Paris, 02/05/2000 (Agence Europe) - Last January, the WEU Security Studies Institute headed by Nicole Gnesotto organised a seminar on "the future of Euro-Mediterranean security dialogue", which brought together experts from both side of the Mediterranean involved more or less directly in the Barcelona Process. In March, the Institute published under the same heading one of its "Occasional Papers" (No 14), drawn up under Martin Omega. It groups the contributions of all participants, showing that, while most of the interested countries are in favour of enlarging the Euro-Mediterranean Process to cover the security dimension, some remain more reserved or even sceptical.
In his conclusions, Martin Omega, who recalls that the Euro-Mediterranean meeting at ministerial level in April 1999 in Stuttgart had provided for the adoption of a Peace and Stability Charter, considers that, at this stage, the EU Member States must decide whether it is appropriate to propose including security and military cooperation in this document to the Mediterranean partners. Most of the participants at the seminar, he points out, considered that the Charter should avoid all specific reference to measures concerning a security and military partnership during an initial phase, while others considered it necessary to include measures of a military kind right away. In his view, the Charter should be a dynamic political document whose open language would make it possible to implement security and military measures where necessary. Also, in order to take into account the hesitation of some Mediterranean partners to take part in the "security dimension" of the Euro-Mediterranean process, it would be necessary to include in the Charter the possibility of exemption (the "opting out" solution) during a transitional period, or the prospect of sub-regional cooperation.
It is the personal opinion of Egyptian Ambassador in Turkey Fathy El Shazly, one of the participants, that it should be possible to adopt the Charter during the "Barcelona IV" meeting under French Presidency, during the second half of this year (although he also said he has always been "highly sceptical about an EU common strategy for the Mediterranean" as he considers the Barcelona Declaration a "strategic document in itself": see EUROPE of 21 April, pages 7 and 8, on the subject of the difficulties that the European Union encounters in the definition of a common strategy of this kind). On the other hand, Haytham Satayhi, from Damascus University, exclaimed: "As far as I am concerned, to date, I do not understand why there must be military cooperation. In what aim? For what goal? Who is the presumed enemy? (…) Security cooperation would only be understandable if it came after the settlement of conflicts and disputes". Rachid Driss, from the Tunis Association of International Studies, is of a different opinion, and stresses the major importance of the social and cultural chapter of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. He notes that the objective of the signatories of the Barcelona Declaration is to "create a climate of mutual trust", which justifies the elaboration in common of a Euro-Mediterranean Peace and Stability Charter, "despite the difficulties encountered on the way". Mark Heller, from Tel Aviv University, floats quite a different idea, considering that, for the military chapter, the "most promising way to enlarge dialogue is to also involve the United States and transform dialogue into Euro-Mediterranean-American three-way talks". Stephen C. Calleya, from the University of Malta, stresses that the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Security Agency would allow all relevant European security institutions to better coordinate their activities.
In this respect, Alberto Bin, Coordinator of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue in NATO, notes that the aim of this dialogue is above all "political", and that the Atlantic Alliance in Washington has more than once shown that Mediterranean dialogue has "evolutive potential". Arnaud Jacomet, WEU Secretary General, stresses for his part that the future of the Mediterranean Dialogue of the Western European Union "depends fundamentally" on the time that the European Union will need to resume the functions and activities hitherto carried out by the WEU. Alexander Zafiriou, from the EU Council Secretariat (who, like the two previous participants expressed personal points of view), said it is true that such dialogue has evolved in an disorganised way but one can see synergies taking shape for the future and, he says, he believes NATO and the EU have to establish their complementary nature in this field.
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Courtois (Quai d'Orsay), one of the coordinators of the Euro-Mediterranean process in the EU capitals, clearly states that the future Charter "should undeniably be the essential element which was lacking in the partnership built among the 27", while Farnesina coordinator, Ambassador Antonio Badini noted that, while preserving the role of NATO, the EU "could play
The role of main provider of stability in the Mediterranean," and that their counterpart in Madrid, ambassador Pedro-Lopez-Aquirrebengoa, underlines the need for the future Charter (a "Charter for stability" and not yet "for security", which will only be possible in the future, he underlines) to be "evolving and flexible."
The more concrete suggestions come from a military that is active on the ground, Admiral Francisco Rapallo, Commander of Euromarfor, recalls that the operations of this multilateral force, created in 1995 and who feels that it is presently "appropriate" to establish a link between the Euromarfor "constituent document" and the Barcelona Conference. Euromarfor constitutes "a credible force, well adapted to lead missions defined in the Petersberg declaration," and furthermore it is a "concept shared by four Mediterranean countries" (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and linked to "the spirit" of the Barcelona Process, said Admiral Rapallo.