The fourth month of this year is a particularly good one for national elections. In Hungary on the third, bringing to a close a highly anticipated and greatly observed election campaign, the coalition of the incumbent prime minister, Viktor Orbán, won a two-thirds majority to the national assembly (see EUROPE 12926/15). The 24th will see both general elections in Slovenia and the second round of the presidential elections in France.
This Sunday just gone, the first round of the vote allowed the French electorate to make their choice between 12 candidates, half of whom were sovereignist and the other half in favour of the European Union, more or less. The population’s growing disillusionment with politics and its major players was confirmed. More than one in every four voters stayed away from the polling stations. The many, many people who rejected the principle of the vote are effectively giving their blessing to a society in which nobody votes at all. The incumbent President, Emmanuel Macron, and the Rassemblement National candidate, Marine Le Pen, came first and second, with 27.6% and 23.4% of the votes respectively. The Republican Right and the Socialist party came nowhere. A new campaign will now begin for the next fortnight: European issues will no doubt be a much greater feature than in the first round.
Mr Macron’s positions and actions with regard to the EU are very familiar to our readers. Ms Le Pen’s merit a closer look. Having previously run in the presidential elections in 2017, she was asked what her first initiative would be in the event of her taking up office and she replied that she would go to Brussels to bring back France’s sovereignty. She also argued the case for a return to the French franc and a common currency, publicly getting tangled up over the au modus operandi of this farewell to the euro.
The ‘Le Pen 2022’ vintage is no longer questioning the euro, but what about the European Union? On the candidate’s official website, readers may find her ‘presidential programme’ (a summary of her manifesto) and 17 thematic booklets. None of these concerns international issues (even though such matters take up 50% of the President of the Republic’s time) or macroeconomic and monetary policy. Only the dossier on Defence, which focuses on rearmament and the reconstruction of France as a power, sheds any light on her intentions: ‘withdrawal from the integrated command of NATO, discussions on a new strategic agreement with the United States, dialogue with Russia on major common dossiers, phase-out of structuring cooperation initiatives with Germany, new phase of dialogue on the entente cordiale with the British’ (p. 6), and more. Strategic partnerships will be consolidated, or created, with Cyprus, Greece, Hungary and Serbia (p. 12) – and that’s just Europe. France’s global diplomacy will be based on its overseas territories (which will be re-armed), the French-speaking countries, its network of embassies and its seat on the United Nations Security Council, which it will never agree to share. Not a word about any kind of reflection on multilateralism.
In the ‘presidential programme’ itself, under the title ‘Putting France back into the concert of the nations’, we read that this aim will be achieved on two fronts: the French-speaking world (particularly in Africa) and the ‘creation of a European Alliance of Nations, the aim of which will be to take over gradually from the European Union. This Europe of free and sovereign nations, assuming its thousand-year heritage, will be one of cooperation and will serve to put an end to the plans of those who wish to see the European Union made into a federalist super-State loaded with ideology’ (p. 19). Reading Le Pen’s text is time well spent: we know what we are up against.
The risks of a rise to power of the far right (which enjoys a long tradition in France) unquestionably lies in its overtly xenophobic and repressive policy line. But there is also the question of respecting commitments enshrined in the treaties as well as the quality of France’s representation in major international bodies. Ms Penn has made it known that she will not attend NATO summits. But how will she conduct herself, how will she be seen at the European Council, at the G7, the G20, the COP, transatlantic summits? Her skills of rhetoric and negotiating abilities will not necessarily work wonders. In particular, against the current backdrop of a terrible war, will she shore up European and Western solidarity with Ukraine – about which not a word is written in her manifesto – and against the abominable Russian regime?
Let us touch upon the way her presidential campaigns were paid for. In 2017, Marine Le Pen obtained a loan from a Russian bank; no doubt it was the merest coincidence that on 24 March, a few weeks ahead of the first round, she visited the Kremlin and received a very warm welcome. This time round, she has taken out a loan for more than 10 million euros with the Hungarian bank MKB, the main shareholder of which has close links to Viktor Orbán.
The cordial relationship between Putin and Orbán is no secret. In the middle of the public health crisis, Orbán notoriously ordered doses of the new Russia vaccine Sputnik V, a move hailed by Le Pen in a gushing tweet (see EUROPE 12662/1). Orbán won the general elections in his country by a large margin for at least two reasons: having the media under his control, which diminished the public expression of the united opposition, and the idea that a Budapest-Moscow axis would keep the country safe from war. The referendum on protecting children from LGBT ideology, on the other hand, which was invalidated due to insufficient turnout, was a failure for Hungary’s master.
Putin officially congratulated Orbán on his election victory, stressing plans to develop bilateral contacts. The Hungarian president is currently refusing to supply arms to Ukraine and is making much of its role as mediator between the warring parties, but is lining up behind the Kremlin’s wishes to be paid in rubles for gas from Russia. “Viktor, you need to decide which side you’re on!”, President Zelenskyy told him. Is Orbán reporting back to Putin on the negotiations of the European Council? The institution will need to tread carefully.
The Slovenian political scene and its current leader have already been described in this column (see EUROPE 12750/1 and 12751/1). The general elections are just around the corner and the outcome is anybody’s guess.
The party (SDS) of the Prime Minister, Janez Janša, is ahead in the opinion polls, but the green, libertarian Freedom Movement (GS) has enjoyed a meteoric rise in the country, winning second place; it is followed by the Social Democrats, whose popularity is on the wane, and a slew of minor political groups. The creations, mergers and de-mergers between political parties in Slovenia are difficult to follow, to say the least. Incidentally, Janša is increasingly under fire from civil society and the press, which criticise him for his authoritarian and xenophobic tendencies and his poor performance in tackling corruption. Assuming that he is asked once again to form a government, his three current partners may not have enough seats to put together a majority. If this happens, who out of the current opposition would accept his leadership? An admirer of Orbán (particularly over his bringing the media to heel), Janša is nonetheless playing the game of the institutional framework of the EU, as we saw during the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2021. Yet there are some who consider that Slovenia is moving towards and illiberal regime. The importance of the elections of 24 April derives partly from the context created by the other two.
If Marine Le Pen accedes to the Presidency of France and Janez Janša is comfortably re-elected, Orbán, who is currently fairly isolated in the EU since he alienated Poland, will have new allies to count on. Other sovereignist populists from across the continent would draw great confidence from this. In the worst-case scenario, the EU would fall apart, initially legally and in terms of its values. Internal borders would make their great comeback. Another Europe would emerge. A Europe lacking the military power of France. A Europe with no geopolitical weight.
And nothing would please Mr Putin more.
Renaud Denuit