Two days after the adoption by the Twenty-Seven of the European Commission's mandate for negotiations on the future relationship with the United Kingdom, the British Government in turn presented, on Thursday 27 February, its own priorities for these negotiations which will open on Monday 2 March in Brussels (see EUROPE 12433/1).
Clearly, London has decided to start this discussion offensively, already warning that the British Government could abandon the negotiations in June if it considers the state of progress of the talks to be unsatisfactory.
In its mandate, the UK authorities are also preparing the ground for a scenario of failure of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) talks by the end of the year and warning economic actors that the EU and the UK could find themselves in a relationship similar to the one between the Twenty-Seven and Australia, which is based on WTO standards alone.
Promising to seek an agreement with the EU on the basis of the October 2017 political declaration, the UK government indeed states in its mandate that "if it is not possible to negotiate a satisfactory outcome, the trade relationship with the EU will rest on the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement and will look similar to Australia's".
The Commission reacted quickly and stressed that a mid-term meeting in June was already foreseen in the Joint Declaration on future post-Brexit relations. This meeting should in fact allow both parties to see where they stand on crucial aspects such as fisheries, a sector in which the Commission wants an agreement by 1 July.
Unlike in London, however, the EU's chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has never publicly threatened to stop all negotiations with the UK which, in addition to trade issues, deal with internal and external security, if the two sides do not reach an agreement on fisheries by 1 July.
The British Mandate also recalls from the outset a general principle, already well known to the Twenty-Seven: London will not negotiate any arrangement in which the United Kingdom "does not have control of its own laws and political life". “This means that we will not accept any obligation for our laws to align with those of the EU, nor will we accept that the European institutions, including the Court of Justice, have jurisdiction in the UK”. On the other hand, "friendly cooperation" between "sovereign equals" is desired.
This principle is reiterated in the chapter on competition policy: "The agreement should commit the parties to maintain effective competition legislation, covering merger control, anti-competitive practices and antitrust, while retaining the right to provide for exemptions. This does not require legal or regulatory alignment. Both sides should have the regulatory freedom to respond to new and emerging challenges in these areas”.
So what does this 36-page British mandate say in substance? Unsurprisingly, London will seek a tariff- and quota-free agreement, similar to the EU/Canada (CETA) agreement referred to on numerous occasions.
"The agreement should provide for liberalised market access for trade in goods. Market access provisions must be comprehensive and ensure the absence of customs duties, fees, taxes and quantitative restrictions on trade in manufactured and agricultural products", the text states. And added: “As with recent EU free trade agreements, such as the EU/Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (...), [the EU/UK agreement] should facilitate trade and address non-tariff barriers for UK exports to the EU (such as import and export licensing restrictions) and vice versa”.
On services, the mandate further stipulates that services and investment provisions should be based on the recent free trade agreements the EU has signed with Canada or Japan, and could build on previous offers made to other non-Member State partners. The agreement should promote the liberalisation of trade in services and investment and create the basis for the future development of trade in services.
On financial services, London does not contest the choice of equivalence made by the EU, but would like to see structures put in place to assess the conditions for the possible withdrawal of such equivalence.
The crucial issue of fisheries
This is an area that is set to quickly become 'explosive'. As it has already announced, the United Kingdom wants to become an independent coastal state again and, according to the United Kingdom, it is only on the basis of annual agreements that fishing opportunities in British and European waters would be decided.
The EU Member States, for their part, want to fix arrangements over several years.
The agreement, according to the UK mandate, "should define the scope and process of annual negotiations" on access to fishing areas and fishing opportunities (total allowable catch). Fishing opportunities should be "negotiated annually on the basis" of the best available science for shared stocks provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).
The United Kingdom will no longer accept the "relative stability" mechanism for sharing fishing quotas. This means that future fishing opportunities should be based on the principle of zonal attachment, which better reflects where the fish live and is the basis of the EU's fisheries agreement with Norway, the text goes on to say.
No European arrest warrant
In the field of internal security, the United Kingdom reiterates its wish to maintain access or cooperation similar to that which currently exists for the Schengen Information System or the European Criminal Records Information System - Third Country Nationals ( ECRIS-TCN). It also wants to share 'PNR' data on air passengers.
However, London no longer wants to participate in the European Arrest Warrant and will instead seek rapid extradition instruments, as they exist with Norway or Iceland. In May 2018, the 'May' government had nevertheless shown its interest in remaining in this tool (see EUROPE 12018/13).
See the UK negotiating mandate: http://bit.ly/3a6h0gz (Original version in French by Solenn Paulic)