De kolonisten van de Wetstraat
The title, which takes its inspiration from the board game “Settlers of Catan”, hides a well-documented investigation into the funding system of Belgian and European political parties. This investigation takes the reader the full length of the rue de la Loi in Brussels, from the country’s federal and Flemish parliaments to the European quarter. The book highlights the enormous disparity between the rules in place in the Belgian system and the European framework, the latter being far more restrictive, although there is still room for improvement.
The authors, political scientists and researchers, remind the reader that public funding (federal, regional or infra-regional) has been the main source of income for political parties for some 30 years. The public funding system, originally designed to put an end to opaque and often criminal practices, has become a veritable cash cow (or “goose that lays golden eggs”, which is the expression selected by the authors) for the Belgian parties. This is so much the case that subsidies in Belgium are twice as high per number of voters as in France or Spain and as much as three times higher than in the Netherlands.
In total, public subsidies (78.3 million euros) represented 77.8% of the Belgian parties’ income in 2022. They topped up this income mainly out of amounts paid by the MPs (or deducted directly by the institutions from their allowances, to be paid into the accounts of their respective parties) to the tune of 11.4 million, or 11.3% of the parties’ income. Membership fees accounted for just 3.9% and donations 0.2%, with the rest coming from financial or real-estate investments, as Belgian’s “rentier parties” have had plenty of time to build up their savings over the years, allowing them to invest it. They are no longer under any pressure to recruit new members, as is the case in the Netherlands, where a proportion of public funding is proportionate to the number of activists, or Germany (but which is also the case at European level), where it is proportionate to the level of private funding.
Belgian’s seven parliaments (the authors arrive at the figure of nine, by differentiating between the two assemblies of the federal parliament and adding the Cocof, as the Commission of the French-Speaking Community, which is more like a French-speaking section of the government and the Brussels parliament, is commonly known: Ed) cost 586.2 million euros (2021 figures). They are the bodies that are primarily responsible for the payment of public subsidies and the income deducted from the MPs’ allowances. In other words, nearly one-sixth of the expenses of the parliamentary system is used to maintain the kingdom’s political parties.
The high level and predictability of subsidies for a period of five years – as Belgian holds its general elections, as it did on 9 June 2024 (at the same time as the European elections), for all of its parliaments at the same time, with the communal elections to be held in October of this year – almost make it possible for the parties to spend without keeping a count. This makes the Belgian parties the “absolute champions of spending on Facebook” and social media, the authors stress (our translation throughout).
The subsidies paid to the political parties have also benefited from being indexed and have therefore increased considerably over the last 30 years, while campaign costs have been governed by the law, were not indexed and have fallen considerably as all of the election campaigns have been grouped together. This means that “the wealthiest [parties] take an increasing share of their income from the yield on their assets. Their investments generate interest and dividends and their real estate can be rented out. This creates a financial snowball effect”, the authors observe. By this means, the net assets of the Belgian political parties have risen from 66 million euros in 1999 to 166 million in 2022. In the long term, the return on the capital could even grow larger than the public subsidies, the authors calculate, going so far as to predict that the parties would “no longer need anyone to vote for them to continue to exist”.
In the section devoted to the European institutions, the authors explain that the funding system is far more compartmentalised. The European political parties, for instance, are funded by the national parties that belong to them and receive European subsidies, subject to certain conditions. However, there is a growing divide between them and the political groups, which are financed through the European Parliament. Similarly, foundations, although linked to the parties, benefit from European subsidies, but may not receive funding from or transfer funds to political parties and groups.
Each year, the general budget earmarks an envelope to pay for the European political parties. This has constantly increased since it was created in 2004 (9.7 million euros) to stand at 57.2 million in 2019. This envelope is divided up between the recognised political parties, 10% being divided equally and the remaining 90% on a pro-rata basis of the number of members of the European Parliament who are members of the party. The political groups are funded out of the budget of the European Parliament, which makes annual provision for an amount to be used for this purpose: 66 million in 2023. 2.5% of this amount is divided equally between the groups and remaining 97.5% on the basis of their respective sizes. Finally, the foundations shared 23 million euros between them in 2023, on the basis of the same model as that of the parties. (Olivier Jehin)
Bart Maddens, Jef Smulders, Gunther Vandeneynde, Wouter Wolfs. De kolonisten van de Wetstraat – Partijfinanciering in België en de EU (available in Dutch only). Ertsberg. ISBN: 978-9-4647-5071-3. 279 pages. €29,95
The Rise of the Far Right in Europe
“We constantly hear in public discourse about the negative impacts of the rise of the far right or democracy. However, we haven’t heard any self-criticism, nor a whisper of the real causes that drive electoral behaviour to the edges of the political axis, since the neoliberal governments are so successful that they can’t justify why citizens are giving to their vote characteristics of negative expression and protest”, Victoria Pistikou (Democritus University of Thrace) writes in this opinion piece published in the electronic newsletter of the Centre for European Affairs of the University of Nicosia.
Because “if someone believed that citizens turned out fascists or anti-democrats would be at least naive”. In fact, this would be quite simply impossible, as “the majority of people are trained from a young age to be faithful to principles like freedom and democracy”, the author argues. Europe’s continued loss of orientation regarding integration and stagnation in the economic and political sector are fuelling the rise of the far right, Pistikou argues, stressing that “economic instability, inflation and unemployment with the failure of traditional parties to address issues, have driven voters to seek alternatives in the far-right wing”. And whilst, according to Eurostat, the Eurozone is in the midst of another recession, the “constant excuse from European governments is that the war in Ukraine is to blame”. These same governments have failed to “provide a convincing answer as to why the EU did not protect its energy independence”.
There is much discussion about the participation of European forces on the side of Ukraine; “meanwhile, the genocide of Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh is underway with Turkey’s blessings”, the author states, adding that “it is still a question on why European partners pressure Greece, in the name of solidarity, to send vital and crucial military equipment to Ukraine, while at the same time Spain is equipping Turkey’s war industry, which in turn bolsters the violations of Greek national airspace”.
Pistikou then opens up discussion on the “elephant in the room”: the national interests that shape – or not – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP). “As long as the neoliberal governments tend to ignore that the behaviour of states is governed and determined by national interest and power, reality will continue to prove them wrong. But this requires a self-criticism and the acknowledgement that must be a shift towards a more realistic framework of cooperation, without the cover of integration, solidarity, and other fairytales”, the author writes.
She concludes by saying that “if the mandate of European citizens is for less Europe, or a Europe à la carte, then the leaderships, if they respect popular sovereignty, should adopt policies that move away from integration (…). If the benefits of European integration are not reaching its citizens, Europe should search deeper than enhancing its communicative skills”.
In another article, Yannos Katsourides stresses that while the formation of a far-right ‘supergroup’ of the European Parliament appears improbable, the rise in extremes “will significantly affect both the internal political dynamics of member states and the functioning of European institutions, which are already experiencing problems and face intense criticism”. “They will have the power to veto crucial decisions inflicting serious negative consequences on issues such as immigration, LGBTQ+ and transgender rights, foreign policy, etc. For instance, we can expect stricter immigration policies and a further weakening of the European Green Deal. Additionally, there may be diminished support for protecting minority rights and sanctioning the liberal governments within the EU”, Katsourides argues.
Entitled “The EU at a Crossroad”, this edition of the quarterly newsletter In Depth also contains a series of articles on current geopolitical issues. (OJ)
Victoria Pistikou. The Rise of the Far Right in Europe. In Depth, Volume 21, issue 2, May 2024. The electronic newsletter of the Centre for European and International Affairs of the University of Nicosia can be downloaded free of charge from the Centre’s website: https://aeur.eu/f/ckz