The third country that represents a challenge for the EU is Turkey.
As long ago as the European Council of 23-24 October 2014 – six years ago – the Conclusions expressed ‘serious concern about the renewed tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Turkey to show restraint and to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty over its territorial sea and Cyprus’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone’. The next warning came on 22 March 2018: ‘the European Council strongly condemns Turkey’s continued illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea and underlines its full solidarity with Cyprus and Greece’. Following its meeting on 20 June 2019, the institution repeated its condemnation of the previous year, only more insistently. A selected highlight: ‘the European Council expresses serious concerns over Turkey’s current illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and deplores that Turkey has not yet responded to the EU’s repeated calls to cease such activities. The European Council underlines the serious immediate negative impact that such legal actions have across the range of EU-Turkey relations.’
The same concerns were voiced at ministerial level. On 15 July 2019, the Council adopted unexpected retaliatory measures (suspension of negotiations on the agreement on air transport, suspension of the sessions of the Association Council, reduction in pre-accession). On 14 October, it criticised Turkey’s military intervention in Syria and, once again, its drilling activities: having reaffirmed this as a clear transgression and called for dialogue and negotiations, it agreed on the principle of restrictive measures against legal and natural persons involved in these operations. The High Representative and the Commission were invited to submit proposals…
Enter 2020 and a worsening situation. On 13 July, the Foreign Affairs Ministers toughened their vocabulary on the activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish activities in Libya and the reclassification of the church of St Sophie as a mosque, but made no reference to retaliatory actions. On 23 August, Greece and Turkey announced that they were ready to start dialogue and progress was noted within a NATO context, but ongoing tensions between the Turks and the Cypriots (see EUROPE 12566/14) were such as to prompt the same ministers to discuss a whole raft of sanctions on 28 August, whilst calling for matters to be sorted out by diplomatic means if possible (see EUROPE 12548/1). But any decisions that might be made were escalated to a higher-level institution.
On 1 October, the European Council held an in-depth debate on the subject, which it came out of looking less than redoubtable. It welcomed the measures of trust recently taken by Greece and Turkey and the resumption of their talks with a view to mapping the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of both countries, whilst strongly condemning Turkey’s violations of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. According to rumours, Cyprus had announced that it would not rubber-stamp the Belarus dossier until such a condemnation was forthcoming.
Leaders also made the case for a global settlement to the Cyprus question (more specifically, the reunification of the island) and whipped themselves into a frenzy of enticing promises: a ‘constructive political programme between the EU and Turkey’ (updating customs union, trade, continued cooperation on migration matters, etc.). This gamble on dialogue (see EUROPE 12572/1), which was somewhat redolent of its German influence, was offset by the threat of sanctions on the grounds of articles 29 TEU and 215 TFEU, which was more to the liking of France and Austria.
On 6 October, the Commission simultaneously published all its reports on the accession candidate countries. The situation described in Turkey was not promising: serious setbacks for democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, independence of the judiciary, the freedom of expression, fulfilment of obligations concerning customs union, etc., and military ambitions that are incompatible with the priorities of the EU (see EUROPE 12575/12).
Yes, you read that right: a State answering that description retains its candidate country status; but how?
Far from being bowled over by the flowery language of the European Council, the Turks decided to take things up a notch, opening Varosha beach, in the Turkish part of Cyprus, to the public on 8 October, in breach of the ceasefire agreements concluded under the United Nations, in a move that was criticised by Josep Borrell (see EUROPE 12576/23). On 13 October, the High Representative mounted a new appeal for the site to be closed, but this was in vain (see EUROPE 12580/12).
At its meeting on 15 and 16 October, recalling its Conclusions from earlier that month, the European Council deplored the ‘renewed unilateral and provocative actions by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, including recent exploratory activities’, called upon the country to respect the relevant UN Resolutions and stressed the importance of the status of Varosha. Not a word about sanctions.
Last Sunday, and against all expectation, a candidate supported by Ankara won the presidential elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, against an opponent who is in favour of reunifying the island. A further success for President Erdoğan.
All of this shows, firstly, the level of efficacy with which the European Council defends the territorial waters of its individual member states and, secondly, how great an impression its texts have on Erdoğan, who pursues a policy of autonomous, even imperial, power, with timely interventions in given theatres of operations within his vast zone. As for the tragedy of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Putin and Erdoğan can at least agree that Europe has no say in this particular matter.
The fourth country that is challenging Europe’s resolution is China, to which an entire page was devoted in the Conclusions of the European Council of 1 and 2 October.
A bilateral EU-China summit by video conference went very well between Xi Jinping, Charles Michel, Ursula von der Leyen and Angela Merkel on 14 September (see EUROPE 12559/1). Subsequently, the Chinese President announced that his country would aim for carbon neutrality by 2060, a commitment that was hailed by the European Council. Welcoming the minutes of the meeting, the Council underlined the ‘need to rebalance the economic relationship’. The aim continues to be sealing a global investment deal that will contribute to a ‘level playing field’, before the end of this year. The video conference did not steer clear of controversial issues and the European Council was obliged to stress its ‘serious concerns about the human rights situation in China, including developments in Hong Kong and the treatment of people belonging to minorities’, without daring to go so far as to refer to the million Uighur Muslims believed to be detained in camps. To finish, the European Council said that it ‘looks forward to a meeting of all its members with President Xi Jinping in 2021’. A dialogue with the Emperor of China, isn’t that exciting?
In an article in the French Sunday newspaper Journal du dimanche on 29 August (see EUROPE 12549/16), Josep Borrell identified a fundamental historical phenomenon: the emergence of new empires: Russia, China, Turkey – which are ‘sovereignist towards the outside and authoritarian towards the inside’, ‘based on values that are not our own’ and whose language of power Europe needs to learn as a matter of urgency (our translation).
And so, the European Council still has a lot to learn. What effect does its rhetoric of ‘serious concern’ have on empires?
- ‘’You don’t scare me!’
Renaud Denuit