ACP States seem to share European notion of agriculture. As I have already more or less written: the document by ACP State sugar producers, supported by all the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the world (see our bulletin of 29 June, p.13), seems to me to bear out the major principles of European Union agriculture policy. I would not say it confirms every detail but rather the fundamental principles. What are the ACP sugar exporters to the Union requesting of the EU? That it continue to buy their sugar at the current price, which is clearly above the world price. If this is impossible (it is hard to see how the EU could guarantee the same price to ACPs if the European price is brought down by 40%, as the Commission is suggesting), they ask that their producers receive the same financial compensation as that envisaged for European producers.
On what arguments is this request based? On safeguard of acquired advantages and on the fact that the current "sugar protocol" was a development instrument that contributed to social and rural development in the ACP countries concerned. In agriculture, global free competition is not the only criterion to be taken into consideration: social, environmental, historic and other elements must also be borne in mind. Although they share these considerations applicable to farming as a whole, the ACP States no doubt acknowledge the fact that European farmers are entitled to rights similar to those that they are requesting for their own farmers, and they will distance themselves - in WTO Doha Round talks - from the positions of the countries of the "Group of 20", which are on the contrary fighting for free trade in agriculture (some explicitly calling for EU preferences granted to ACP countries to be abolished). Without the support of associate countries, the EU would find it difficult to maintain its stance in Geneva and would perhaps have to accept a higher degree of free international trade, no longer defending its preferential regimes pending revision of international rules.
Experience gained. This brief factual introduction, based on a topical element, naturally takes me to the reflections of Pascal Lamy on the notion of "global governance", to which I referred in this column on 6 July. The importance of such reflections result, I believe, from the fact that they are not only the result of studies or lectures within academic circles but of five years experience on a daily basis as negotiator of the largest trade power in the world. To sum up the experience gained, I shall take the following comments made by Mr Lamy on 20 April in Paris: "Does the current system of international relations allow globalisation to be kept under control? Clearly it does not. Can one envisage changes to it? Fortunately, yes. This is why we must speak of Europe (…). Europe is a technological leap in governance still not well understood. The founding fathers took the nations out of the intergovernmental logic of things and made them enter a Community logic, based on autonomous institutions and common policies (…). European innovation is likely to inspire evolution in the system of international relations toward global governance".
The European laboratory. These concepts are developed in a booklet of no more than 90 pages (1), from which I take two extracts: "The European project has never been so relevant. For Europeans and for the rest of the world also. What has been invented over more than fifty years is also what the world needs today: a democratic power to meet the gigantic challenges facing our societies that cannot be faced by the States alone (…) States are powerless in the face of many aspects of globalisation. They can no longer hope, on their own, to settle problems developing at global scale. At the same time, the forms of democratic legitimacy essential for these issues to be taken on do not migrate to the international scene: they remain within nation States. International institutions theoretically responsible for global issues are suspected of illegitimacy, but national democracies do not have the means to control global changes". At this point, Pascal Lamy gives the example of Europe, using the term "European laboratory".
It is not that he considers everything works as it should in Europe. On the contrary, he is highly critical about several points, mainly noting the "cold wind of public opinion" which means that "the European area today lacks democratic appeal". He examines the reasons for this at length and suggests a number of remedies. I do not intend to go into this today, except in that the present analysis prompts Lamy to write: "The European experience is therefore in no way a perfect model that one simply needs to export to other continents in order to build the global political life we all need. But it is the most successful attempt so far to go beyond national democracy". It is therefore by drawing inspiration from the European experience that Pascal Lamy sets out his thirteen key markers for global governance.
The thirteen "key markers" for global governance. Here is Pascal Lamy's list
1. Global collective preferences. Priorities of Member States are diverse, sometimes divergent, for historical reasons and because of the differences in levels of development. There will, nonetheless, be a need for agreement on a certain number of common objectives and shared choices.
2. Minimum standards, initially modest with regard to the goals but applying to all from the outset.
3. Globally owned resources to be protected (against air pollution, access to water, safeguard of fishing resources, protection against contagious diseases etc.).
4. Regionalism, allowing the grouping together of countries wishing to share sovereignty.
5. Subsidiarity, recognising that certain competencies will remain national or "regional".
6. Coherency between the actions of the different global organisations, such as those responsible for trade (WTO), social standards (ILO) and the environment.
7. Global actors, whose debates and decision are visible to all.
8. Real governance mechanisms whose legitimacy and how they function are clear.
9. Permanent majorities for decision-making, superseding principle of numerical equality of states.
10. Initiative capacity, whose modalities will need to be worked out.
11. Dispute arbitration mechanisms (which decide on the sensitive issues of legitimacy).
12. Transparency, which also involve the taking into account of opinions of opposition powers.
13. Solidarity, involving elements of redistributing benefits world-wide.
What to do in the meantime? For each of these "key markers", Pascal Lamy has provided some indications and options. For example, he takes a position on the "Tobin Tax" (he prefers on capital revenue rather than on capital flows). The least we can say is that his plan does not constitute a short term objective. The world is far from being ready for such efforts, which for some, appear to be utopian rather than future reality.
The problem is that of knowing what the attitude of Europe will be, while awaiting the future responses, in order to safeguard benefits and master globalisation. The EU has already indicated quite a lot of elements for a better regulated globalisation and which responds in part to the two major challenges facing humanity. The first is that "directly threatening the survival of our planet: destruction of the soil and water resources, greenhouse effect, bio-diversity degradation, air pollution" (I've used the terms referred to by Pascal Lamy). The second is the risk of famine and endemic diseases that continue to threaten a large part of humanity. The EU has striven to provide some partial responses, notably by proposing the introduction of certain disciplines in international trade on the environment, animal welfare and social principles, with the negative result we all know, that at the same time as developing a concept of farming based on the right of different groups or people to food self-sufficiency instead of encouraging the scourge (for those who practise it) of mono-culture for exports. At the same time, it remains the largest provider in the world of food aid, organised in a way that can intervene everywhere, to the point that experts have been able to assert that if famines still exist in the world and children die of hunger, it is down to conflicts that make rescue operations impossible.
Being able to say no. While waiting for these ideas to make progress (there are some signs, indeed, what was said on the previous page on ACPs), that the EU has to resist the demands and pressures, which if they were followed through, would result in the destruction of four fifths of European agriculture, going exactly in the opposite direction as that needed to respond to the two challenges that were mentioned: without efforts from farmers (including those who are involved in non-food production: forests, vegetable fibres, bio-fuels) a vast part of European territory would be at risk of desertification and European support for fighting against starvation in the world in the form of food aid would be compromised. The efforts and concessions made for reaching an agreement with Mercosur and for relaunching the "Doha round" of the WTO should not in any sense compromise what is essential.
In another area, immediate efforts are required, without delay and without waiting for global projects be put into practice: finance. Rules and precautions have to be strengthened to fight against abuse and drift, and fighting effectively against the funding of terrorism. Europe is working on it and has to continue to do so without being affected by the expected protests of those who benefit from freedom without rules.
(F.R.)
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(1) Pascal Lamy: "La démocratie monde". Collection "La république des idées". Edition Le Seuil.