Christophe Hansen (Luxembourg, EPP) is co-rapporteur with Kati Piri (Netherlands, S&D) on the future partnership with the United Kingdom, specifically for the trade agreement. While the committees responsible for the substance (INTA/AFET) will vote on their report on 12 June (link to report: https://bit.ly/2YsY72X ), he reviewed the European Parliament’s main messages with EUROPE. (Interview by Solenn Paulic)
Agence Europe: The Trade and External Affairs Committees will vote on Friday on the future relationship before the 17 June plenary. What will they say?
Christophe Hansen: we will reiterate the general principles and should be supported by a large majority: Parliament wants a global agreement rather than a sectoral approach; we don't want cherry-picking, and [we want] an agreement at least equivalent to what we negotiated with Japan or Canada; we are reiterating the political declaration, and we are asking for the best possible level of cooperation to ensure, for example, that there are no physical borders on the island of Ireland.
We also want to reiterate that the Level Playing Field (LPF) is not an ideological thing: we are not insisting that the United Kingdom should copy and paste European legislation; that would be to ignore the logic of Brexit. We are well aware that the British want to be able to diverge, but we want fair competition on tax, environmental, social and other standards. British standards in all future changes must occur at the same level as those in the EU.
We do not want them to be exactly the same, and if British legislation pursues the same effects without the same rules, we can live with it. But we cannot accept a situation where, to give an example, the price per tonne of carbon would be 25 euros in the EU and 1 euro in the UK.
London complains that the EU is refusing to grant it a CETA or Japan-type agreement. Why is that not possible?
If London does not want more than the CETA, then its approach is not the right one, because we have a comprehensive agreement with Canada. Now, London wants an a la carte approach, so with regard to format, it’s already not going well. In such agreements, there are usually specific provisions on SMEs. In this case, the United Kingdom is offering nothing on this or on public procurement.
But on financial services, they are asking for much more. They want to be able to co-decide with the Commission on equivalence, which, of course, is not possible. London still says it wants recognition of professional qualifications, but it does not say which professions, and that is not in our other agreements.
And it should be stressed that no trade agreement is a copy of another; it depends largely on the location, particularly geographical location, and here, largely on proximity.
Where are the areas in which the EU will need to be particularly vigilant if London chooses to diverge?
I see potential problems in the area of State aid, where London does indeed seem to want to move away. There is also the issue of common external tariffs on products exported from non-Member States to the EU.
London has recently announced different tariffs, and this could make the controls on goods arriving in Northern Ireland a little stricter. We’ll have to be very careful.
London has begun its negotiations with the United States and is starting them with Japan. What is the potential impact on Europeans? Will there be chlorinated chicken in the EU?
These parallel negotiations are already having an influence on Britain’s focus in relation to the EU, and I wonder how it is possible to conduct three major negotiations at the same time with the same degree of concentration...
If I were British, I would concentrate on the partner with whom I have the most to lose, and that is obviously the EU. With Japan, they will not have the same conditions as what they have with the EU, which were negotiated with a large bloc. And with the United States, I do not see at all what margin and what concessions they could obtain from this large trading bloc. Under these conditions, yes, we can say that there is a real risk of products such as chlorinated chicken arriving in the EU.
That is why we insist in our report on significant border controls. We also know that the EU is setting a very high bar for protected geographical indications (PGI). However, the United States absolutely does not want to hear about this issue, and we have already had problems with them about usurping PGI, for example on wines with the ‘château’ appellation, for example. In France, it corresponds to very strict terms of reference.
The United Kingdom has committed itself to respecting PGI, but with the size of the American market, we see a potential danger.
The high-level meeting by videoconference with Boris Johnson, Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel and David Sassoli has been scheduled for Monday 15 June. How do you see it going?
I believe that pragmatism will return, and perhaps we can expect this meeting to set a different tone; perhaps we will stop taking everything to the press. We could then agree on the form of the deal. We know that the British do not want an agreement on international cooperation and defence; that’s just how it is.
As far as the method is concerned, I believe that the current 11 to 12 thematic negotiation tables are not the best approach. This does not seem to me to be conducive to moving the negotiations forward. However, an agreement must be reached by the end of October at the latest, and we also know that the British side is saying ‘no’ to extending the transition period. We have to put everything into one negotiation, and there will have to be compromises and quid pro quos on fisheries, financial services, etc.
One could also imagine transitional forms of application for the agreement after 1 January 2021, as there will undoubtedly be sectors where a period of adaptation will be needed.