The possibility for the countries of the EU to negotiate and sign the new Treaty, introducing institutional reforms and setting out new European objectives, by the end of the year is linked to the convocation of an intergovernmental conference (IGC) by the June European Council and its mandate. “Constitution” and similar terms will be abandoned, but the current draft of the Constitutional Treaty will be the basis of the new negotiations, the aim being that the revised text will enter into force in the first few months of 2009. Yesterday I indicated the elements which might make this timetable unrealistic. In short:
- the member states which have already ratified the Constitutional Treaty (which is the majority of them) must accept starting the ratification exercise over from the beginning with a revised text;
- all the member states must demonstrate political will to overcome their differences. There is no shortage of difficult dossiers: the voting system in the Council (Poland contests the double majority), the future composition of the Commission (equal rotation among member states creates confusion), the fate of the political and military solidarity clause, the enhanced cooperation mechanism, etc.
The difficulties. The insertion of new elements into the text will be relatively easy at first, since there is consensus over their aims: combating climate change, developing common energy and immigration policies, social cohesion (as long as we do not go beyond the basic principles). Strengthening economic governance and tax harmonisation will probably encounter more obstacles.
The real difficulties will come in the subsequent phase, however, when it comes to establishing the content of policies, whether through a revision of existing common policies (in particular the agricultural policy) or the negotiation of new common policies, and yet more so when it comes to the new budget arrangements setting out the size and nature of Union receipts and expenditure. But the institutional reform which will have entered into force in the meantime should have got the EU in decent working order, and therefore in a position to take the decisions currently considered indispensable.
Consequences of failure. We can understand that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, fresh from his experience as president of the Convention which drafted the Constitutional Treaty, has demanded that certain institutional aspects be clarified (e.g. the election method for the future longer-term President of the European Council) and above all that the arrangements to be applied to states which do not ratify the new Treaty be clarified. An “opt out clause” could in his opinion be arranged for some policies, in order to ease ratification where reservations relate to a given aspect of the Treaty rather than the entirety of it. Elmar Brok, speaking as EP rapporteur on the constitutional process, was more explicit: if institutional reform fails as a result of rejection by any member state, the result of the deadlock would be the emergence of a hard core made up of countries which are determined to move forward, with the others left in the margins. Mr Brok explicitly mentioned Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt's project aimed at creating a United States of Europe, composed of those member states which are prepared to participate in the enterprise.
Clarification of the chances of obtaining an overall agreement, and the conditions for it, will come with the European Council of 21-22 June, based on the draft conclusions which will be tabled by the German presidency. In a speech last Sunday in Berlin, Angela Merkel did not stick only to the timetable aspect; she also pre-empted her own views on the key objectives of institutional reform. I quote: “the European Union needs more and better defined responsibility in terms of energy policy, foreign policy and justice and home affairs. It must better demarcate member states' responsibilities and its own. It must concentrate on the key issues and preserve wherever possible the national characteristics of the member states. It must ensure that its institutions function effectively, and in a democratic and transparent fashion, even with 27 member states or more.”
They will need to… Will all the member states be inclined to accept the reforms? Gordon Brown would need to forget a few unfortunate phrases of the type: there is nothing in between the national state and globalisation. A few countries in central and eastern Europe would need to be more flexible, through internal development or realism. France will probably be in favour, because it will get them out of the position of main culprit in the crisis: the divide between the member states will no longer be a matter of those who have ratified and those who haven't, but rather between those who share the new ambitions and those who reject them.
(F.R.)