Brussels, 14/10/2003 (Agence Europe) - The European Parliament on Thursday adopted the report by Monica Frassoni (Greens, Belgium) on the conclusion on an institutional agreement between the Parliament, the European Commission and the Council. Entitled "Improving legislation", this agreement sets a series of rules of conduct to improve the legislative procedure, and especially to avoid the European Parliament being sidelined in case of recourse to regulation and self-regulation mechanisms, an approach currently favoured by the Commission in various fields - social, industrial, environmental... which is known as "soft law". In its opinion on the White Paper "European Governance" in 2001, Parliament criticised the Commission's unilateral approach (see EUROPE of 23 November 2001). As a result, negotiations began in September 2002 between the three institutions, at technical level, between the three Secretaries General, and political level, with the Parliament's delegation consisting of the chairman of the legal committee, Giuseppe Gargani (EPP, Italy), Johannes Swoboda (PES, Austria), and Nick Clegg (ELDR, United Kingdom), under Monica Frassoni's leadership. A draft agreement was drawn up in June, still to be formally approved by the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. "Parliament's aim in the negotiations leading to the draft agreement was limited. Above all, it was to avoid an excess of the current trend, underlying in the White Paper... this aim has been achieved", says Monica Frassoni in her report.
The usefulness of recourse to alternative regulation modes is recognised "in the fact that the EC Treaty does not specifically impose recourse to a legal instrument". But under seven conditions, four of them positive, and three negative. Generally speaking, the Commission has to ensure that recourse to the co-regulation and self-regulation mechanisms: 1) is always in line with Community law; 2) respects transparency criteria (publishing agreements); 3) respects criteria on representation of parties involved; 4) represents added value for general interest. These modes are not applicable in the following situations: 1) fundamental rights or major political decisions are at stake; 2) the rules should be applied uniformly in all Member States; 3) competition principles or the unity of the internal market are unaffected.
The text draws a distinction between co-regulation- whereby a Community legislative act confers the achievement of definite objectives onto parties recognised in the field (economic shareholders, social partners, NGOs or associations)- and self-regulation, which is defined as the possibility for the same bodies to adopt common guidelines at European level among themselves and for themselves (codes of conduct or sectorial agreements), which are then validated by the Community authority (for example the agreement by car producers on the reduction of carbon monoxide emissions, or the social partners' agreement in accordance with the procedure of articles 138 and 139 of the Treaty of the European Communities).
For co-regulation, a right of "call back" is provided for, but in such a way that it is neither imperative nor automatic. The basic legislative act can, on the request of the Parliament or the Council, on a case-by-case basis and depending on the subject, provide a time-scale of two months from notification. During these two months, each institution would be able either to suggest changes, or to oppose its entry into force and ask the Commission to present a proposed legislative act. "The text does not specify to what extent the Commission is obliged to take account of observations or requests made by either institution", observes Monica Frassoni. "But during negotiations at political level the Commission recognised that in such a case, unlike with comitology, its leeway to disregard the opposition via one branch of legislative power will be limited". The European Commission will also have to justify, in its statement of reason, why it has had recourse to this mechanism.
For self-regulation, the Commission's commitment is lesser. It will simply inform the European Parliament and the Council of the self-regulation practices it considers satisfactory under the criteria laid down. It also undertakes to look into the possibility of proposing a legislative act, especially on request of the competent legislative authority, or in case of non-respect of these practices.
The draft agreement also touches upon improving the legislative procedure on three points: impact studies, transposition time, and communication once a text has been adopted. Once the codecision procedure applies, Parliament and Council could, on the basis of jointly-defined criteria and procedures, proceed to impact studies prior to the adoption of a substantial amendment, either at first reading, or at conciliation stage. This option, as opposed to an obligation, will pose major procedural questions, whose existence Parliament acknowledges, but which were not resolved at this stage. The same goes for the question of establishing an inter-insitutional body and impact study, which was raised but ruled out straight away as premature. In connection with transpositition of Community law in national law, the insitutions are also committed to a binding deadline in all directives, which is as short as possible, not going beyond two years, as a general rule. Such a commitment is not without interrest, the parliamentary report points out, given that the treaty is silent on this question and leaves it to the legislator to look at on a case-by-case basis. When co-decision procedure, in first or second reading or after conciliation is positive, the three insitutions are committed to holding a joint press conference.