Don't be a wet blanket. They all looked so pleased last week as they took part at the launching of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on institutional reform, that it would be distasteful to raise any doubts or perplexities. And I am not being ironical. On the contrary, there is something comforting and uplifting about the confidence delegations showed regarding the likelihood of a nice reform being defined in several months, which would allow the EU institutions to successfully navigate enlargement and the upheavals it will cause and to effectively manage a Community in which the number of Member States has doubled. This is a sign of the youth and lasting nature of the European idea as well as of the vitality of the Community method. We believe in it, and we push on with it.
But the almost general satisfaction noted so far is mainly due to one thing: the fact that everyone has the possibility of confirming their starting positions (mainly though declarations on the fringe of the work of the IGC, or through documents, or during the first meetings of the deputies) without any idea being rejected. Every party can consider, and rightly, that its ideas are on the negotiation table, without worrying too much for now about knowing whether they correspond to the neighbour's ideas. Thus, for example, one reaffirms that the future European Commission should have as many EU Commissioners as there are Member States, while another welcomes the fact that the choice of a maximum of 20 Commissioners has not been put to one side, and a third accepts the formula of "one country, one Commissioner" on condition that the weight of the large country within the Council is revised. Furthermore, the small countries insist on equality between Member Sates. All is just muddle, with harmony is just show. But this is quite natural as we are only at the beginning. If there were no differences, the Conference would be superfluous.
Who wants to reject the Delors project? There is no trace, in negotiation issues, of the major jolt caused by the Delors project. We note that some feel a certain embarrassment when talking about it. It puts people out. And yet, it is there, and its time will come. Jacques Delors has not tried to invent a theoretical construction. He simply keeps to a clear and irrefutable reasoning, like a theorem. Let us recall the logical sequence, because if we read some of the reactions to it, it gives the impression that some commentators have not understood properly, or prefer not to understand. The three points of the Delors theorem are:
The danger of dilution does exist, but … The logic behind this reasoning is not challenged. Most commentators recognise the reality of the danger of dilution, towards a little-structured entity which does not have strong institutions or an intergovernmental essence. But the Delors recipe to face up to this seems too radical. We recall the response made by the chairman of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, Giorgio Napolitanto, on behalf of the European Parliament. In his opinion, the analysis made by Delors is well founded but the solution is wrong as it would comprise the risk of compromising the Union's "institutional fabric". Regarding the Commission, the solution put forward by IGC official Michel Barnier has almost become famous: "Delors is not yet right". Why? Because, once the danger is denounced, it would still be possible, says Mr Barnier, to face up to it with vigorous reform and a revised enhanced cooperation mechanism that would allow the most ambitious among us to achieve their aims. The Delors solution would remain in reserve if this attempt fails. We have the impression that the joint rapporteur for the Parliament, Jo Leinen, intends to go along the same lines for the second report under preparation, that is: enlarged IGC and real reforms as a remedy for the danger of dilution.
To conclude: analyses coincide quite broadly but Jacques Delors, on his side, does not believe that the Union of 30 or 35 members would have the possibility or the determination to create, through institutional adjustments, the political entity that represents the undertaking's point of arrival. Michel Barnier and Giorgio Napolitano consider this is still possible.
Cacophony behind the façade of harmony. And what do the governments think? One should not forget that, at the end of the day, they are the ones to take decisions as the IGC is, as its name says, "intergovernmental". Several positions are encouraging when you read them. Such is the case of the speech by Lamberto Dini speaking before the Italian parliament, a speech that contains several confirmations and also several new ideas: for example, that the eventual resignation of the Commission would have to be decided by the Council after Parliament's assent (in order to eliminate the anomaly of a Parliament that can overthrow the Executive without the latter being able to dissolve it, while the power of censure and the power of dissolution are parallel in all Constitutions). More generally, the Italian position speaks of "constructing a genuine collective sovereignty" and speaks of very elevated ambitions as regards defence: giving the EU credible military capabilities, promoting concentrations in the arms industry, making it possible for the EU to absorb the guarantees contained in the WEU Treaty.
The British government White Paper also comprises reasonable developments, but the risks of EU dilution do not make London authorities too afraid. France had accomplished a remarkable step with the speech by Jacques Chirac in Strasbourg, but the government now seems to give priority to the requirement of conluding the IGC under French Presidency, not wishing to be considered responsible for an eventual failure and considering that, at any rate, other IGCs will be indispensable afterwards (while, for several observers, the future revisions to be made by the enlarged EU through consensus are too uncertain). Germany and Spain seem to be sticking to the principle of a limited agenda, in order not to overload the IGC. For the "small countries", the main concern seems to be keeping one Commissioner per Member State, neglecting the perplexities that would be caused by a future Commission with about thirty Commissioners. Several Member States consider priority should be given to rapid accession by applicant countries, while avoiding complication of the IGC agenda with questions to which there is no uniform answer.
Who is afraid of including defence in reform? There are also other reasons which do not bear mentioning (or which are not owned up to). Several governments do not wish for the provisions relating to European security and defence policy to be discussed in the IGC. How can one fail to see in this their concern to avoid submitting to their parliaments, when the time comes, a chapter of the Treaty in this domain? And yet, it is difficult to see an institutional reform that neglects the most important development, now well into the process of gestation. More generally, how can one not note that the evolution towards a Europe with less ambition and less integration would correspond more to the type of Union that certain governments have described to their peoples in order to convince them to vote for accession? It is not from Copenhagen or Stockhom that the calls for greater ambition will come. And could the enhanced cooperation, even improved, effectively represent the answer to the risks of dilution? Romano Prodi last week admitted that he has no idea "how the enhanced cooperations will be managed in a Union with 28 Member States. We clearly see the problem and we can assess the difficulties but we do not yet have a solution". In other words: is it possible to transform the current mechanism of enhanced cooperations, which does not work, into an instrument likely to allow a limited group to achieve the aims that go beyond the determination or the capacities of the future enlarged Union?
To conclude, it is easy to see the distance that separates the ambitions of come Member States and the conception of several others. Should one seek compromises that would inevitably fall half way, by limiting the ambitions of some and going further than the desires of others? Or would it be preferable to create legal conditions that would then allow each country to follow the idea that best conforms to its own conception of Europe, to its aspirations, and to its history, by opening the door to an "avant-garde"? As Michel Barnier says, Jacques Delors "is not yet right". But for how long?
Ferdinando Riccardi.