About a month ago, the general opinion was that this week’s European Council would give the United Kingdom a further extension to implement Brexit, particularly as the House of Commons voted through a law forcing the Prime Minister to ask for such an extension if no exit deal had been reached by the end of October. And a deal seemed unlikely, in view of the intransigence and lack of diplomacy of Boris Johnson.
In addition, Ms von der Leyen had just finished revealing the composition of her Commission (see EUROPE 12324/1). Its structure was more reminiscent of a lasagne than a team and some of the portfolios titles were a bit unexpected, but no matter: in addition to the need to respect the sacrosanct national balances, there was also a gender balance to observe and in any case, the MEPs would be far more interested in the integrity and qualifications of the candidate Commissioners than in optimising the internal functioning of the institution. Some marginal changes may be necessary, but the planning would by and large stand: a global vote of confidence on 23 October, with the new College to take up its duties on 1 November. A new start, with the fire of God expected to start falling in the next hundred days!
There have already been a few incidents along the way. First of all, the Hungarian and Romanian candidates were rejected by the Parliament (see EUROPE 12338/9). A second hearing before the MEPs was required for the Polish and French candidates and, in the case of the latter, the exercise ended with a solid vote to reject (see EUROPE 12346/1). It turned out that the EPP + S&D + Renew Europe majority was not solid in every circumstance. Paris and Bucharest must submit new proposals this week and Budapest has appointed its ambassador to the EU, Olivér Várhelyi, but all three of these must be made public so that the procedure can start again: interview with the President-elect, reshuffle of the portfolios if necessary, examination of the candidacies and hearings at the EP (not ruling out the possibility of a catch-up exercise). It simply isn’t feasible to do all this between 18 and 23 October, as the Conference of the Presidents of the political groups of the EP is expected to confirm on Wednesday. We would then be looking at a new Commission to take up its duties in mid-November or, more likely, 1 December. This extension could allow the Parliament to adopt the multi-annual strategy of its dreams, affording it more influence on the College’s orientations.
In the meantime, Boris Johnson has been issuing multiple declarations confirming his unshakeable intention to leave the European Union on 31 October. On Monday of this week, the Queen’s Speech, a veritable exercise in “His Master’s Voice”, was quite unambiguous on this point. The first national ‘post-Brexit’ budget has already been announced. This inflexibility is designed to shore up the British position in the last-chance negotiations with the EU, which have been marked in recent days by a brutal acceleration and maximum confidentiality. If an agreement can be reached in time on the unavoidable issue of Northern Ireland’s ‘special status’ (negotiations were still underway as we went to press), it could be approved by the European Council, but would need to be rubber-stamped by Westminster on Saturday morning, with the Parliament convened for an extraordinary session. The situation is becoming impossible to predict.
In the event that a further extension is awarded unanimously by the 27, the United Kingdom would be obliged to propose a candidate Commissioner, who would have to be given a portfolio and appear for a hearing before the European Parliament. If London does not propose anybody, the future Commission would be illegal and then the mask would fall: deliberate sabotage of the functioning of the EU for electoral purposes. It would also be useful to have some clarity as to the UK’s intentions of paying its dues to the EU, including the 2020 budget (see EUROPE 12349/6), as this, like the new multi-annual financial framework, will suffer the consequences. And how would the EU respond if the commitments made by Theresa May were not adhered to?
In the event of a hard Brexit on 31 October, it would be the responsibility of the Juncker Commission to manage it. And be it the MFF, the exit deal or the future British ‘interim’ Commissioner, the Parliament will have its say. But equally, it is hardly likely that the future Commission, or its President-elect at least, would not try to influence a situation that will be handed over to her.
Basically, the initial planning has been solidly heckled. There is no point in invoking even more dramatic external unexpected circumstances: Turkish military action against the Kurds, who have just secured the solidarity of the Syrian regime, with local disinvestment of the United States, a rise in power of Russian arbitration and an unavoidable new humanitarian disaster. The EU can make the statements and limit arms sales to Turkey, but Ankara’s blackmail over migration flows will soon convince it not to take these measures too far.
Forced once again into the position of having to wing it, the members of the European Council, who like to present themselves as leaders, find themselves this week facing major challenges that will require them to overcome their ongoing divisions and show courage and imagination. And that will be the biggest challenge of them all.
Renaud Denuit