On 10 November 2021, Josep Borrell presented his draft text to the College of Commissioners (see EUROPE 12830/2). It was a 28-page document, which had been sent to the delegations by the services of the Council the day before, and which bore the title: ‘A strategic compass for security and defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’. The document was arranged in five sections: world we face, act, secure, invest and partner. These sections have made it through to the final version.
The first part consisted of a world tour of threats or conflict sites, all of which are well known. It was the result of the contributions of the national intelligence services, put together by an international team of journalists. The various threats were not assessed by the level of danger to the EU (hence, the war games of North Korea appeared on the same footing as the terrible misdeeds of Russia); nor were they subjected to a prospective analysis. As regards Russia, the text remained confident that the ties linking it to the EU would hold firm.
In chapter 2, the Compass became far more interesting, with the announcement of a rapid deployment capacity of 5000, to be fully operational in 2025, and prepared by regular live exercises to begin in 2023. 2022 would see the start of operational links between military missions underway (Atalanta, Ormuz, Sahel…), The expansion of the military presence towards the India-Pacific region, the adoption of a register of rotation cycles for military missions and mutual assistance exercises in the event of armed aggression or a cyber-attack. In 2023, this would be added to by a military conception of air security operations, the deployment of experts for civil admissions, the systematisation of live exercises and the evaluation of joint costs to promote solidarity.
Chapter 3 was given over to disinformation, cyber-attacks, hybrid threats, the link between defence and space policy, between defence and climate change (development of toolkits, legislative actions and specific strategies). Chapter 4 concerned increasing investments, interoperability and modernising land, sea, air and space matériel, advanced technologies and reducing strategic dependencies. Finally, chapter 5 (the least original of them all) argued the case for reinforcing geographically identified partnerships, be they multilateral (NATO, United Nations), regional (OSCE, African Union, ASEAN) or bilateral (USA, Norway, Canada, United Kingdom, etc...). For all three types of partnership, a general timetable was laid down for political commitments, with 2022 looking like a very busy year.
On 16 November, the Compass received a warm welcome from the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers (see EUROPE 12833/2). However, there would be a succession of new versions to build a solid consensus. In January 2022, the Presidency of the Council of the EU was taken over by France, a country that is notoriously in favour of progress towards common defence. Meanwhile, Russian armed forces were building up on the borders with Ukraine. The American leaders were the first to predict the worst, which suggests that their intelligence services were a bit better than those of the European capitals, who could not bring themselves to believe it.
On 15 February, the Commission adopted two texts with the aim of feeding into the Compass: a communication on ways of protecting the European space domain and developing joint procurement for defence capabilities – just 11%, while the official target of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) was 35% – together with a detailed roadmap to reduce dependencies on critical technologies (see EUROPE 12868/3).
Two days later, the European Parliament adopted a lengthy resolution based on the report by Nathalie Loiseau, by a comfortable majority. It consisted of a no-holds-barred, comprehensive and merciless analysis of the common security and defence situation. The MEPs voiced lofty visions of the role of the strategic compass, which they hoped would eventually lead to a proper European Union of Security and Defence covering all aspects, which they consider is desperately and urgently needed (see EUROPE 128793/6). They were not wide of the mark, as Russian forces attack Ukraine on 24th of that month.
That invasion and the devastation it has caused, an invasion that was morally odious and politically stupid, would rock the Twenty-Seven to their core, bring them together even more strongly, while cementing Western solidarity. It would have major effects on the nascent Strategic Compass, as its inspiration would undergo a sort of Copernican revolution. The version of 5 March started in sombre and solemn tones: ‘The return of war in Europe, with Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, as well as major geopolitical shifts are challenging our ability to promote our vision and defend our interests’. The support the EU has given Ukraine against Russian aggression translated an unprecedented determination to bring back peace, working together with our allies.
The document gained several new passages on the subject. This time, Russia and China were mentioned as the disturbers of an international order based on law. The immediate strategic environment of the EU was described as highly dangerous, given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, of terrorism, of hybrid threats. Mutual assistance in the event of attack was firmly reiterated. The rapid reaction force was described in depth, as was the cooperation required in the maritime, air, space and cybernetic domains.
The text featured new additions on human rights, the fight against terrorism, promoting disarmament, intelligence capabilities, increasing the quality and amount of military expenditure, new ambition for the PSC, weapons exports, technological sovereignty, gender equality. Monitoring conditions were bolstered, as was the definition, from mid-2022, of joint targets for the national defence budgets and interoperability. Solidarity commitments were made, not only in favour of a Ukraine at war, but also for the security of Moldova and Georgia. Full of determination, calling for leaps forward, decreeing an increase in possible resources, the document had reached its maturity – due to the dramatic background to its coming-of-age (see EUROPE 12905/8). The geopolitical turn taken by the German government was probably a factor as well.
On 9 March, the Summit of Versailles confirmed the commitment of the Twenty-Seven substantially to increase military spending (see EUROPE 12907/2). To earn the blessing of the meeting of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers, a couple of passages had to be added to the Compass on fundamental cooperation with NATO and mutual assistance in the event of aggression, to reassure both the most pro-Atlantist countries and the neutral ones. The text, which remained unchanged in its version dated 21 March (47 pages) following lengthy negotiations, was approved by the Council of the EU (see EUROPE 12915/10), and then, four days later, was ‘rubber-stamped’ at the European Council (see EUROPE 12919/3). The official timetable had been observed.
The Strategic Compass is not a binding legislative act, but a major political document approved unanimously at the very highest level. The adventure of its creation is a massive achievement in itself. It has generated a process consisting of 50 specific actions set out in an agenda, with the High Representative to be responsible for ensuring that it is complied with. The EU/NATO Summit to be held in Madrid this June is expected to confirm both the Compass and the complementarity of the two organisations.
Without the constant support of the military itself, of parliamentarians, of all future national governments, not forgetting the populations and the media, this new initiative would have ended up running aground in pointless procedures and empty declarations, like so many have done before it. But if it succeeds, it will lend meaning to the concept of ‘A Europe that protects’, in the form of a progressive ‘single defence’ – both of which are expressions that everybody understands.
The European elections of 2024 will be played out over this issue.
Renaud Denuit