La souveraineté, l’Europe et le peuple
It might seem a bit paradoxical for a committed European to take a deep dive into the universe of sovereignists who, to a greater or a lesser extent, see the nation state as a line that can never be crossed. Even more so for a federalist – such as me – when faced with narratives which tend to limit sovereignty to nothing more than a political community set in stone for eternity. This is to disregard history.
“The people” to whom the sovereignists – French, in this book – lay claim is the fruit of centuries, but also of successive elites that have done their bit to shape it by dint of rhetoric, myths, political and legal instruments, occasionally even coercion and repression. It is surely superfluous to point out that, contrary to the French national mythology, 14 July does not just correspond to the storming of the Bastille, but also to the first major national celebration, that of the federation, which preceded the Terror, leading to the centralisation movement and the bitter struggle that has followed ever since for the various regimes that have followed on from each other to dispel the regional identities that constituted the France of the ‘ancien regime’.
But certainly, in our common conception of Europe, there can be no sovereignty without political community. To claim this sovereignty, this community must first gain awareness of itself, as Hegel explains, and this awareness is still incomplete at European level. This is largely because of its chaotic institutional infrastructure and policies that are basically straight out of the French national economic mythology playbook. But the history of political ideas, concepts of State, people, nation and sovereignty did not come full circle in the 20th century. After much stopping and starting, rattling over many points – and there will be many more of these to come – the train of Europe continues its journey. And it is clear for all to see, such are the merits of European integration, that this creation of a European awareness, however slowly it comes about, is a process without constraint and which fully respects all identities, in all their diversity and complexity.
That said, there are compelling arguments and criticisms that merit a hearing in the narrative of the sovereignists, who have contributed to various conferences, and whose texts are included in this book. Here is a selection of them (our translation throughout).
“Sovereignty, first and foremost, is an absolute. It is the will of a people. It is therefore indivisible from the concept of people”, writes French essayist and politician Henri Guaino, before proceeding to supply an essentially negative definition of it: “sovereignty is the inalienable right of a person or a people to refuse what they do not want for themselves”. He adds that “the dissolution of people is not something that happens by decree; hence the stalemate we find ourselves in in Europe. We have chosen a path that leads us progressively to decree the fusion of European peoples, but this is a process that cannot be decreed”. Later on, he defines independence as “choosing where to place the cursor of the interdependence that links us to others”. He goes on to say that “it is a political choice, but not a choice that is located in the absolute. General de Gaulle wanted sovereignty for France alongside independence for Europe. To be as independent as possible from the major powers, from the major blocs Europe is caught between, we must work together towards our independence, up to the limits imposed by our desire to remain a sovereign people, in other words a people that has the ability to say no at any time”. This should not, however, make them incapable of saying yes!
“The French malheur is their misunderstanding of the history one makes in spite of oneself. The French have adapted to globalisation via European politics and the constrains it has imposed, but they do not really have any idea what they have done, they have not taken ownership of it and they do not understand what is happening to them. They are experiencing the misfortune of those who do not know at what point of their history they are – with all that that might bring in terms of political pathologies”, argues historian Marcel Gauchet in an exchange with Guaino referred to in the work. Guaino hits back by referring to the profound crisis experienced by Western societies: “in every Western country, we are facing a crisis of democracy the likes of which has not been seen since the 1930s. In the run-up to elections, our politicians promise to change lives and make everything better, and straight after the elections, they say ‘I wish I could, but I can’t. It’s not me, you must understand, it’s the free-trade agreements, Europe, globalisation, the WTO…’”. “If we accept the idea that treaties can be enacted in the internal laws of states, that calls time not on sovereignty (…), but on its normal, daily, ordinary exercise. Elections no longer have any purpose, since every time anybody tries to change something, they have to ask permission from their partners (…). In this state of affairs, there is no longer any democracy. The voting for nothing. And the more we vote for nothing, the more people start to realise that this is the case”.
Guaino takes the view that the “answer is to modify article 55 [of the French constitution: Ed] to make clear that the treaties take precedence over the law when they came later and, conversely, the law takes precedence when it came later”. “It is for governments and majorities to make use of this option with discernment, on a case-by-case basis”, he continues, overlooking the legal uncertainty that this wording would bring about. However, he feels that it is either this or a total renegotiation of the treaties, “which would, fatally, lead once again to real legal monstrosities as when diplomats and bureaucrats are given the job of writing the treaties, we end up with monstrosities like the Lisbon treaty”. Which is a very good point, well made.
According to Gauchet, “we are in the throes of a revolution in which Europe played a decisive, albeit non-exclusive, role, in which the concept of democracy has been replaced with the concept of the rule of law. European integration is the paragon of this revolution. Indeed, it enshrines the principle of legal arbitration for the most fundamental decisions, with judges taking the place of political decision-makers in the name of legal standards and principles. The political decision, in other words sovereignty, is placed under the control of a legal authority that is supposed to be the quintessence of the democratic decision-making whose place it is taking”. He goes on to argue that “this is a low-decibel revolution, that is proceeding in an everyday fashion, by means of judicial action that dare not speak its political name, but which is formidably effective, both at the level of the doctrine and the level of the functioning of the institutions. It is a steamroller, moving forward without the people being aware of it (…). It is obviously not some kind of plot on the part of the judges, but a cultural and even profoundly civilisational evolution, of which the European Union today is the global laboratory and watched in that role with interest by all proponents of this model in other parts of the world, where it by no means possesses the primacy it enjoys on our continent”.
Many senior political figures “are very comfortable in this situation of irresponsibility”, writes Guaino, who goes on to say that “the enjoyment they gain from the exercise of power – or rather from the appearance of it – is enough for most political leaders of our time. The scope of the dominant ideology and this permanent waste pile of political power take us further than the end of democracy, as far as the depoliticisation of society and the economy, in other words a situation in which they are piloted automatically by the markets, competition, under the watchful eye of jurisdictions and independent authorities, of which Europe is the testing bench”.
Former adviser to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Georges Kuzmanovic, stresses that neoliberalism was not imposed upon France from outside: “the French elite were the ones who betrayed their country; no foreign invader came to impose upon us laws and norms that run counter to the general interest, that of the people. It was the French themselves who did it”. Like Emmanuel Macron, whom he describes as the “most effective proponent of maximising the wealth of the few at the expense of everybody else”. He goes on to point out that “every year, the largest fortunes increase at a record-breaking level: this year, Bernard Arnault’s grew by 30%; at a global level, in 10 years, the wealth of the richest has increased four- or five-fold; the share of the national wealth they own has risen year-on-year, without exception. The common good is aspired to by a tiny caste, assisted in their plans by the changing face of capitalism, which was formerly industrial and national in nature and is now international and financial”. He concedes that “it is true that leaving the European Union in itself will not solve the problem: if we keep the same leaders at national level to impose the same national policies, we will have gained nothing”.
Also extremely critical of a political Europe that does not exist, Member of the European Parliament Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL) nonetheless sets out to make the case for internal reforms of the institutions to steer European policies towards projects (transport infrastructure, for instance) that are both specific and useful. He also notes that unlike what happens in France, the German Chancellor comes to the European Council on the basis of a mandate granted by the Bundestag, to which he or she returns to report back results of the negotiation once the summit is over. The MEP also observes that “the Germans assume that they have a strategy of influence, of looking at every job within the European institutions to see where they can put their own men and women”. By contrast, “the French abandoned the arena 20 years ago. The same is true of the employers’ associations: the French leaders are useless, but the French capitalists are also useless. Currently, German employers have 120 permanent representatives in Brussels, not including those of the Länder. Medef has three mission delegates. Obviously, then, when there’s lobbying to be done on a text, whether it is to defend France’s economic, industrial or agricultural interest, there’s nobody there to do it. France has orchestrated its own sidelining”.
Maurel further argues that “if there’s one thing that needs to be done to strengthen France’s position and future within Europe, it’s having leaders that are up to the level of the country’s ambitions. I believe this is possible, but to achieve it will require us not to give up on strategies of influence. We also need people who are interested in Europe, as the most influential politicians in France are not. We get a new Secretary of State for European Affairs every six months. The major mainstream media are just as uninterested in Europe. There are fewer and fewer French correspondents in Brussels compared to the numbers of Italians or Spanish. Nobody is interested in Europe, and then they act surprised when they get a bad deal. But it is also because no one is ever there and that there is no policy of influence. The diplomatic representation in Brussels is not high-level, but it matters. The organisations, the institutions, they require investment. That is not something we are good at. If this is to change, the leaders will need a new strategy”. (Olivier Jehin)
Association des Amis de Coralie Delaume. La souveraineté, l’Europe et le peuple (available in French only). Michalon. ISBN: 978-2-3470-0248-0. 331 pages. €21,00
A Military Pillar in the European Union
“The US and EU are condemned to cooperate structurally if they want to maintain a somewhat ‘rules-based international order’”, writes Belgian General Joe Coelmont in this Policy brief, which calls upon Europeans finally to develop a coherent and credible European defence for crisis management.
The former Belgian representative to the military committee of the EU stresses that the Headline Goal of providing a rapid deployment capability of 60,000 troops has never got out of the starting blocks and questions the wisdom of the current attempt to build a rapid deployment capability (EU RDC) of 5000 troops, which is “at best a first entry force”. He comments that the ‘Strategic Compass’ pays very little attention to battlegroups, which have existed for a long time, albeit without ever serving. Finally, he questions the EU’s exact degree of ambition. In reality, he writes, “until the EU has a solid EU military pillar in place, it is condemned to shelve its ‘global’ or ‘integrated’ EU security strategy (…) and its security policy will by default be ‘Fortress Europe’. A very porous fortress”.
Coelmont argues the case for setting up a “European Security Council”, with a decision-making procedure, immune from “qualified minority vetoes” and with the active involvement of the European Commission. The purpose of this Council would be to issue guidelines for the launch of crisis management operations and commitments to be undertaken with partner countries, organisations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions. It also calls for the creation of a formal Council of defence ministers, to be chaired by the High Representative, a streamlining of the structures of the European Defence Agency to make it more efficient, the coordination of the CARD process (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) by the general headquarters of the EU (rather than the EDA, which goes no further than to draft a descriptive report) and the establishment of a permanent strategic headquarters worthy of the name. (OJ)
Jo Coelmont. A “military pillar” in the European Union: Crisis management, Capabilities and Coherence (3 Cs) – And EU-US Cooperation (a 4th C). Egmont Policy Brief 310, June 2023. 6 pages. This policy brief may be downloaded free of charge from the Institute’s website: https://aeur.eu/f/7zc