An episode not entirely lacking in usefulness. Now that the storm has died down somewhat, we can speak with the benefit of hindsight about the criticisms and attacks that seemed to be an attempt to bring down Romano Prodi and his Commission. Over and above the unjustifiable excess and certain lies, with distance we can observe that this episode was not entirely lacking in usefulness. It forced the Commission itself to tighten ranks after an examination of conscience; it led certain Heads of Government to take a position; it caused some Members of the EP to defend the Commission's role in the institutional balance; and it convinced several commentators to wonder whether the objective was to reduce the power of the Commission as an autonomous and independent institution.
There is no single explanation of the sudden concentration of the offensive: a number of elements came into play and several interpretations have been put forward. The objective of certain journalists was first and foremost to publish a scoop, announcing either the imminent departure of Mr Prodi or a plot by Mr Kinnock and Mr Patten to replace him. Those familiar with the means of appointing the Commission President are in a position to assess the worth and seriousness of such "news". Vice-President Loyola de Palacio denounced the attacks against Romano Prodi as a manoeuvre to weaken the Commission: "Those who wish an intergovernmental Europe have always wanted a weak Commission". She saw in these recent events one more episode of the "age-old dilemma" between backers of integration and those who prefer simple governmental co-operation. Mr Prodi, meanwhile, spoke of a "tempest in a teacup" and articles "basati sul nulla" (based on nothing). He sees such personal attacks as the price to be paid by those trying to innovate: "If the Commission sleeps, no one gets angry. If the Commission acts, there will be more such episodes." What counts is the support of the governments for his action and he considers that in this respect he was confirmed. Sources close to the Commission admitted that there are some "communication problems", in particular concerning the President's most controversial initiatives: the announcement of a global figure for EU aid for the Kosovo region, the planned meeting with Colonel Ghadafi.
A warning from on high? The reality may be more complex. The echoes reported and amplified by part of the press could not be based "sul nulla"; the journalists had in all likelihood picked up phrases that had not been dropped by chance. Why rule out that one or another Head of Government may have wanted to send an indirect warning to the Commission President? Not a reproach, not a disavowal, but simply a reminder of the spirit in which he was appointed. For several Heads of Government, Romano Prodi was chosen because he was "one of them". They had decided to become more personally involved in Community affairs, taking the view that it is their role to define broad policy guidelines and take decisions in principle, given their responsibility and representativeness. The choice of the Commission President was in line with this stance. This was not the first time a former Prime Minister had been appointed, but the choice coincided this time with the will to take in hand the leadership of Community activity. With their appointment of Romano Prodi, they wanted to restore prestige and visibility to the Commission Presidency following the earlier misadventures; for some Heads of Government, this had to go hand in hand with a sort of symbiosis between the Commission and the European Council. It is obvious that harmony must prevail between these two institutions and that a conflict would be harmful to the interests of Europe; but the Commission also has an autonomous role to play and cannot please all the people all the time. Some aspects of President Prodi's terminology may have indisposed one capital or another, such as the insistence on defining the Commission as "the government of Europe" or the foreign policy initiatives that allegedly are not part of its responsibilities.
This is why some capitals could have allowed indiscreet or vaguely critical remarks to circulate: a warning shot followed immediately, once the desired effect had been obtained, by a reiteration of confidence and support. Mere suppositions? True, but like Monsieur Prudhomme, I shall say: "That's my opinion and I share it". Especially because I am not alone. The former Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry, Boris Bianchieri, interprets the British behaviour similarly. The press in the United Kingdom, inspired by high places, was the first to report insinuations accusing Romano Prodi "of everything and of nothing", and then the first to deny the existence of plots or a loss of confidence by the European Council. According to Mr Banchieri, London's real concern was to make Mr Prodi understand that he "must accept the limits of his tasks, without the illusion of conducting foreign policy, which is the responsibility of the national governments, and not of a European government (...); that he must give up the idea of leading Europe to ambitious goals, a role no one has given him." In his opinion, no one in high places wants a crisis in the Commission, but some think the Executive should be less concerned about the future and more with "managing what exists".
The real danger for Eurocracy. But Boris Bianchieri goes even further. He sees another cause of Romano Prodi's difficulties: he has allegedly "irritated the strong Brussels bureaucracy, thinking he could reorganise it his way". We have already had the occasion to express our opinion on this point: the supposed bitterness of some Eurocrats would not be due to the reforms but to the impression that the President had sometimes given in to a certain demagogy, adopting the tone and language of those who had promoted the view that everything was rotten before, that Europe was being managed abominably, that incompetence and mismanagement prevailed and that everything had to be chucked out. The Eurocracy is running some risks, certainly, but they do not derive from the President's views (which, beyond a little over-zealous language, have set the objective of making it the world's most effective administration) but rather from those who wish to transform it into a sort of secretariat for the use of Member States and the Council. This tendency exists even within the Commission.
Right of initiative: loss of an exclusive power? This is one of the dangers lying in wait for the Commission: breaking the impetus and inventive spirit of its administration by placing it under "guardianship" and at the service of projects and ideas that come from elsewhere. This is the most important point. The role of the Commission in Europe's institutional balance is unique; it represents the real institutional innovation of the Treaty of Rome. What sets it apart is its independence from the governments and the other institutions, and its exclusive right of initiative. These two characteristics are being attacked by some Member States and part of the European Parliament. The right of initiative of governments (recognised in the second and third pillars, foreign policy and justice) are beginning to take effect in projects that are taking their course amidst general indifference. We would like to know what the Commission thinks about initiatives by Germany, Finland or Austria: why did it not itself take the initiative? Does it agree with their spirit and content? Does the duality of the origin of projects affect the orientation of Community legislation? Moreover, we are among those convinced that the personal integrity of Mr CFSP and of the Commission Vice-President charged with external relations is such that there will be no difficulty in the management of the EU's external policy. The determination of Javier Solana and Chris Patten to co-operate fairly, each in his own area of responsibilities, is unquestionable and they are too accomplished in politics to offend each other. But the risk of ambiguity or duplication exists. When Mr Patten goes to the Middle East, he deals essentially with implementation of the EU's bilateral agreements with the countries of this region and economic co-operation; but how could he help answering questions on the peace process, how could he prevent his interlocutors from speaking about it? They would not understand if the Commission Vice-President halted the discussion, telling them: "You will have to speak to Mr Solana about that." The Ghadafi case stems from the same problem, even if the first contact was made by the President.
Concerning the European Parliament, Jacques Delors has stated: the Commission has had to make concessions but "cannot continue indefinitely in that direction". The EP Committee on Budgetary Control is doing its job but this committee "alone must not personify the style of the European Parliament" (1). Parliament should support the Commission's role and autonomy: this is not the area where it should try to increase its influence.
Ensuring consistency. Given these different dangers, the Commission must improve its collective nature and comprehensive deliberations. Personalities are gradually emerging in the new Commission: Mrs Loyola de Palacio, Pascal Lamy, Mario Monti and a few others have already left their mark on policies for which they are responsible. But one sometimes has the impression that each Commissioner deals only with his own sector, that there is not enough general debate on different policies, with the participation of all. The main concern of the Commission as a collective body must be to ensure consistency between different policy areas. This recommendation would seem banal, had we not seen in the past disconcerting inconsistencies, notably between agricultural policy and external policies, between environmental policy and industrial policy. And the contradictions had an impact at the level of the Council, where overall deliberations were totally lacking.
But we will discuss the Council tomorrow.
Ferdinando Riccardi
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(1) French Senate hearing, see EUROPE of 28 and 29 April, "Texts of the Week"