Convention "saboteurs". Last week saw extraordinary somersaults of pride at the Convention, which bode well, with the necessary precautions for the final phase of its work. When around fifteen Convention members belonging to the "government representatives" tried to more or less deliberately sabotage the sixteen months of work and destroy the hopes raised by this new method to get Europe moving forward, by even rejecting the notion of institutional reform, the three other components of the Convention reacted together, most of whom were behind President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in bypassing their quarrels in favour of reasonable compromises.
Told in this way, it appears that the crisis has now been overcome and everything appears simple. But the moment for alarm was quite serious. Part of the press spoke of a "blocked Convention" and at first glimpse, it appeared that this could be so, as half of the governments came out in favour of maintaining the inter-institutional system of Nice, namely, the most imbalanced and complicated system possible and the worst that Europe has every known. VGE's reaction was clear from the outset, getting rid of any institutional reform would mean getting rid of the constitutional treaty as a Constitution cannot exist cut off from its institutions. But VGE added that the weight of what Olivier Duhamel defined as the "saboteurs of the Convention", should not be overestimated, as they were only around twenty out of 105. It's true that they represented more than a half of governments but this will be in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that their significance will become a determining factor and when governments alone are debating. Although in the Convention, a fraction was important, a single component cannot impose its views on the others.
A coalition left to itself. The reaction of the three other components (national parliamentarians, MEPs, Commission) was effective up to a point where we can ask ourselves what has become of the "Nice loyalists" coalition. The opposition to institutional reform was launched by the Spanish government with the goal of conserving the quasi-equality between the large countries obtained at Nice in the voting method at the Council (27 votes, as opposed to 29 each for Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy). Alfonso Dastis, (Convention Deputy for Ana de Palacio, personally representing the Prime Minister) employed his entire dialectical abilities and diplomatic experience to get the greatest number of allies to support his thesis. He succeeded brilliantly and even obtained the "benign neglect" of the British government. The biggest component for his support came from the nine accession countries as well as Bulgarian (Poland didn't get involved) and the amongst the small and medium countries, the Benelux states refuses to be associated with it despite their well-known reservations about the Giscardian project; Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands at the decisive moment discovered their tradition role of supporting Community Europe and constructive mediation.
What happened next? Genuine Spanish worries were clarified: this consisted in keeping as much weight as possible in future negotiations on Union financial perspectives, in order to defend European budgetary support when most structural funds are directed to Eastern and Central European countries. 27 votes at the Council could help Spain to constitute "blocking minorities" when faced with demands from net "contributor countries" that want to off-lay their financial responsibilities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ana de Palacio managed to get the possibility of the Nice voting method included in the "Giscard project" extended to perhaps 2012. Spain's fears were therefore minimised (in my opinion the fears were over the top) and the country no longer had any reason for defending so ferociously the institutional system of Nice, neither did the United Kingdom have any reason for affecting support for Spain out of solidarity. I say no reason because the refusal for institutional reform was obviously incompatible with the Anglo-Spanish demand for a stable European Presidency. All of a sudden, in the press conference that brought together the "paladins of Nice" the Spanish and British governments were no longer there! (see our bulletin of 6 June p 4). Five Member States and ten accession counties were on their own, paying for their ingenuousness and lack of knowledge of the underside of the affair by having the displeasure of having fingers pointed at them accusing them of "being saboteurs of the Convention" or at the very least, "conservatives" opposed to a new Europe!
The positive effects of the storm. Hence, institutional reform, partly revised and more flexible gathered momentum. It's positive because in my opinion, it should be recognised that as well as the provisions on the Presidency of the Summit and the composition of the Commission, it is really the transition to "double majority" (majority of States representing at least 60% of the population) which represents an essential innovation, in keeping with the nature of the EU, as a Union of States and peoples, which is much clearer and more simple and which will liberate Europe for ever from the Byzantine and sometimes suspect calculations on the number of votes for each country. I think that those left with egg on their face in this disagreeable business were the countries of Central an Eastern Europe, who gave the impression of not having understood that the Nice system did not in any lasting way respond to their priority concern, which is the guarantee that each country would have a European Commissioner. On the contrary, Nice lays down that the number of Commissioners should be fewer than the number of Member States soon as there are more than 27.
The storm provoked a somersault at the beginning of this chronicle. In Friday's press conference (see our bulletin of 7 June pp 3 and those following), Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had been royally at ease in his clarity and mastery of the different cases and demonstrated an admirable calm in the face of Wednesday and Thursday's events. This serenity came in large part from the sprit of compromise which was felt in the room during the morning's debates.
The President himself set an example: the Congress of European people (which VGE still personally thinks would be a positive innovation) does not figure in the draft proposed by the Presidium. Olivier Duhamel agreed to give up the word "federal" by requesting that other made similar efforts, for example on the question of religion. Elmar Brok, who in the past had attacked VGE in very sharp terms (to put it mildly) thanked the President for his efforts and made a commitment to support him. Similarly, the Socialist, Pervenche Bérès and Alain Lamassoure summed up the situation, "the moment when the governmental component was threatening to blow up the Convention, there was a new situation and VGE was an ally". For the majority of debates go back to our bulletins of 6-7 January.
Commission support. The Commission's support was also quite considerable. Before, addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Romano Prodi announced that he would not rule our the hypothesis of a "stable President" of the European Council if it meant that this would involve a President/Chairman who strengthened technical effectiveness. MIchel Barnier and Antonio Vitorino, representing the Commission at the Convention, explained to VGE that their priorities were getting majority voting extended and that the Commission kept its exclusive right of initiative, completed by the demand for unanimity of the Council for amending Commission proposals. In these conditions, a more stable President of the European Council could even be "useful". Other innovations of the Presidium, such as the "super-qualified majority" or the "evolutionary clause" for certain institutional reforms (which won't enter into force till 2009 or after) were supported by the Commission but criticised by some Convention Members, who find it hard to accept that the Nice institutional system will continue till 2009.
We are able to see the scale of developments. Messrs Barnier and Vitorino even see, at the end of the long road, the chance for concretising "the most audacious, fair yet most difficult idea, that of a single President of the union". And therefore the formula launched at the Convention by Pierre Lequilller becomes, after having obtained the support from an increasing number of Convention Members, a Commission position for the future.
Nothing is yet definitive, given that as for Wednesday, in the final session before the Summit of Thessaloniki, the Convention will still have to outline a large number of aspects, such as enhancing economic co-ordination. It will also have to regain the trust of this "governmental component" fringe, which opposed institutional reform. Ana de Palacio took up her place among the "progressives" and stressed that "No-one owns the exclusive heritage of European commitment" and the representatives from the governments of Austria and Hungary welcomed the "possible developments" (whereas before they announced the "first class burial" of the Giscardian institutional draft"). The solemn warning from Dominique de Villepin, which was directed more towards the future Intergovernmental Conference that to the Convention, should not b e forgotten, "the real issue is knowing whether we'll go forward together or if someone will take the initiative to open up the way. In one way or another, Europe will go forward". This confirms the existence of alternative solutions, if by chance the IGC aims at unambitious compromises.
(F.R.)