Few kids prancing on the chairs. The big debate has begun satisfactorily, in the sense that it is already possible to establish some first provisional results. This positive assessment obviously does not imply any judgement of value on what has already been said and proposed over the past few weeks. It simply means that the first phase, that of open discussion, is unfolding as it should, with problems being raised and positions clarified. In most cases, participants do not confine themselves to vague stances, and they do not slide into the sticky situation of approximate phrases that really do not mean anything. Even General de Gaulle would admit that there are not too many kids (to use his own figurative term) prancing up and down on the seats crying "Europe! Europe!", without it being understood what they want. If they do exist, we don't listen to them. And that is already a positive point.
I have gleaned the following from the first batch of declarations, debates and documents.
"Eurosceptics" and "sovereignists" do not conceal the game they are playing. Within the European Parliament, the "SOS Democracy" intergroup has taken the initiative of organising public conferences, of which I attended the first (see this heading dated 13 April). There was nothing ambiguous about the presentation of the positions taken by this intergroup. The aim is to make national authorities and national parliaments responsible for decision-making, by subtracting them from the European institutions which hold this power abusively (in the sense that they do not have the democratic legitimacy to exercise such authority). Reform of the EU should, according to this intergroup which brings together parliamentarians from several parties and nationalities, be along a radically intergovernmental line and put an end to the "Community method". That is quite clear.
Jacques Delors' ideas gaining ground … In the opposite camp, the concepts and even the solutions put forward (sometimes over several years now) by Jacques Delors have been largely taken on board, even by those who have no idea where they came from. This is the case for: a) the "Nation State Federation" for defining the point of arrival, that is, an entity of a federal nature in which participant states keep their identity; b) the notion of vanguard allowing countries that so wish to achieve new initiatives without the others being able to oppose them; and c) the solution of a ministerial Council for European Affairs, which would assume the responsibility of ensuring coherency of Community action, abandoned by the General Affairs Council. The new Council, composed of deputy prime ministers or ministers directly linked to the heads of government, would be meeting in Brussels at least twice a month. At the same time, the idea of global economic governance is making headway and is making people aware of the need for a better balance in EMU between the monetary chapter and the economic chapter, that is, two firm points of the reflection by Jacques Delors, which are not directly part of the debate on the future of Europe but which are indirectly linked to it.
… but with several dangerous differences. Jacques Delors' intuition and suggestions are, however, in some cases deflected from their objective and used to other ends. This is mainly the case regarding the "Council for European Affairs" mentioned in the paragraph above. Alain Juppé gave the impression of having taken up this formula in order to make it a true European government, to the detriment of the European Commission (see this heading 9/10 April). The essential element of Delors' idea, however, is that of safeguarding the "institutional triangle" made up of European Parliament/Commission/Council, an essential pillar to ensure the correct working of Europe. Alain Juppé's idea, on the other hand, runs counter to this along the lines of clearly intergovernmental management.
The former French prime minister does not stand alone. The institutional balance, and above all the role of the Commission, seem seriously brought into question in several projects. This is one of the most worrying elements that emerge from the work in progress. The "small countries" should be particularly vigilant and give greater importance to the place and the autonomy of the Commission rather than to certain details relating to the breakdown of votes within the Council or to the number of seats at the EP.
A dangerous exercise. The institutional balance is also brought into question in the first stances taken on one of the four themes discussed in Nice, namely the sharing of powers between the European, national and local levels. The dangers of this exercise are becoming increasingly obvious, as some political forces (mainly several German Länder) do not hide the fact that they see this as an opportunity to recover powers by taking them from the EU. The Land of Bavaria (see editorial dated 2/3 April, on the statements by Mr Bocklet during the hearing on governance) is of the opinion that the Union should not only give up Common Agricultural Policy but also a true regional policy.
The "wise" give way to the Convention. Regarding the instruments to be set in place and the procedure to be followed, the solution of a restricted group of "wise" persons that would establish a report on Europe of the future is to be considered dead and buried. Now that it has been said and proclaimed in every possible way that it is necessary to enlarge the debate in include public opinion, it would be incongruous to return to a formula that was precious in the past and sometimes gave extraordinary results but which is no longer appropriate. Italy and, in part, Germany brought up the idea of the "wise" again but without conviction and without over-insisting (see our heading in yesterday's EUROPE).
The formula that is making progress, however, is that of the Convention, on the wings of success of that which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The report that the European Parliament will discuss mid-May (rapporteurs: Socialist Antonio José Seguro and EPP member Inigo Mendez de Vigo, see summary in our bulletin of 19 April, p.3), in favour of the Convention, hinted that a fourway composition - national parliaments, European Parliament, Commission and national governments -.is now something that is practically acquired.
Limits of the "civil society". Commissioner Michel Barnier thinks along the same lines regarding the composition of the Convention, but adds an element that he believes to be essential: it should be "permanently permeable" to contributions from outside. This requirement meets the concern of allowing non-governmental organisations and other representatives of the civil society to make their contribution even in the later phases of the exercise. If this were not so, the participation of the "civil society" to the defining of tomorrow's Europe would have been short-lived: several months by the end of the year, with the Convention pushing ahead without it. This participation should therefore be extended. But, at the same time, some reservation is expressed about the idea that enlargement of the circle of participants represents a cure-all in itself: if the civil society takes the floor then, by magic, Europe becomes open, transparent, democratic and legitimate. But things are not that simple.
What are the dangers? The first is that of sliding towards a sort of corporatism by allowing pressure groups to take the floor, in the sense that the specific interests of any one group could prevail over the general interest. Christine Roger, Chef de Cabinet under Commissioner Barnier, stressed the risk that the more powerful and better organised groups would make their voices ring out louder and clearer than the others. A second danger lies in the fact that discussions could be scattered: allowing everyone to voice their opinions would mean opening the road to a shambles of positions taken in every direction, even on subjects that have nothing to do with EU reform. It is therefore be necessary to organise and structure the debate and allow parliaments and institutions to take the floor, when the time comes, while deciding that the Convention will remain "permeable" and take into account qualified opinions submitted to it.
Towards a "double report"? The fundamental question of how the Convention works remains open (whatever its official name is). Participants at the Convention which established the Charter of Fundamental Rights considered that one of the essential elements of its success could be imputed to the fact that it did not vote: debates continued until compromise was reached which could not, by definition, give satisfaction to the initial claims made but which were reasonable and sufficiently balanced to be approved by unanimity. But one should be realistic: this method will not be practical in the Convention on the future of Europe. The positions such as those summarised above now seem too cut-and-dried and practically irreconcilable on essential issues, to imagine that differences may be smoothed out through compromises. I would go still further: differences must not be smoothed out through compromises that would weaken and water down projects, or which would allow ambiguity and uncertainty to persist. The Convention should perhaps result in two texts, one by majority, the other by minority, presenting and explaining the respective positions. It would be an element of clarity introduced into the big debate, but a part of those taking part will no doubt seek to avoid this by every means possible. At any rate, we are not yet there. It will be up to the Laeken Summit, in December, to specify the mandate of the Convention.
Farewell to the traditional IGC. The broad consensus in favour of the Convention implies the death of the Intergovernmental Conference of the traditional kind, in which a new Treaty was negotiated among diplomats, its elaboration being entrusted to the foreign ministers (often deliberating in secret) and approved by governments, while the parliaments only intervened at the time of approval (EP) or ratification (national parliaments). This solution is now rejected even by diplomats, which is significant. An IGC remains indispensable for the final phase and for the conclusion, which must be short and not reopen the whole debate. For this aspect, the scheme of things presented by Romano Prodi in February before the European Parliament will therefore be retained. It remains to be seen how the IGC will behave if the Convention results in a two-fold project … (F.R.)