The vital importance of the European diplomatic corps currently in gestation explains and justifies the controversies and at times varying viewpoints about what form the corps should take because it will gradually generate a common EU foreign policy. The guidelines that EU heads of state will decide upon at the end of the week will set out how the new corps will look and how it will function, guidelines for the future High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, whose job it will be to manage the diplomatic corps. The European Council at the end of the week will take account of the views of the European Commission (the new department's rules and regulations will later be decided upon in agreement with the Commission) and the European Parliament (due to its powers over the budget and its role in appointing the Commission). This involves a lot of food for thought and in my column last week and earlier this week, I have been looking at this. A few further comments.
We are not yet expecting any decisions about the content of the EU's foreign policy. This is self-evident, and yet there are some people at the European Parliament who are calling for objectives and criteria to be decided upon. This will be a long and winding road. At the moment, the EU does not even agree among itself on the recognition of certain countries (like Kosovo) or about opening EU accession talks with Croatia, not to mention the aim of the current negotiations with Turkey, and so on. EP rapporteur Elmar Brok admitted that in terms of operations, the EU's foreign policy will necessarily be decided by the executive at both Member State and EU level. The idea at the moment is to decide on how the new diplomatic corps would operate and be comprised. The Swedish Presidency document for the Summit (that the External Relations Council has been adjusting) urges heads of state to stipulate that the High Representative shall regularly consult with the European Parliament over major issues and the fundamental choices made by the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the EU common security and defence policy (CFDP), and that the diplomatic corps staff must keep in close contact with the EP. This is clear and is a huge improvement on the current situation where the EP has virtually no powers in this domain.
Over the years, this new diplomatic corps will be the mechanism that will gradually define common policies and initiatives for the EU to take. This objective is not shared by all at the EP. Some MEPs, particularly the British, are calling for countries to retain national autonomy over foreign policy issues. The UK foreign minister, David Miliband, however, has come out in favour of a 'strong EU foreign policy' so that the EU can be a player on the world stage rather than a mere spectator (see yesterday's newsletter).
One must never forget that at the end of the day, the content of EU foreign policy is decided by citizens when they vote at national and EU level, and deciding in a document on what should comprise the policy would not just be impossible but it would also be anti-democratic. This is why I feel that people are going over the top (see yesterday's newsletter) when they talk about a fundamental disagreement between the EU institutions made up of Member States' representatives (the European Council and the Council of Ministers) and the structurally supranational EU institutions (the European Commission and the EP). We should not forget that governments wanting an institutional strengthening of the EU are in the majority and there is generally limited popular support for Eurosceptics.
The EP's budget powers will be respected.. The Swedish Presidency's document (a Presidency whose effectiveness and balance are exemplary) seems to take account of most of the EP's demands. The EP's budget powers will be fully respected, even if the diplomatic corps' budget is separate from the Commission's budget. The EP will have the option of closely scrutinising the rest of the procedure because it will be consulted on the new diplomatic corps' formal draft operational statutes. The EP will also be able to influence both the appointment and the action of the High Representative (who will also be a vice-president of the European Commission). The EP will ask the new Vice-President-High Representative to speak out on the EP's demands before unveiling his or her draft programme for the new corps.
Overall, things seem to be moving in a positive direction and this should facilitate the procedures in the future, when the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, to appoint a High Representative who will then formally unveil draft terms and conditions for the diplomatic corps. It should also make it easier for agreement to be reached on this document. (F.R. trans fl)