An unprecedented public and official debate. At its last session of 2002, the Convention made a decisive step by discussing two issues that will determine the nature and character of tomorrow's EU: that of foreign policy and that of defence policy. Never before has an Community institution proceeded with such a public and formal debate. Sure, Europe has already known projects and initiatives in these fields: the foundations of these two policies are enshrined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, and the implementation has begun, notably with the appointment of the High Representative for Foreign Policy and the definition of "Petersberg tasks" regarding defence. But it is the first time that an institution has devoted a debate to the goals and workings of CFSP (common foreign and security policy) and ESDP (European security and defence policy) not intended for confrontation of opinions and ideas, but the point of arrival of which will be the definition of provisions to enshrine in the future Constitutional treaty. In other words, on 20 December an official debate began within the Convention that will tell us if in future Europe will not only be an economic power, but also a political entity able to exercise influence on the way the world moves and safeguard and advance its model of society and civilisation.
Three groups of countries. The members of the Convention were reacting to the reports by Jean-Luc Dehaene and Michel Barnier, who chaired the two preparatory working groups and who, in practice, left aside the Convention's general rule on "seeking a consensus", having noted that consensus could only be achieved through "lowest-denominator" compromises, in other words, lowering Europe's ambitions. Jean-Luc Dehaene thus reported on the different "options", and Michel Barnier did not hesitate to speak of majority and minority stances. The debate in plenary logically confirmed the existence of differences (see the report in our bulletin of 21 December, pp.3/4/5) already observed within the groups. Generally-speaking, taking account of the stances of the governmental representatives, one could distinguish three groups of countries:
a) a group in favour of more Community-based options for both foreign and defence policies, involving the Commission (and in part the European Parliament) in the procedures and introducing majority voting into CFSP, possibly with precautions so that a country directly implicated in a determined area not be placed in a minority in decisions concerning precisely that area. This group comprises Germany, France, Italy and the three Benelux countries (with aspects of caution on the part of the Netherlands). Several members of these countries even consider the proposals of the rapporteur to be too limited and want to go further. I stress, in passing, that the countries just mentioned are the six founding countries of the European Community;
b) a group of countries in principle in favour of strengthening both CFSP and ESDP but which considers that these policies must remain intergovernmental and that decisions here may only be taken through unanimity. Belonging to this group, with national nuances and reservations, the United Kingdom (Minister Peter Hain was very explicit in his criticisms of the Dehaene report, to the extent that the latter accused him of having a made a presentation "close to a caricature"), Spain and possibly also Greece and Portugal;
c) the group of neutral or non-aligned countries comprising Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and to a large extent, Austria and Finland too. Sure, significant national traits characterise each of these countries. Sweden, for example, is in favour of cooperation in the field of armaments, and the Finnish representative placed emphasis on the difference between a "neutral" country (that Finland is not) and a non-aligned country, which participates actively and effectively in international actions with which it has decided to associate itself. What unites these countries is the rejection of a "eurozone of defence"; co-operation is possible, but with a free choice for countries on a case by case basis, given that the UN and NATO would remain the leaders. The United Kingdom shares in this thinking, so much so that for certain aspects it is more part of this third group than the second.
Prudence in the East. The members of the Convention of Central and Eastern Europe were, generally-speaking, rather prudent, and the impression to emerge from their addresses is that Europe's autonomy regarding foreign and defence policy is not, for now, their main concern. Most are still fairly recent (or potential) members of NATO, and it is in the context of the Atlantic Alliance that they see their security. But one should not draw hasty conclusions over their future interest or disinterest in CFSP or ESDP. When they participate in these policies, developments could be fast.
Alain Lamassoure resists. This overview, clearly approximate, needs complementing by a few forcefully affirmed specific stances by one or another member. Some consider that the European Parliament has been largely forgotten in the institutional changes being envisaged; one also criticised the silence over national parliaments. But the real subversive element was the address by Alain Lamassoure MEP, who for some time has assumed the rule of spoilsport in the Convention and whose written contributions (regularly summarised in our daily bulletins) are always imaginative and sometimes disturbing. I could, without great exaggeration, synthesise his opinion as follows: the Dehaene and Barnier reports are not very incisive and, in fact, ineffective, in the sense that they do not touch upon the substance of the problems. They propose cosmetic innovations, like the elimination of the duality between Solana and Patten; but "was it the dual role that prevented the EU from taking a firmer stance on the Middle East or Iraq?" Will Mr. Double Hat be able to avoid the differences between the stances of the Member States of the United Nations Security Council?" Mr. Lamassoure thus considers as an accessory more or less shrewd institutional arrangements, considering that substantive problems need tackling, like the role of the French and British nuclear forces or relations between Europe and the United States within the Atlantic Alliance. He also provided a definition to the attitude of neutral countries that the latter did not appreciate (so much so that a certain number of their representatives reacted).
The response of those disagreeing with Lamassoure is that the role of the Constitution is not to define stances on Iraq or the Middle East, nor on relations with the United States, nor the role of nuclear power, or any other foreign or military policy. The Constitution needs to establish principles, institutions and procedures. It does not define the contents of policies, but aims to create the instruments that will gradually render these possible.
The clear ideas of Jean-Luc Dehaene. This summary of the debate of 20 December does not adequately take account of the general considerations that lie at the basis of the project and that explain and justify its magnitude and significance. The rule, inevitable, that limits to 3 minutes the time each member of the Convention has to speak in plenary session a priori eliminates general statements; and that's no bad thing, as there would be no little risk of repetitions and waffling. But at least the two rapporteurs wanted to be heard a little more at length. Fortunately, both Jean-Luc Dehaene, Convention vice-president, and Michel Barnier, European commissioner, had the opportunity to speak out elsewhere, and without being tied to such rigorous temporal constraints.
Pierre Lequiller, member of the Convention and chair of the "delegation for the European Union" of the French National Assembly, was kind enough to invite Jean-Luc Dehaene to Paris on 11 December, nine days before the debate in Brussels. The former Belgian prime minister then spoke out frankly and clearly as he is wont to do. His working group "set out from the idea that the European Union had to be made into a credible and influential player on the international stage, in other words as global player in world governance. It's a necessity for the EU, a central purpose of European integration. The question is not do we want a role, but how to play the role effectively, to put an end to the situation observed in several sectors where we are the main contributors without proportional influence?". Political will will be necessary, but "structures and procedures need creating capable of playing in favour of the emergence of a common political will. The working group does not propose a revolution, but drawing the lessons of progress made, in the path traced out by the creation of the High Representative for CFSP". According to Dehaene, "at this stage of its work, the Convention would like to conserve the distinction between the Community aspect and the intergovernmental aspect of foreign policy; but, to prevent that leading to differing foreign policies, co-ordination needs increasing".
It's from these principles that the working group set out its positions (for which, in fact, there is rarely a consensus, to the extent that the report refers more to "options" than proposals), to which Jean-Luc Dehaene added some personal remarks. I'll mention two. He believes that relations between Javier Solana and Chris Patten "have been satisfactory due to their personal affinity, and not for institutional reasons" (which, in other words, means that the two roles should be unified) and he considers that the formula of a single presidency for the Council and Commission "presents several advantages, and I would defend it if I thought a consensus possible" (which doubtless comforted Mr. Lequiller, great defender of this formula).
What conclusions to draw from all this? Tomorrow a stab at an answer. (F.R.)