tense international and geopolitical context, be it Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, negotiations with Donald Trump on customs tariffs or peace in Gaza. The Chancellor has stepped up his visits to Paris, Warsaw, then Brussels, where he consolidated relations with Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa, so as to relaunch a common dynamic around industrial competitiveness in European defence. However, this productivity provides a sharp contrast with the French situation. Mired in successive manoeuvrings, Paris is struggling to maintain its image as a reliable partner, however much Emmanuel Macron retains European and foreign affairs in his ‘reserved field’. Brussels’ repeated warnings about the public deficit, together with social tensions and the prospect of a change of president in 2027, have reduced the credibility of the French government on the European stage. In this way, Friedrich Merz is making a name for himself by dint of consistency rather than inspiration, whereas Paris risks looking like it is riding shotgun”, Süß argues.
And while “the Franco-German relationship continues to be the decisive link in the chain of Friedrich Merz’s European policy”, the stated political ambition is struggling against France’s political instability, on top of which there are disagreements over trade policy and the risk of the failure of the two most emblematic armaments cooperation projects, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the tank system (MGCS). (OJ)
Jeanette Süß. La fabrique de la politique européenne de l’Allemagne. Institut français des relations internationales. L’étude est accessible sur le site de l’IFRI : https://aeur.eu/f/kee