Renovatio Europae
The result of a research project developed at the Instytut Zachodni in Poznan, this work, which was published in March 2020, brings together many conservative voices around the principal theme of values and cultural identity and sets itself the task of sketching out a “conservative alternative for Europe”. Europe is pluralist and all the positions expressed in the work deserve a place in this column. In this particular case, it has the merit of being a collection of contributions that perfectly illustrate the socio-cultural gulf that runs through all our societies, although it is possible to identify a more conservative central and eastern Europe than a Western Europe that can be described as progressive.
The Belgian historian David Engels kicks things off by stressing that “only solidarity between citizens can steer the continent through the imminent years of crisis and decline, for which Europeans are entirely to blame” (our translation throughout). “But without a common identity, there is no way of creating this social cohesion and the recent migration crisis has taught us that this ‘identity’ cannot be built solely on a foundation of humanist and universalist values, but needs to be rooted more deeply in the cultural, historical and spiritual subconsciousness of a past that has been shared for centuries, i.e. in the values that are generally known as conservative”, argues the author, who is best known for his book “Le déclin”, published in 2012. In that work, which uses the analogy of the end of the Roman Empire, Engels foretold for Europe a future of crises and civil wars that could be ended only through a strong regime, in this case embodied in personal power. In this latest opus, he recommends a European political integration that takes its inspiration from the mediaeval federal formats of the Holy Roman Empire or the first “Rzeczpospolita Polska”. This integration would be “based on respect for our shared past in order to face the shared challenges of today and tomorrow, but without obliterating local, regional and national traditions and identities under the joint weight of multiculturalism, individualism, turbo-capitalism and globalisation”, explains Engels, who dubs this new political ideology “hesperialism”.
“In practice, remodelling the European Union on the basis of the example of its predecessors would entail allocating it only the political competences that are strictly necessary for the long-term institutional survival and cultural perpetuation of Europe, while all other echelons of power – national, regional or communal – would retain as much autonomy as possible, so as to allow them to shape their own destiny in accordance with their own rules and traditions”, the author continues, even though he acknowledges that a system of this kind would inevitably bring forth forms of competition between federated entities, in a scenario he describes as “creative chaos”. This would be temporary, because the European states would naturally end up “assimilating others and harmonising their respective institutions”. The attachment to the nation-state is offset, according to Engels, by a genuine clarity: “while the nation-states would be strengthened as vital foundation elements of a reborn European Union, one would have to acknowledge that the nation-state – in view of the emergence of China, India or Brazil, the chaos in Africa, radicalisation in the Middle East, the instability of relations with Russia and the uncertainty around the future involvement of the United States in Europe – cannot face these challenges alone, particularly as the days of Europe’s technological and economic superiority over the rest of the world are long gone”.
The neo-Roman Imperial model described by Engels would comprise: (a) a two-chamber system (European Parliament and European Council) which, like the Diet of the Holy Empire, would hold only limited legislative powers based on consensus or at least a two-thirds majority; (b) a President elected by universal suffrage (Engels reminds us that the Holy Roman Emperor was initially elected by free men), who would represent the European Union at the United Nations Security Council (on the basis of a federalisation of the French seat) and command the operations of the European forces; as a mediator of conflicts within the Union, he or she would chair a court of arbitration; (c) seven secretaries of state, elected by the Parliament, whose individual portfolios would correspond to the EU’s own competences and replacing the European Commission, which would be dissolved. These competences would be as follows: (1) defence, with a European army that would be “made up, in peace time, by a hub of European units, supported by fixed contingents from various nation-states and with nuclear capability”, whose missions would involve protecting the borders on the south and east of the EU and intervening outside the continent; in the longer term, the aim would be to “ensure that all European member states become members of NATO, where they will be represented by a joint defence secretary, and to guarantee better symmetry between Europe and the United States within that organisation”; (2) the police, with a view to stepping up the fight against organised crime and terrorism, which would entail reinforcing Europol and Frontex; (3) transport infrastructure; (4) legal harmonisation, in connection with worker mobility; (5) strategic resources (sustainable energy, food production, industrial autonomy); (6) education (mobility of students) and research; (7) finances and the euro.
This rough sketch of the EU’s institutional evolution, though somewhat sloppy in my view, is without question the most interesting part of this work, which teems with references to the nation-state, seen in many cases as the impermeable boundary of politics, and the philosophical and theological concepts of “state of nature” and “natural law”, which are both bandied about in the greatest confusion. Readers may recall that state of nature refers to the self-centred exercise of one’s own freedom by each, within a permanent power balance, otherwise known as “the war of all against all” (Hobbes). As for natural law, this is made up of universal principles imposed on all, everywhere and at all times, dictated by reason or by God. It thus exposes us to all excesses, however extreme, of those who claim to interpret a higher and/or divine will. As imperfect as it is, it is my view that positive law remains the mechanism that does the best job of protecting individuals and human societies. Intending no disrespect to Alvino-Mario Fantini, his highly nostalgic contribution, which is marked by a most traditionalist form of Catholicism, goes so far as to refer to “natural marriage”! Nature recognises only coupling and in law, marriage boils down to a contract. It is a sacrament only for the Catholic Church. There is nothing natural or universal about it, but that does not detract from the beauty of the promise given freely by the future spouses, wherever in the world they are. (Olivier Jehin)
David Engels (edited by). Renovatio Europae – Plaidoyer pour un renouve au hespérialiste de l’Europe (available in French only. Les éditions du Cerf. ISBN: 978-2-204-14035-5. 232 pages. €22,00
La création du Parquet européen
This monograph does the useful job of presenting both the genesis of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, taking us through the negotiation phase of Regulation 2017/1939 (in the framework of a reinforced cooperation between 22 member states: all but Hungary, Poland, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark) and the selection of the first European public prosecutor, Romania’s Laura Codruta Kövesi, but also its implementation (with the cases of Belgium and Italy) and its relations with Europol, Eurojust and Olaf. The publication of this work, which raises the question as to whether the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is a genuine revolution, paving the way for a certain federalisation of criminal justice, or is simply a more modest evolution, coincides with the office, which is located in Luxembourg, becoming operational.
As Constance Chevallier-Govers, a lecturer at the Faculty of Law at Université Grenoble-Alpes, points out, “the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office shows the emergence of a shared enforcement power”. It “launches and directs investigations, brings proceedings, but the national jurisdictions retain the right to judge and punish on the basis of the criminal law of that state”, she adds, going on to stress that “imperium (‘the power to use force’) and jurisdictio (‘the power to bring justice’) remain in the hands of the member states, but are at the service of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (…). No material enforcement power that can materialise in operational powers has been given to the office, just a non-material enforcement power, which is a form of revolution in itself”.
Louise Seiler looks at the prospects of seeing the material competences of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office extended, for instance to cross-border terrorist acts, as called for by the European Commission in its communication of 12 September 2018. Such an extension is compromised, as it would require the unanimous agreement of all member states, including the five which are not participating in the reinforced cooperation, the author explains, referring to article 86, paragraphs 1 (competence related to the protection of the financial interests of the EU) to 4 (extending its powers unanimously) TFEU. However, Seiler foresees a plethora of potential extensions on the basis of a broader interpretation of the financial interests of the EU. This could include protecting the European currency, for instance against counterfeiting, policing attacks on the integrity of the financial markets or money-laundering, which is a source of funding for terrorism and organised crime, and would indirectly allow the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to play a key role in the fight against these two phenomena. (OJ)
Constance Chevallier-Govers and Anne Weyembergh (edited by). La création du Parquet européen – Simple évolution ou révolution au sein de l’espace judiciaire européen? (Available in French only). Bruylant. ISBN: 978-2-8027-6840-1. 442 pages. €85,00
Politiques publiques et personnes âgées dépendantes
In the latest edition of the Revue de l’Union européenne, Anne Meyer-Heine (IEP Aix-en-Provence) looks at the public policies of the member states of the EU as regards care for the dependent elderly. She observes that allowing seniors to remain at home is a priority objective in many EU countries, but that its implementation varies considerably from one country to the next. Sweden, which was one of the first countries to have to deal with an ageing population, stated its intention as long ago as the 1940s of “allowing seniors to remain at home as far as possible rather than live in an institution, so as to offer them a more familiar and comfortable environment and allow them to continue to participate in community life” (our translation throughout). From the late 1970s, Denmark and, more recently, the Netherlands also developed policies of allowing the elderly to remain at home. In Denmark, a law in 1987 prohibited the construction of new retirement homes and less than 4% of people aged 65 and above live in a residence offering nursing care, while 20% of homes have been adapted to allow seniors to remain there. In the opposite corner, adapted housing rates are relatively low in France and Germany and very low in Italy and Spain. Meyer-Heine concludes that “in the European Union today, it is time to articulate a genuine public policy around structures and professionals who, by supporting families and local assistance, would allow older people a genuine choice as to where they live”. (OJ)
Anne Meyer-Heine. Politiques publiques et personnes âgées dépendantes : priorité au maintien à domicile au sein de l’Union européenne (available in French only). Revue de l’Union européenne no. 647 – April 2021. Dalloz. €59,09
Souveränismus als Vorwand
In this article, which was published in the review Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, the journalist Gregor Mayer deciphers the system of corruption hidden behind the façade of Ordan-style sovereignism. In it, he describes how the clientele of the Hungarian regime and the Orban family took advantage of the pandemic to increase the number of public contracts awarded fraudulently, usually without even being put out to any kind of tender process. The review also contains an interesting article by Thomas Brey on the revisionism and instrumentalisation of history for nationalist and populist purposes in the Balkans. (OJ)
Gregor Mayer. Souveränismus als Vorwand – Viktor Orbans Ringen mit dem europäischen Projekt (available in German only). Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 01/2021. ISSN: 0340-174X. 112 pages. €15,00