Platitudes… What could the repercussions from the Kosovo dossier be for the EU? It is not the job of this column to comment on everything that occurs in the world. But in this case, the EU is directly involved because all Balkan countries have prospects with regard to joining the EU and it is therefore up to the latter to decide on a case-by-case basis whether each country can join - no one has the right to decide in its name (even if this temptation appears to be quite strong in Washington). In this case, as we are aware, divergences exist within the EU: five member states do not recognise Kosovo as a sovereign country. Speaking on behalf of all member states, Ms Ashton was unable to go beyond stating a few platitudes: the EU has its foundations in good relations with all neighbouring countries, the future of Serbia and Kosovo (together or separately?) is in the EU, the authorities of the two parties must be prepared for dialogue. She did, of course, say that the EU was prepared to facilitate this dialogue (see our previous publication).
… and divergences. Nonetheless, we only need to turn to the European Parliament to see the differences revealed. Bernd Posselt spoke as rapporteur on Kosovo and not on behalf of his group (the EPP). He called on the Serbian authorities to “finally face reality” and consider what has happened as an opportunity: if Serbia abandons the illusion of resuming control of Kosovo, the doors of Europe are open to it. The Serbian ethnic zone of an independent Kosovo will be able to benefit from a form of autonomy but the hypothesis of this zone becoming part of Serbia is, according to Mr Posselt, out of the question and he calls on EU countries that have not yet recognised Kosovo to do so immediately. Mario Borghezio MEP goes even further: he affirms that the opinion of the UN Court of Justice is valid for all “nations without a state”, which exist in the EU and he mentions Flanders, Corsica, Euskadi (the Basque country in Spain) and “Padania”, to which he considers he himself belongs.
Ambiguities. We can see that not everyone shares the idea that Kosovo is a specific case, which does not constitute a precedent. The integral text of the UN opinion clarifies the scope and the limitations, explaining that this case is not valid for other more or less similar cases; but this is not the general perception or interpretation of the UN recommendation. The position of countries that have not recognised Kosovo as a new state is motivated in each case, as we are aware, by internal considerations. I am not only referring to Community countries such as Spain and Cyprus, whose reasons for non-recognition are well-known, but also to Russia and China. Certain national positions are even contradictory. Moscow rejects outright the possibility of Chechnya or any other entity in the Caucasus leaving the Russian Federation, but when a former province of Georgia proclaims self-determination Russia recognises it immediately.
Kosovo's own position appears ambiguous: it considers that the former borders of Serbia, recognised by the UN, are not intangible but declares that its own borders are indeed untouchable, and the possibility of the zone inhabited by the Serbian minority becoming part of Serbia is rejected outright (by the authorities in Pristina and by Mr Posselt). What principles should therefore be respected?
The conditions on which a state can exist. Certain political scientists consider that a state does not simply exist because it is recognised but is recognised because it exists. And to exist it must be able to manage itself, levy taxes, pay its civil servants and be genuinely autonomous. According to this thesis, “there is no point recognising something that does not fulfil the objective criteria of being a state”.
It is not the role of this column to take a position on these concepts. Nonetheless, we can examine the position taken by the EU in its enlargement policy. It is true that during the ongoing accession negotiations, respect for the necessary conditions is examined by the European Commission, chapter by chapter, and that this sometimes provokes a slow pace of progress, delays and misunderstandings. If the interlocutor is a genuine state, this robust position has a number of positive aspects to it. For example, a country like Croatia is encouraged to resolve its conflicts or divergences with neighbouring countries to speed up the process. Nevertheless, the candidate country should not be allowed to consider accession to the EU as a weapon with which it can strengthen its own position in relation to neighbouring countries or to quite clearly transfer the strength of its existence to Europe. It should be constantly pointed out that the first objective of European unity was reconciliation between the different nations that had torn themselves apart in the worst conflicts of history and that a state, in order to be considered as such, must possess the means of its own autonomy and not be a semi-protectorate of the EU or the UN or have a regime that is largely dominated by corruption or organised crime. These concepts do not refer either to Kosovo or any other specific country but rather, have a general character and this column will return to the subject tomorrow.
(F.R./transl.fl)