Clever work, but lacking solid foundations. The British authorities are right to consider carefully and with concern the renewal of Franco-German co-operation on European issues, because this rapprochement will automatically result in positions that move away from the United Kingdom's traditional stance and will compromise Tony Blair's objective of placing his country at the centre of key developments in European construction. The fault is not Tony Blair's. We recall his "Birmingham speech", in which burned the European flame that had appeared to have died out; and it was good that this flame had been reignited on the other side of the Channel. But public opinion in the United Kingdom - influenced by an incredibly anti-European press that often verges on lies and bad faith - is not following its Prime Minister. Tony Blair and his associates are continually obliged to prove their loyalty to classic British ideas and to pretend that the EU is now moving in the same direction: against Community mechanisms, in favour of intergovernmental cooperation, towards the widest free-trade area possible, without common policies and without the ambition of real political autonomy. For a while, the British tactic of finding allies and building ties had produced results; as reflected in certain positions adopted by Mr Aznar, President Chirac and Mr Berlusconi. The peak of success was reached with the relaunch, merit-worthy and positive in itself, of a European defence policy with France. At the Convention, everyone has admired the unceasing activity and clever manoeuvring of Peter Hain, who established alliances and coordinated his positions with those of other Convention Members.
But this effort could not guarantee lasting results in the absence of a solid foundation of shared convictions and positions. Tony Blair and his associates continually run up against the obstacle of the attitude of the press and the hesitations and uncertainties of the public opinion that soaks it up. It is impossible for a democratic country to play a role in or guide an undertaking such as the consolidation and relaunch of European construction if its public opinion does not support it. To take this into account, the United Kingdom's official positions are becoming more reluctant with regard to the strengthening of the Community institutions and majority decision-making procedures, and favourable to everything that can encourage the alternative solution: the free-trade area. We might recall a significant episode: when Andrew Duff (Member of the EP and Convention Member, British but very pro-European) welcomed a "great step forward for Britain's European policy" (concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights), Peter Hain reacted quickly, denying the existence of a change in the government's attitude and confirming his reservations about writing the Charter into the future Constitutional Treaty (see our bulletin of 1 November, page 4). The assertion of a change of attitude, which according to Mr Duff was very real, was an embarrassment to the government.
The CAP and EMU without the United Kingdom? In all likelihood, the British authorities actually believed, for a while, that they could lead the Union in the direction of their country's traditional positions. But other Member States reacted forcefully, which surprised Tony Blair. We commneted on two striking cases in this column: the compromise at the Brussels Summit on the future and the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (see this column of 5 November) and the support of the majority of the Convention for greater co-ordination of economic policies with Community procedures (see 14 November). The compromise on the CAP confirmed the yawning gap between the British and the continental views on agriculture and its role; Tony Blair's astonishment and annoyance provoked the widely reported incident with Jacques Chirac. The case of EMU does not directly effect the United Kingdom, which is not a member of the euro zone, but it is precisely this situation of exclusion that concerns London, because it will result in a restricted EcoFin Council with decision-making powers from which the United Kingdom will be excluded. If this movement widens, it will mark the end of the "Blair doctrine", the end of the dream of placing his country at the centre of all European developments. Doubts are emerging even on the real convergence of the positions of France and the United Kingdom over European defence, and the announcement of a Franco-German document for submission to the Convention will further heighten London's isolation, because it will take account of the German positions (towards which France is moving) in favour of consolidating the powers of the Commission and of the European Parliament and expanding the use of majority decision-making.
Those who do not renounce. My attempt at stock-taking does not include any criticism of the United Kingdom. Any great people has the right to make choices and this will not be challenged at the time when Giscard d'Estaing envisages introducing the "right of secession" into the constitutional treaty ("If, after democratic consultation, a country wants to leave the Union, there is no reason why it should have to stay in it. The EU will never be a prison"). However, in my opinion, the British must give up the idea that most continental countries could give up continuation of the work undertaken. This work has known interruptions, periods of fatigue, and sometimes moments when faith is lacking, but the road is nonetheless mapped out: continental Europe is moving towards a closer and closer Union of the countries of which it is composed and of the peoples that live in it. National identities will be respected and sometimes even strengthened, regional identities previously held down will be able to develop. But Europe will be united, by placing powers and parts of sovereignty in common, entrusted to Community institutions. The reasons for this are too powerful and too deep for the project to be abandoned. And not only for the reasons that usually spring to mind.
The reasons the Germans give … In Germany, the Adenauers, Brandts, Schmidts and Kohls wanted a united Europe mainly as a sound and definitive framework for their own country, so that the vitality and the strength of the German people will never again serve the desire of domination. Texts by Konrad Adenauer (on steel) and Helmuth Schmidt (on currency) explicitly affirm this. It was no longer military might that they feared but successively industrial power (the use of steel has been entrusted to a European High Authority) and monetary and financial power (the strength of the DM has become a common heritage managed by a European Central Bank). To this determination to conquer the "German demons" was added the conscience of the terrible price paid by the German people for Hitler's murdering madness: deportation, persecution, territorial losses comparable to the suffering and the injustice inflicted earlier on other peoples. And the consequences of this are not yet over. If the united Europe had been created earlier, the problem of Kaliningrad would never have existed, as Emmanuel Kant's homeland would have remained the peaceful German town of Königsberg.
… and those given by the British. Continentals should better understand the reasons for the United Kingdom's attitude. A large part of the British people consider the history of the last century was essentially the history of two attempts at invading their country which, if they had been successful, would have destroyed the country's freedom, autonomy, democracy and traditions. These two attempts came from the Continent, and it is thanks to the help and solidarity of the United States that they failed. It is the subconscious belief of the people that the Continent is the invader, and America the saviour. Any sensible person knows that it is precisely European unity that makes it impossible for such aberrations to ever happen again. But how long will it still take to change the way people think? If the British press reflects the mood of the population, then change is not for tomorrow. If such is the real state of public opinion, the United Kingdom will be moving further from single currency and will not play any significant role in revision of CAP (most Member States, while reforming CAP, will not give up defending and protecting European agriculture). The developments that we are beginning to see in the Convention, as well as the document announced by the European Commission (on 5 December) and the common Franco-German position (spring 2003) would worsen and make divergence more increasingly obvious. I have carefully read the interview given to Le Figaro of 11 November by the new British Minister for European Affairs, Denis MacShane, who invites the continental countries to better understand his country which is "modern, dynamic and henceforth firmly anchored in Europe". He describes himself as having a passion for Europe, and wants to explain why to his compatriots. Then there are the declarations by Peter Hain (see our bulletin of 16 November, p.7). The intention is good, but the result is doubtful.
A third way? If the United Kingdom sticks to its position, there are two ways out (as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing explicitly explained in his last interview): either the Convention generates a Treaty conform to the highest ambitions and, in this case, it would not be ratified by the United Kingdom, or the Convention fails and the Union becomes a simple free trade area. But there could also be a third way. The British authorities could reflect from now on on "differentiation" between EU Member States, which is Jacques Delors' conception of things. The experience of the Danish Presidency could provide elements of precious reflection. Denmark is presiding the Council with obvious efficacy, and has made difficult issues move forward and obtained compromises on the trickiest subjects. And yet, Denmark does not take part in the essential elements of European construction: either in single currency or in the common defence policy, or in part of the projects relating to the area of freedom, security and justice. The work in these fields was chaired by another Member State. But the results of the half year are nonetheless broadly positive. It is preferable to take into consideration this successful experience rather than seek to direct the EU along a road that does not correspond to the ambitions of the majority of Member States. All the more as it would, I hope, be pointless. (F.R.)