Loyalty is crucial in politics, particularly within democracies and international agreements. Unfortunately, ambiguity is gaining ground these days and there are plenty of illustrations of this.
The European Union has built a strong and fruitful relationship with India, as its principal trade partner. During her visit in February of this year, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, held in-depth talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, for instance with a view to concluding a free-trade agreement before the end of this year: ‘the biggest agreement of its kind ever concluded anywhere in the world’, as the President described it, hailing India a ‘pillar of certainty in an increasingly uncertain world’. Another objective was to step up cooperation in the field of security and defence (see EUROPE 13590/1). Strengthening ties between the European Union and the non-communist countries of Asia is a logical strategic aim and a vast democracy would seem like a sensible place to start. Well, that’s true, but …
On 31 August, the lavish meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was, unsurprisingly, attended by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, but also by Modi, beaming radiantly alongside Xi Jinping. What was India doing at this dictators’ club? It is highly likely that the eye-watering customs tariffs slapped on the country by Donald Trump had quite a bit to do with it. This is a huge blow to Europe, particularly as solidarity with Russia in its war against Ukraine was reaffirmed at the summit. On 4 September, the President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the Commission had a telephone meeting with Modi. The conclusions of this are reported to be a commitment to a strategic agenda be adopted at the next EU-India summit, to be held in 2026. President Costa also announced that India’s dialogue with President Zelenskyy was still ongoing. Could this be the end of a double game?
Another example of ambiguity, this one better known and broader, is the EU-USA agreement on customs tariffs of 27 July (see EUROPE 13689/1). According to the Commission, this was the best possible option, but many members of the European Parliament (see EUROPE B13701B4) and experienced economists consider that the ‘deal’ is imbalanced and unrealistic, possibly even illegal. President Trump has still not ordered the reduction of American tariffs on European cars, which was due to take effect on 1 August, even though the Commission has met all prior conditions. Furthermore, discussions on steel and aluminium have not yet made progress and the tariffs imposed upon European exporters still stand at 50% (see EUROPE 13703/15). As for the commitment to buy energy from the United States in the amount of 750 billion dollars, it has not exactly gone down well with MEPs and environmental NGOs (see EUROPE 13701/20 and EUROPE 702/2). Misgivings have also been voiced on the next stages of the negotiations and, more broadly, on the future of transatlantic relations, with the United States no longer abiding by WTO rules. Will next Wednesday’s debate at the European Parliament, in the framework of Mrs von der Leyen’s state of the EU speech, bring a little clarity and assuage those concerns?
As for Greenland, which Trump has his eye on, Europe’s very firm position has been voiced by the European Council (see EUROPE 13571/2) and members of the European Parliament (see EUROPE 13634/15). Behind the scenes, however, the Trump administration, has not given up hope: a team of influencers is working secretly on creating a pro-American breakaway movement. Meanwhile, the Commission is proposing to double aid to Greenland in the next multi-annual financial framework (see EUROPE 13701/11).
It would take forever to attempt to summarise the changes in direction President Trump has taken over NATO, Ukraine and Vladimir Putin. The crux of the issue is compliance with article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the event of an attack on one of its members. The most recent NATO summit ended on an optimistic note, with the Europeans pledging to increase their budgetary participation (see EUROPE 13667/1). But in bad news just in, Trump is to terminate certain military programmes in eastern Europe, starting with the Baltic Security Initiative (225 million dollars), with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to lose out for their military infrastructure and training. A very strange signal to be sending out.
Trump has promised peace in Ukraine, he just hasn’t said when he’ll deliver it. Meanwhile, Russia maintains its belligerence every day. Putin, that master of ambiguity, says he wants peace by finally agreeing to meet Zelenskyy, but only on the condition that they meet in Moscow. Unacceptable.
In the opposite corner, 36 countries have assembled a ‘coalition of the willing’ over the last six months, to develop a multiformat military device with the aim of securing Ukrainian territory following the peace deal. This unprecedented and laudable initiative, in which President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer have invested heavily, reached maturity on 4 September (see EUROPE 13702/12). Levels of commitment vary from one country to the next and the United States is not on board, but may offer a ‘safety net’, according to a comment made by Trump over the telephone. The official affirmation ‘we are ready’ makes it sound as though there will be peace next week. Russia, which is slowly gaining ground, has one decisive advantage: the number of troops who can be mobilised. This was a decisive factor in bringing both world wars to an end. But this time, the American troops won’t be coming. But should the coalition possibly go beyond its current remit to save Ukraine from disaster? One further act of ambiguity. As things stand, the European Union is preparing new sanctions against Russia and its allies, no doubt with customs tariffs as its weapon of choice (see EUROPE 13703/20).
In its attempts to deal with the genocide underway in Gaza for the last several months, the European Union has completely failed. Its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, said this out loud on 3 September (see EUROPE 13701/6). There was no shortage of official verbal indignation, but political dialogue did not bring about sufficient humanitarian improvements and the option of sanctions, even in a limited form, failed to attract anything approaching a consensus (see EUROPE 13701/6). For this reason, the high number of ministerial meetings will have given the impression of hypocrisy and, in the eyes of the world, the Council of the EU bears some of the responsibility in the continued genocide. This powerlessness may be put down to the rule of unanimity at the Council, but none of the capital cities has stood up and shouted ‘enough!’ The member states that are the most sensitive to the drama unfolding have therefore taken national emergency measures. This may save their honour, but not that of the EU which, in the matter at hand, has none.
On the subject of humanitarian matters, although the Commission pays for many lines of emergency aid, as regularly reported on by our bulletin, it must be stressed that the money currently being sent to Libya is enabling criminal acts. On 24 August, the ship ‘Ocean Viking’, which had just saved 47 people from drowning (most of whom had fled Sudan), was fired upon with real bullets dozens of times by the Libyan coast guard. The organisation that owns the ship, ‘SOS Mediterranean’, complained and called upon the EU to block payments to Libya (see EUROPE 13703/5). How will the Commission respond?
In the inner life of the European Union, there are many cases of ambiguity as well: the policy of legislative simplification, which is effectively partial deregulation, as it exempts certain players from certain legal obligations, the exact status of the safeguard clause added to the EU-Mercosur agreement (see EUROPE 13701/1), a timetable for the adoption of the climate objective 2040 (see EUROPE 13701/18), the reasons for the adoption of the fine on Google following the weekly meeting of the College of European Commissioners (see EUROPE 13703/11), the game being played by the EPP at the European Parliament (see EUROPE 13698/1), to name but a few.
‘If you set aside ambiguity, it is always to your own detriment’: this quotation, frequently attributed to President Mitterrand, actually originates from Cardinal de Retz. It may have been true in his day, but it is certainly not the case in our democracies.
Renaud Denuit