“We need a stronger Europe.” That is the premise for the new European Union global strategy that High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini has just presented to the European Council (see EUROPE 11583) and one week later to the European Parliament (see EUROPE 11588). At any other time in history, this phrase could have appeared a statement of the most blindingly obvious. In the wake of the referendum which saw a majority of English and Welsh voters choose to weaken Europe by implicitly strengthening all populist, nationalistic and extremist forces on the continent, it sounds more like a cry of despair. In this particular moment of existential crisis, when Europe is threatened both by the spread of crises and wars at its borders and by the seeds of extremism and division being sown within its ranks, we more than ever before need a real union that is able to defend our shared European interests. But what are these shared interests, risks and threats?
The principal merit of this global strategy is that it offers a realistic analysis of today's complex, unstable and interconnected geostrategic environment. It opens with an observation that is the opposite of the prevailing sentiment at the time the previous security strategy was adopted in 2003. “Our Union is under threat”, states the text citing the questioning of the European project, the doubt cast over European security to the East, crises and conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity. This accumulation of threats requires “an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders”. To this first priority, the document adds four others that all seek to bring greater global stability: state and societal resilience to the East as far as Central Asia and to the South as far as Central Africa; an integrated approach to conflicts seeking to prevent and/or to contribute to conflict resolution and stabilisation of crisis zones; increased support for regional organisations; reform of the global system of governance (see also EUROPE 11581).
The givens of the problem are clear. How to address them is, however, much less so. This 32-page text, including the foreword by Ms Mogherini and the executive summary, the product of a lengthy process of consideration and consultation, is woefully verbose and only very partially addresses the need for clear guidelines that can translate into operational reality. Repetitions in the text are many and the convoluted wording makes it turgid reading, when the primary purpose of any document of this kind is to serve as a strategic communication tool. In the area of defence, the text encourages cooperation and speaks of “Europe's autonomy of decision and action”, while laying great stress on the sovereignty of the member states and NATO's leading role. It speaks of strengthening operations planning and conduct structures but avoids any mention of a permanent headquarters. It advocates more enhanced cooperation in the hope that, in time, this “might lead to a more structured form of cooperation”. The tortuous style, which only serves to lower the level of ambition, is the result of last-minute compromises made to win the assent of the member states whose diplomats were consulted individually and separately, according to what is known as the confessional method. Reading the conclusions of the European Council of 28 June which merely “welcomes the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy by the High Representative”, one may nonetheless question the value of this tortuous language and, indeed, the genuine will of the member states to fully commit to consolidating European defence.
Current circumstances, dominated by management of the consequences of the UK's withdrawal, will tend to overshadow the strategy. The window of opportunity that would have allowed work to begin in the second half of the year on a European White Paper on security and defence to make it operational will very quickly close as the two major states that are France and Germany move into their respective election campaigns. If she is to save the process, Federica Mogherini will have to seek the support of the European Commission which, on 25 October, is due to approve a defence action plan. With the Commission and the European Defence Agency involved, it would at least be possible to make progress towards bringing capability planning and procurement processes closer together, through a European defence semester equivalent to what is done in the area of budgets. If it proves impossible to publish an actual White Paper, a strategic document specifically on the “defence and security” chapter remains a possibility, alongside other work on the migration and development components. Ms Mogherini has asked former chair of the EU military committee, French general Patrick de Rousiers, to work on the follow-up on defence. It will now be for him to show that, in politics as in music, offbeat can be artful.
Olivier Jehin