Romano Prodi has fired first (see yesterday's bulletin, p. 7 and p.13). We can but welcome the dynamism that enabled him to anticipate, for the Commission over which he presides, the reforms expected of all European institutions to improve their functioning and efficiency and to prepare for enlargement. His initiative responds to four essential principles:
1. Respect for the Convention's prerogatives, in the sense that nothing Prodi announced interferes with the new Treaty that has to emerge from the work of the members of the Convention. Prodi placed emphasis at his press conference that his reform was planned with "no changes to the treaties". A new Treaty is the task of the Convention (and will then be that of the future intergovernmental conference), but better institutional functioning of the Union is the responsibility of the current institutions.
2. We shall not be able to avoid the formula "one Commissioner of the nationality of each Member state". Mr. Prodi does not believe in the political possibility of a limited Commission, as for most small EU Member states, and even more so for candidate countries, "having a Commissioner of their nationality is a symbol, the sign of the direct link with the Union". It is, moreover, the conclusion that other prominent people have reached, according to whom it is not possible to place emphasis on the significance of the Commission, its innovative nature, its key-role in the balance of powers between the Institutions, and then announce that there will not be a Commissioner with the nationality of a certain number of current or future Member states. Member states which, perhaps mistakenly, fear being among those "excluded" do not accept that. No stretch of the imagination, no ingenious formula of rotation has been able to convince small Member states or candidate states. It was explained to them that over a certain period it would be one or other of the large states that would not have a Commissioner of their nationality. The reply by a "small" Head of government was astute: he noted that one could not take a Commission seriously without a German or French Commissioner among its ranks. Theoretically, a Commission with ten or a dozen members would probably be ideal. But it is politically impossible. Another formula thus needed inventing.
3. Efficiency and Collegiality. The mechanism proposed to try to reconcile the efficiency of a Commission with 25 and 30 members (even though the Nice Treaty provides for the figure not exceeding 26) with the respect of its collegial nature. The Commission's responsibilities would be pooled into groups, for example: a) external relations, international trade, aid to development; b)economic, fiscal and customs policies; c) employment, social affairs, training, research; d) industry, energy, transport, trans-European networks. Each group would be placed under the responsibility of a vice-president. The vice-presidents would be designated by the president, ensuring a "global balance", and each would share the responsibility of their "group of responsibilities" with two or three Commissioners. Orally, Mr. Prodi ruled out that the result could be a kind of "board of large countries", as vice-presidents would be designated by the president on the basis of their "personal qualities" (with the possibility of a rotation, yet to be worked out). The College would meet once or twice a month, to plan work, determine political guidelines for its action and to hand "habilitations to act" (empowerment) to the vice-presidents (who would share this responsibility with the Commissioners belonging to the group they lead). The president and vice-presidents would meet at least once a week.
4. Presidential decision. According to Prodi, its reform can be decided by the president himself, with the powers he already holds. He did, however, express the desire for a debate within the College, and it was with satisfaction that he noted a broad consensus (without formal approval, that he had not sought).
Aspects to clarify. The importance of the Prodi initiative is obvious, but it is just as obvious that it does not solve all the problems. The College would remain the master of decisions; it could thus refuse certain habilitations and demand that this or that proposal or decision be discussed in plenary. The outcome is that we have not overcome the problem posed by simple majority voting in a College where nationals of countries representing a small minority of the Union's population could be in a majority. That's the reason for the small phrase by Valery Giscard d'Estaing by which too large a Commission "would not be able to vote". Could we then introduce the "double majority" rule? That would amount to attributing Commissioners with the nature of representatives of their country of origin. Would it then be possible to adopt the formula of the Toulemon project, by which "no decision may be taken without the agreement of the limited presidential College"? These are aspects that need to be clarified. They're not the only ones. (F.R.)