Autonomy of Commissioners. I am going to radically distance myself from most of the commentaries I read last month on the sharing out of duties and responsibilities at the Barroso Commission. What I often read consisted of a saga of blinkered nationalism, which was rather distressing and ominous: most of the analyses attempted to assess which Member States came out on top (and which ones lost out) in the distribution of portfolios, which of them had obtained most powers and chances for pursuing their national interests at the Commission. Some thought it was the United Kingdom who won out, others thought Germany had succeeded, while France had lost out and so forth.
If we're going to play that game, the conclusion is automatic: the most powerful country in Europe is now Portugal because it has the presidency! All this would be the case if each of the Commissioners were there to push for the interests of their own countries of origin and if the Commission were not there for defining and defending the general European interest. Let's keep hold of this principle at least, and underline that already in the long history of the institution, the cases where a Commissioner has created the impressions of defining his attitude on the lines of his country of origin are very rare. There's just been a couple of cases in this connection and the College was there to put things back on an even keel. In the next Commission, collegiality is expected to be even stronger due to the number of Commissioners and horizontal responsibilities, which the president has kept for himself or conferred to one or other of the vice presidents.
Don't make the imbalance worse (it already exists). I know that there is a certain demand for national balance at the College. Who could possibly claim that this column has neglected this aspect? I've repeatedly said, to the point of distraction for a number of readers, that the composition of the Commission resulting from the Treaty of Nice is to the detriment of the big countries, that the Constitution, with it principle of "equal rotation" will not improve the situation and that this imbalance involves a risk of leading the big countries to reinforce the intergovernmental character of the Union by reducing the autonomy of the Commission (as they feel they don't have as significant presence as they would wish). But it is certainly not by putting such emphasis on the nationality of the Commissioners that they'll prevent this risk arising! The new Commissioners who have already presented themselves to the European Parliament (for the preliminary examination for access to the Prodi Commission) have shown that they are aware of their duty to be independent and of the supranational nature of their role. Let's trust the new Commission without worsening national sensitivities any further in this respect. The latter will be able to legitimately express themselves in order for the College to deliberate in full knowledge of the repercussions of the decisions of each of the Member States but they should never be able to over-rule the European general interest.
An impression that was overall, impressive, but… I'll come back to my starting point: it will be necessary to assess the decisions made by Mr Barroso, not in light of national struggles for ensuring prestigious positions but in light of the overall balance and capacity of the Commission to work effectively in the European interest. My first impression is positive, overall, but on the condition that some precautions are taken. There is also another big question mark, which in my opinion is of some concern. I'll talk about this tomorrow.