The German government is made up of a coalition of three parties: the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and the Liberals (FDP). In addition to the post of Chancellor, the SPD holds eight ministerial posts, the Greens five and the FDP four. The last of these parties came in fourth place in the most recent federal elections, winning 11.45% of the vote. The leader of the FDP, Christian Lindner, is Finance Minister and the government no. 3. The portfolio of Transport and Digital is held by another member of the FDP, Volker Wissing.
In the regional elections of Lower Saxony on 9 October 2022, the SPD was victorious, the Greens increased their share of the vote, but the FDP fell below the 5% mark, stripping them of any representation in the assembly of the Land. It experienced much the same outcome on 27 March in Saarland and came away from the elections of 15 May in Rhineland-North Westphalia with just 5.86% of the vote. In Berlin on 12 February 2023, the CDU triumphed by a large majority, the SPD lost much of its share of the vote, the Greens held onto theirs and the FDP, once again, dropped below the 5% mark.
After a run of four disastrous elections, the German Liberals desperately needed to win back their grassroots support, who, although ageing, are still well represented in the private sector and the medium-sized cities of the West. They are committed to economic liberalism and no doubt feel that the FDP is being led astray by a left-wing alliance. The chief of the FDP is playing the long game. There are two sides to Lindner: half populist, half respectable businessman; against immigration, he drives a Porsche and takes care of his image. All’s fair in love, war and gaining back the ground the FDP has lost: even public declarations in which senior party figures highlight their differences, all the way up to European level. It is fair to say that Lindner is not a committed pro-European: in his book, the Franco-German friendship must play second fiddle to budgetary rigour.
This Tuesday, the finance ministers, meeting in Council, had the European economic governance framework on their agenda. The draft conclusions had been approved without a hitch the week before at the level of Member States’ ambassadors to the EU (Coreper), including by the German ambassador. Lindner caused astonishment and upset when he asked in the dossier to be reopened, instructing the Commission to do this; the conclusions were amended, allowing the Swedish Presidency of the Council to express its satisfaction (see EUROPE 13141/22). It was indicative of a certain method, but this was not the worst.
The German U-turn on the regulation putting a moratorium on the sale of vehicles with internal combustion engines is far more problematic. The negotiations between the Parliament and the Council were tough; the Germans made clear their commitment to synthetic fuels (e-fuels); they succeeded in having a recital added stipulating that the Commission would, in the fullness of time, present a proposal allowing the sale of internal combustion engine vehicles beyond 2035, provided that they were carbon neutral; a review clause was built into the procedure for 2026 (see EUROPE 13053/1). These additions allowed a solid deal to be struck, challenged by none of the member states and approved by a vote of the European Parliament, even though the EPP group, which has a strong German showing, voted against it, partly in order to defend synthetic fuels (see EUROPE 12967/3). After an uneventful reading at Coreper, the Council’s vote of approval was all set to take place on 7 March.
On 27 February, at an informal meeting of the “Transport” Council in Stockholm, the German Secretary of State, Michael Theurer (FDP, along with his minister), made a song and dance about the need to legislate in favour of e-fuels. The following day, the Minister himself, Volker Lessing, announced to the press that Germany would not accept the agreement concluded unless the Commission tabled a proposal for binding legislation on details for internal combustion vehicles running on e-fuels to be registered even beyond 2035 (see EUROPE 13131/6). The man was speaking on behalf of the whole of Germany, no more no less, and urged the Commission to accept his conditions. Had he forgotten about article 245 TFEU, which stipulates that “Member States shall respect [the European Commissioners’] independence and shall not seek to influence them in the performance of their tasks”?
Or was he just checking that the European Commissioners were keeping their oaths, sworn before the Court of Justice of the EU on 13 January 2019, when they all promised the following, amongst other things: “I solemnly undertake (…) to be completely independent in carrying out my responsibilities, in the general interest of the EU; in the performance of my tasks, neither to seek nor to take instructions from any Government or from any other institution, body, office or entity”? Regardless, the Vice-President of the Commission with responsibility for the Green Pact, Frans Timmermans, refused to discuss the matter with Wissing, according to the latter (Euractiv, 1 March).
Initially, one might have thought that as the vote was already scheduled, Germany would abstain – no harm done! But this was not in fact the case. It was a strategy to undermine an agreement that had been put together jointly, line by line, down to the last dot and comma, by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. That was a dangerous precedent to set: if an inter-institutional agreement could be undone simply on the threat of a minister, voiced before the media, what would that mean for future institutional agreements? Pacta sunt servanda: if they are not, then mutual trust disappears. And to make matters worse, the death blow came from a minister who is a member of the smallest (and getting even smaller!) political party of a government coalition. This last-minute stunt – when it was all over bar the shouting – came as a surprise even to senior figures in the European automotive industry, most of whom have already accepted the move to electrification and are making plans accordingly. But it is not beyond the realms of possibility – and we will probably never know for certain – that this sneak attack may have been designed to appeal to sections of the German electorate with a deep attachment to the German automotive industry and to reassure elements of that industry. On 3 March, the Swedish Presidency announced that the Council vote was to be postponed (see EUROPE 13134/1).
Would Chancellor Scholz step in to calm the storm, so damaging to Europe and to a project that deserves to be one of the most glowing successes of its entire history (see EUROPE 13130/1 and 13131/1)? Not at all. On 5 March, he announced his support for his transport minister. In Meseberg the same day, he met the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who told the press that the problems identified had been resolved, but that this would have to be “in line with our climate objectives, on which there is an agreement in place” (Euractiv, 6 March).
The announcements of the “German blackmail” caused irritation among diplomats and, understandably, indignation among members of the European Parliament who were committed to the regulation that has been voted through. Speaking on behalf of Renew Europe group, Pascal Canfin stressed that his group, which includes FTP members, continued to back the text as adopted and pointed out that this was the first time a member state had gone back on its word following a trilogue agreement (see EUROPE 13135/2). On 9 March, the European Association for Electromobility condemned the lack of respect for the commitments made and other voices have since joined in expressing disapproval for the move.
Meanwhile, despite the consternation of the Green wing of the German government, Berlin has been spinning its web. To begin with, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria expressed sympathy with the German position. They have since been joined by the Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania and Hungary. The transport ministers of these countries (with the exception of Bulgaria) met in Strasbourg on 13 March, outside the framework of the Council of the EU, to put together a common position (see EUROPE 13140/13). It would therefore appear that a kind of coalition of the unwilling is coming into focus, a slap in the face to the states that played the game (particularly France, which drove the common position of the member states during its Presidency of the Council); a slap in the face, too, for the Commission and the European Parliament. It is scarcely to be believed that the President of the latter has not yet spoken up on the issue.
By way of conclusion, article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union bears repeating: “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the member states shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which blow from the Treaties (…). Member states shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.
If the German democratic tradition starts to move away from sincere cooperation, then others will feel justified to do likewise – or even more so.
Renaud Denuit