It is only natural that national elections concern national issues and only rarely do they play out over foreign policy matters. The personality of the candidates is of major importance. On the evening of election day, as we saw again last Sunday, senior politicians – winners and losers – were the stars of the small screen. As soon as the results were announced, speculation over the configuration of the new German government began.
But as Germany is the most powerful country in Europe, some journalists, with greater or lesser degrees of anxiety, raised the small matter of the consequences of the results for the European Union, or the Franco-German duo. In the worst-case scenario, the day-to-day life of the Union would be hobbled until such time as the new Chancellor takes up office. This kind of doom-mongering seems to have no basis; it is quite simply not borne out by experience, with several previous negotiations having taken a very long time. The only way the pause button would be pressed is if Germany were holding the six-month Presidency of the Council.
The elections of 26 September were more important than their recent predecessors, due to Angela Merkel’s decision to leave politics. Dramatising this fact, certain observers predicted a “crossroads” in German European policy. Do they have a point?
As negotiations to put together a majority in the Bundestag will no doubt take time, the CDU-SPD government will continue to act as caretaker, led by somebody who knows the score. Other than that, should we expect major changes on European soil?
Firstly, the far-right and far-left parties took losses, which is not to be underestimated as the government parties will not be tempted to win back voters by selling out to nationalist forces in a manner that is incompatible with proper inter-state dealings within the EU and, indeed, with the EU’s values. Secondly, there is a long tradition of association not only between the CDU and SPD, but also between the Greens and the Liberals (FDP) – which have been part of federal coalitions going back 20 years – in favour of steadfastly pro-European action. Thirdly, the difference in priorities or emphasis compared to the past will surely make itself felt. A CDU-FDP-Greens coalition, already attempted four years ago, is highly unlikely at this point in time. The SPD won the elections and is legitimately taking its place as the coalition-maker; its principal ally is the Greens. This gives rise to expectations of more social options and, without doubt, more decisive action for the climate. The number one question will be whether Germany will rejoin the “frugal” countries’ camp or will remain a more philosophical player in the recovery plan. The FDP, the necessary third partner, will have to show greater flexibility in this regard, if it wants the team to work.
Germany will have a new Chancellor who will certainly be from the West of the country. This is a major change in its own right. Angela Merkel was able to keep Viktor Orbán, and the leaders of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in some kind of check and succeeded in not reawakening anti-German sentiment in Poland. Admittedly, this was guided largely by economic considerations, but also by the deeply rooted identity of a child of the East. But as relations between the institutions of the EU and the illiberal states are sliding out of control, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the next Chancellor will adopt a tougher stance towards those states. This may usher forth the greatest change of all.
Olaf Scholz has experience in a federal ministerial position, which would exclude any tendency towards a lack of realism; in the outgoing government, in which he served as Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister, he was able to contribute to Germany’s European policy, as expressed, for instance, in the programme of the country’s recent Presidency of the Council, which had the whole of the government behind it.
There remains the question of the quality of the Franco-German pairing, in which the “chemistry” between leaders is of greater importance than it is in other contexts. This relationship between leaders can work very well, even if they are of different political stripes. During the current period and beyond, once the new Chancellor is in office, Emmanuel Macron will not have to go to too much trouble to adapt. From Merkel to Scholz, the President, a centrist, will have another centrist to deal with. Could this favourable configuration be considered sustainable?
With seven months to go until the French presidential elections, it would seem incautious to make too many predictions. The opinion polls could of course be wrong, but it is undeniable that if they all repeatedly reach the same conclusion, this provides a useful basis for an assessment. The President has a public confidence rating of 40% (currently 46%), which is far higher than his two predecessors at the same point in their respective terms in office. He would have to make some very expensive mistakes in the next few months not to come out of the first round of the election with at least 25% of votes cast. In all current scenarios, he will lead at the end of the first round. The other person who could qualify for the second round would be the nationalist candidate (Marine Le Pen), unless the right-wing candidate in the best position as of current, Xavier Bertrand, overtakes her by a nose. What is certain is that there is no left-wing or Green candidate who could make it through to the second round. It is possible to conclude that the re-election of Emmanuel Macron is the most likely scenario. In this event, the continuation of excellent Franco-German cooperation would be secured, something that none of the other candidates (and certainly not Ms Le Pen) would be able to deliver, lacking the appropriate experience.
The Conference on the Future of Europe will not be a launchpad for a second term in office of the French President, but the ideas that emerge from it publicly may guide France’s European priorities, as approved by both the European citizens and the French voting public in April of next year.
The benefit of continuity in Berlin and Paris would then be the ability to carry out very swift discussions and to move forward with initiatives that will, it is to be hoped, be bold and will flush out the positions of the more conservative.
Renaud Denuit