The 'mutual defence' clause has not been abandoned. There is no agreement - not yet, at least - between France, Germany and the UK to scrap the 'mutual defence clause' from the 'Common Security and Defence Policy' chapter of the Constitution for Europe. London has expressed strong reservations, it's true; and part of the British media always assumes that what London wants (or what that section of the media wants) has been won. In fact, the three countries are in the process of seeking formulae compatible with the corresonding NATO clause, to clarify and simplify the draft prepared by the Convention, in other words Article 40 paragraph 7 of the first part of the Constitution (which uses the words "closer cooperation" to define such a fundamental commitment) and Article 214 of part III (stipulating that being involved in this "cooperation" is available to all Member States, indicates how it would work and refers to a "declaration" that hasn! 't yet been penned. Discussions are underway. Paris and Berlin are waiting for London's suggestions.
It is also true that the mutual defence clause has been rejected by a number of other countries. The Finnish foreign minister, Erkki Tuomioja, explained this in an article in the same paper that announced that the 'big three' had abandoned their plans (see Europe of 29 October, page 4). The article's sincerity is welcome. Finland wonders whether the countries favouring the clause (along with "structured cooperation" in the same area, not to be confused with "closer cooperation") really want all the Member States to participate or whether they wouldn't prefer to aim at keeping the role of guardians of genuine European faith and becoming an avant-garde in effect. The minister rejects the idea that a group of countries can "use the EU logo without a mandate from the European Union" and announces that if one day Finland should give up its military non-alignment, the request to join a "collective security" system would be made to NATO, n! ot the EU. That much is clear.
Finland's reasoning is unconvincing. The weakness of the Finnish position lies in its justification, whereby in Mr Tuomioja's words, "it is difficult to understand how dividing the EU would serve to strengthen Europe's position in the world". This phrase recalls the thesis of the ineffable Ralf Dahrendorf's opposition to the single currency because it would have split the EU, because some Member States didn't want it. Which amounts to saying that the opponents of European unity are those who want to make progress in integration, rather than those who reject progress. In the case of the common defence policy, the starting point is clear. A number of Member States believe it is essential for the credibility of any European foreign policy as a tool to enable Europe to make its voice heard in the world and assert its ambitions, interests and values, an ally and equal partner of the United States. This is the thesis of the "Four" at the 2! 9 April 2003 Summit (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg), whose "declaration" notes: "we think it is necessary to give a new boost to the building of Europe of security and defence (…) because diplomatic action is only credible, and therefore effective, if it can rest on real civilian and military capacities" (see No. 2316 in our series EUROPE/Documents). Some Member States don't agree? There are only two solutions in that case - either one gives up, or one accepts differentiation, as happened for the Schengen Area, for the currency, for various social measures. Of course, those who want to progress cannot impose their views - everyone has to discuss things together, leaving the door open so those who prefer to wait can join later, applying Community mechanisms. The British government understands this, as do the "Four", and discussions are continuing in order to allow the UK to take part. Then there will come a time for clarifying the intentions of It! aly and Spain and other countries, including central and Eastern European states. The choice won't always be easy, but one thing seems to be clear - if the content is removed from the current Constitution texts, the "Four" will progress in any event, on the fringes of the European Union if necessary, because they believe that the leap towards a political Europe is unavoidable now.
Two trends among the reticent. It is in the light of these considerations that we should assess what is happening, on the fringes of the IGC for the moment, and within the IGC from 18 November onwards. Some fundamental orientations are already appearing. Among the countries hesitating about committing themselves on the path of common defence, we can distinguish two trends. The first is that of Austria and the Scandinavian Member States, which fear the EU will change its nature and become something their citizens had not foreseen and which they did not express an opinion on at the time of joining the EU. In these countries, the European project was presented as a fundamentally economic affair, with political aspects of course, but modest foreign policy and no (or virtually no) military dimension. The other trend is shared by most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which do not rule out in any way a move in the direction of a "politi! cal Europe", but whose main demand is, at the moment, the security assured by NATO and therefore good relations with the United States, which must not be compromised in any way. Poland leads the way in this trend, because of its size, its traditions and its history.
The priority of Poland and Hungary. Community circles express plenty of criticisms of Poland's attitude on the IGC. It would be better to understand before criticising. Some European newspapers have sought information first hand by investigating in the country itself. As usual, and this is a virtue, the Polish authorities responded frankly (I have already had the opportunity to highlight this in this column on 24 October). The President of the Robert Schuman Foundation in Warsaw, Ròza Thun, explained: "For you, West Europeans, the Second World War ended 60 years ago. Its causes and consequences are distant memories, they no longer hurt. For us, the war and its consequences continued until 1989. Communism and being subject to Russia are recent memories and they still hurt. This is the reason for our special sensitivity to everything regarding security, a sensitivity tinged with anxiety".
Reactions are similar in Hungary. The President of the Hungarian New Atlantic Initiative, Reza Szemerkény, highlighted the "bitter memories" of fellow Hungarians with regard to the big countries of Western Europe. A "shadow of distrust" is understandable, as is their extreme sensitivity towards everything touching on good relations with the United States. Their reactions are similar to those I outlined in the past of British citizens (in this column on 21 May 2003). The countries of Central and Eastern Europe don't want to say in the "grey zone" described by Milan Kundera: "little nations stuck between Germany and Russia, whose existence can be challenged at any moment". Certainly they should understand that the genuine and final guarantee against these threats lies in being involved in a highly integrated Europe, but such changes, even on the psychological level, cannot be cobbled together. History bears down on publi! c opinion and any way, the authorities in these countries believe quite rightly that for who knows how much longer, the "European guarantee" means nothing when it comes to security, only the American guarantee counts. On several occasions these authorities have expressed their intention and even their desire to participate in the future changes in European foreign and security policy, but they can't accept the risk of the attitude of France, Germany and countries following them may reach a point of causing disenchantment in the United States that could, in the worst possible scenario, lead to the US pulling out. The Director of the Polish Public Affairs Institute, Lena Kolarska-Bobìnska, noted (to colleague Sandro Viola) that for the time being, Russia is seen differently in Western Europe from Eastern Europe. The one side sees it as a power to be involved in the West's policies; the other as a fickle neighbour which could still become a threat! one day. It is in the light of these considerations that the Polish position must also be considered (an untenable position in my view) with regard to voting at the Council and CDSP mechanisms.
A few guidelines and areas to be resolved. This overview confirms that the road towards agreement at the IGC on defence issues is still a rocky one.
On the "mutual defence clause", as we have seen, the solution should not reside in simple abandonment (so beloved of the British media) but in a revised formulation, if this can be arrived at. On "structured cooperation", abandoning the idea of including in the Constitution the list of participating countries (which appears to have been settled) will not be enough. The accession mechanisms of the new countries will have to be changed since the rule whereby it is participating countries which decide in a sovreign manner is not acceptable as it is. A full Community procedure is impossible in the military field, but the Council of the EU (in other words, all the Member States) must have its say. If, however, some governments oppose the very existence of structured cooperation and make it impossible, the door is open to an avant-garde on the fringes of the European Union because the supporting countries will not give up. Ei! ther way, the criteria and conditions for participation still have to be decided. A minimum amount of GDP spent on defence? Or absolute figures defined by common agreement? The capability of mobilising forces in the set deadlines? A minimum level of technological innovation effort? Joining a European Arms Agency? All the details of such an agency still have to be set out, in any case, and this will not be an easy task.
The defence chapter is a vital part of the Constitution, even if at the IGC governments prefer for the moment to discuss other matters.
(F.R.)