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Europe Daily Bulletin No. 12250
European elections - EP2019 / Ep2019

Spitzenkandidaten process is “a potentially explosive institutional set-up”, says Olivier Costa

The President of the European Council is expected to convene an informal European summit at the end of May or beginning of June to discuss appointments to senior European positions (see EUROPE 12247/1). In 2014, the Spitzenkandidaten process - by which the top candidate of the winning European party in the European elections becomes President of the European Commission - had finally worked, despite the reluctance of the European Council. In 2019, even if the President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has reiterated his commitment to this procedure (see EUROPE 12249/3), this could change. Olivier Costa, Director of Political Studies at the College of Europe, explains what are the weaknesses of this system and why it could disappear (interviewed by Sophie Petitjean). 

Agence Europe - The Spitzenkandidaten process, what is it?

Olivier Costa - It is the result of a reflection by European political parties on how to make the European election more attractive to citizens. It is an idea that has been around for a long time and finds its inspiration in the Member States. 

This idea of choosing the leading party candidate as the next President of the European Commission is an extrapolation of the Treaties, but it is not enshrined in them. The Lisbon Treaty only says that the President of the Commission must be chosen on the basis of the results of the European elections and that this President must be elected by the European Parliament. 

This worked in 2014. This year, does this process have a chance to succeed?

The Commission and the European Council were not really in favour of it at the beginning. In 2014, they had no choice but to choose Mr Juncker, all the more easily because he was someone whom the other Heads of State trusted and who was moderate enough to be acceptable to everyone. 

This year, it's different: we see that the system is struggling. The liberal group more or less refused to participate this time, due to strategic considerations since, a priori, this system does not allow it to claim the presidency of the Commission. 

The EPP candidate, Manfred Weber, did not participate in the first Spitzenkandidaten debate held in Maastricht. So, as we can see, there is considerable uncertainty that this process will work this year. 

On the other hand, the Conservatives (ACRE) have chosen to participate this time, even if they do not believe in it. Doesn't that balance it out?

That's true. ACRE has an ambivalent discourse: it is critical of European integration, but it shows a real willingness to play the game, unlike UKIP or the French far right. And it has played the game during this legislature by very often participating in winning coalitions in the European Parliament. The Conservatives have also decided to play the Spitzenkandidate game this year, it being understood that it is not impossible that they will score very well. 

After, it's always a ‘fool’s game’: you would think that because of this, the system would become institutionalised. And we see that, in the end, it is being challenged by the Liberals for strategic reasons. 

And on the EPP side, there is a certain hesitation with two names - rather than one - circulating around...

It is true that we do not feel much mobilisation around Manfred Weber's candidacy. In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s nomination was unanimous: he was a heavyweight in the functioning of the EU and a candidate acceptable to everyone in the EPP. 

Mr. Weber does not have that status in his curriculum vitae and he has a somewhat right-wing political position that is a little problematic. And then, there is still some reluctance among some to have a European Commission chaired by a German, knowing that there are already many Germans in power. 

The Frenchman Michel Barnier is more consensual, because he has a more centrist position than Mr Weber. But he has made quite a comeback: the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in France was attributed to him. Yet he has doe well as the EU's chief negotiator on Brexit and has built a strong legitimacy in Brussels. He has a number of qualities that could make him President of the Commission: he portrays himself as a very skilful and patient person. He is also “Macron-compatible”. 

But then it's a game of intoxication. Generally, it is the candidates themselves who try to influence the bookmakers or their entourage who spread rumours. 

Do you understand why some people describe the Spitzenkandidaten process as “undemocratic”?

I don't have a point of view. I try to remain analytically neutral, but it can be said that the system, as it exists, gives too important a role to the EPP - we know that it is always the EPP that wins the elections, at least it has for 20 years. 

And because of this, relying solely on the EPP Congress to choose the future President of the Commission is not necessarily very desirable. 

The second problem is that if we try to impose this Spitzenkandidaten logic, we transform the Commission into a government and this can create a number of misunderstandings, disappointments or ambiguities. 

We saw it during Mr Juncker's mandate: there were tensions between the Commission's political approach, which is that of the Spitzenkandidate, and the vision that the Commission would be a neutral mediator with diverse interests and whose mission would be to draft solid texts to defend the EU's general interest. 

What, concretely, is the risk?

With the Spitzenkandidaten process, a potentially explosive institutional set-up has been created in a configuration where the European Council would, for example, be largely dominated by centrists and the right, and the European elections won by the left. 

This would put us in an extremely difficult situation because it would suit the European Council to choose a left-wing candidate to head the European Commission. This would create a gap with the Commissioners since it is a tradition that Commissioners are chosen by each state and, in most cases, they are of the political colour of the government. So we would end up with a Commission on the right, a President on the left and a Parliament on the left. 

As long as we have this kind of political harmony between the three European institutions, things hold together. If this were to change, we could find ourselves in relatively serious political difficulties.

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