Overtaken by events but maybe useful. Yesterday's column was to some extent behind the news, being unable to take account of developments in the evening, including Mr Papandreou's decision to cancel the national referendum on Greece's remaining in the euro. Yet I am not unhappy that it was published despite this time lag. The reason is that some of the points I raised have not been brought up elsewhere and perhaps remain useful. Some points remain valid no matter how things develop (points A and B), while others might interest some readers (C and D).
A. Making a clear division between being part of the euro and belonging to the EU. Membership of the EU, with all the rights and support that this brings, is not in any way in doubt. That is something that is often overlooked, even in Greece, where the country's obvious European-ness and cultural and historic significance are highlighted. In Athens, a political science student spoke of a “dictatorial response from the EU”. This is a misunderstanding too often heard, and not just in Greece. Leaving the EU would mean losing funding from the regional policy and other Community support, having to cope with illegal immigration over the border with Turkey without any European support, re-establishing passport control for tourists and other visitors, no longer being an active participant in formulating EU policies and in its decision-making. These rights will remain. But being part of the euro does not allow slipping and sliding or weaknesses, because failure of a single member state, even the smallest, throws the continued existence of the single currency into doubt. Weeping and wailing on this is totally unjustified: it is scandalous to reproach Europe for its firmness, particularly as the strictness is complemented by support that is as broad as possible.
B. Greece's own liability. Despite the developments that have taken place, the defects and weaknesses in the management of the country remain. Neither Mr Papandreou's u-turn, nor the formation of a coalition government can diminish the need for profound change if Greece intends to remain part of the eurozone. Yesterday, I purposefully quoted comments by figures such as Philippe Maystadt, who is working to help Greece (the EIB, of which he is the president, intends to contribute to relaunching investment), but is not afraid to point out the unacceptable reality which demands change.
C. Abiding by the Community method. Papandreou's intention to hold a referendum has often been defended, in Brussels and elsewhere, by considerations that relate to respect for democracy. Referendum is, clearly, the finest example of democracy in action: the people say yes or no. It is, however, curious to note that in this particular instance, this argument is being employed by those who, at the same time, strongly defend the supranational way the EU works, the Community method over the inter-governmental. Decisions are increasingly being taken in Brussels and often by qualified majority, something demanded by the large countries. Much has been made of the fact that Mrs Merkel had to be given the approval of the national parliament before she could make certain commitments: a two-day affair related to Constitutional Court decisions.
The Greek referendum would, however, have required several months and, according to Mr Papandreou, would have focused exclusively on the bailout package. Messrs Barroso, Van Rompuy, Juncker, Sarkozy et al. were right when they demanded that the planned referendum should pose the question of Greece's remaining in the eurozone. Allowing a referendum restricted to the decisions of 27 October would have compromised the very operation of the eurozone, making majority rule inapplicable and any decision ineffective. In this case, any talk of people's rights was superficial and populist.
D. Mistaken assessment. The integrity of Mr Papandreou being beyond doubt, one can only assume that, overwhelmed by the domestic situation, he failed correctly to assess the repercussions of his proposed referendum. Had the no vote carried the day at the start of next year, the eurozone and global financial stability would have been compromised. He showed later that he was not arguing his personal position but that, in the hope of achieving a victory for the yes vote, he was hoping to enhance his room for manoeuvre on correcting the shortcomings of his country. This is something his successors will have to do if they want Greece to remain definitively in the eurozone.
(FR/transl.rt)