The aim of both the ‘Letta’ project and the ‘Macron’ version is to organise ‘Greater Europe’. In the former case, the number of countries is limited to 36, but the latter goes much further. If we invite the United Kingdom to join, can we exclude Turkey (which still holds candidate status), Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein (all three of which are members of the European Economic Area)? And what about the exemplary democracy that is Switzerland? That brings us to 41 already.
The ‘Greater European’ institution is the Council of Europe. At the time of writing, it no longer counts Russia (see EUROPE 12912/4) and Belarus (see EUROPE 12913/11) among its members. It has in its possession all the necessary logistical infrastructure. Would it be a useful idea to add an intermediate layer (a new ‘thingamajig’, as the man in the street might say) between it and the EU? With its current count of 46 member countries, it includes all the 41 listed above plus three European micro-states (Andorra, Monaco and San Marino) and just two countries that are geographically non-European (Armenia and Azerbaijan).
One might point out that the ‘European Political Community’ will be made up of heads of state or government, while the Council of Europe meets at ministerial level. This is not in fact quite the case: there have been three summits of heads of state or government of the Council of Europe: in Vienna in October 1993, in Strasbourg in October 1997 and in Warsaw in May 2005. There is no reason this pace could not be picked up. Admittedly, the central mission of the Council of Europe is to defend law and democracy, but the merest glance at its website reveals a far broader range of actions: culture, education, youth, migration, health, artificial intelligence, cyber-crime, money laundering, etc... Certainly, it has no competence in the fields of military, energy or transport, but the heads of state or government remain in charge of their agenda.
And is this concept of ‘Community’ even relevant? As we have previously seen, it implies a treaty on institutional structure. And that’s where things start to get hazy.
President Macron’s proposal was initially met with a frosty welcome from Kiyv and other actual or potential candidate countries, amid concerns that it was simply a delaying tactic to slow their progress towards EU accession, a kind of consolation prize. On 18 May, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for the creation of a ‘European geopolitical Community’ (wording that was subsequently abandoned), to be headed up by the heads of state or government meeting at least twice a year. This Community would not be a substitute for enlargement, but nor would it be any kind of guarantee of one day becoming a member of the EU (see EUROPE 12955/24). Two days later, the leaders of Serbia and Albania gave their blessing to the idea of the ‘European political Community’ (see EUROPE 12957/26).
Also in May, the Jacques Delors Institute (known by its French acronym, IJD) published an extremely interesting reflection piece entitled ‘The European Political Community: A new anchoring to the European Union’. Its authors, Thierry Chopin, Lukás Macek and Sébastien Maillard – all of whom have links to IJD, but write here expressing their personal views – observed that to date, participation in the political dimension of the EU comes about only at the end of lengthy accession negotiations based on stringent legal and economic criteria. The advantage of the proposed EPC would be to turn this logic on its head. Those joining it would have the benefit of immediate political participation whilst enjoying a guarantee of becoming part of the EU one day (unless they change their minds), but without necessarily knowing when. This idea of a guarantee runs counter to Michel’s idea.
However, the authors recommend the following three conditions to be able to join the Community: “the country must be on the European continent, under the same conditions required for the EU, must fully comply with the first of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ and ratify the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [the last of these in bold print in the text], which expresses the EU’s common values and is binding for the candidate country”. Readers may recall that the first Copenhagen Criterion is: ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’. As for the Charter, this is ratified only via the Lisbon Treaty, while Poland has a derogation (as does the United Kingdom, but it is no longer bound by it anyway since Brexit). It should therefore, according to the authors of the reflection, be ratified by all States, whether or not they aspire to join the EU.
In mid-0June, it emerged that the ‘Macron’ plan was attracting a lot of attention and would be on the agenda of the European Council. The French Presidency submitted a one-page non-paper to Coreper to clarify its intentions. ‘The European Political Community would be open to European states sharing a pillar of democratic values, whether or not they are members of the European Union and irrespective of the nature of their current relationship with the European Union: whether they wish to join it, whether they have left it, whether they have no plans to join and are connected to it only by economic agreements. The Community would not replace the Council of Europe, the OSCE or the transatlantic relationship’.
The aim, then, was indeed to create a new, non-specialised entity, which would have a far broader range of competencies than set out in Macron’s speech of 9 May. It would not be a substitute for the enlargement process, but would reinforce ties prior to accession. Organisationally, it would ‘take the form of a light legal structure with decision-making capacity, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of the European Union in each of the States making up this Community. It would meet several times a year at the level of heads of state or government as well as at ministerial level’. The text attracted consensus approval (see EUROPE 12972/9). The absence of any parliamentary dimension and vagueness as to its legal structure are worthy of note.
At the European Council 23-24 June, the EPC was approved in extremely general terms, as a ‘platform for political coordination of European countries across the continent’, which ‘could concern all European countries with whom we have close relations’, the objective being to ‘strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent’. It would, furthermore, ‘fully respect the European Union’s decision-making autonomy’ and ‘not replace existing EU policies and instruments, notably enlargement’ (see EUROPE 12979/4). Not a word did the European Council conclusions contain about its legal status.
The Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU has put the EPC on the agenda of a special summit to be held in Prague on 6 and 7 October, to be attended by all interested countries (see EUROPE 12983/31). As far as we know at this stage, the new Community will take the form of an enlarged European Council, probably to be chaired by Charles Michel. Kosovo, which is still not recognised by five member states of the EU, will be an interesting case to keep an eye on.
It is clear that the ‘Council of Europe’ option has been rejected and that along with the OSCE, there will be a third ‘institution’ representing ‘Greater Europe’. The term ‘Confederation’ was not given consideration either. For clarity, the new entity might take the name ‘European Geopolitical Area’ (the political arm of the EEA, but with different participants), political forum/alliance/association of European democracies… forget it!
In an effort to explain Europe to its citizens, tens of thousands of educators, conference members, journalists and other figures in the debate go all out to explain that the Council of Europe is not the same thing as the European Council or the European Union, that the ministers of the former meet in committee while the ministers of the latter meet in council, that the Council of the EU is not the same thing as the European Council (even though they are both part of the EU), that the European Research Council has nothing to do with the European Council, that the Commission is not the same thing as the Council, but that one of the Commission’s vice-presidents chairs some of the meetings of the Council, that the Commission is involved in the European Council but without voting rights and the European Union replaced the Europe of Communities. They should add that the term ‘Community’ has recently re-emerged, but this time, outside the European Union and possibly in addition to it and that the new ‘European Political Community’, which is also unconnected to the Council of Europe, is not to be confused with the ‘European Political Community’ that was once under consideration, even though they both have exactly the same name and both aim to bring about the political unity of Europe, albeit with entirely different institutional systems.
They shouldn’t be too surprised when the citizens drift further away from Europe, simply because they find it impenetrable.
Making the European institutions understandable in the choice of words is further confirmation of the lack of imagination on the part of their leaders, who seem to have forgotten the sage counsel of Albert Camus: ‘to name things wrongly is to add to the misfortune of the world’.
Renaud Denuit.