Jacques Rupnik is a political scientist specialising in Central Europe. For EUROPE, he recalls the recent emergency measures approved by the Hungarian Parliament and tries to describe what is becoming of Viktor Orbán's regime; a regime which is approaching authoritarianism and which only the EPP may have the power to curb. (Interview by Solenn Paulic)
Agence Europe: NGOs, MEPs, then the Commission and 16 Member States criticised Hungary's new state of danger law. Is the situation that bad?
Jacques Rupnik: Yes, it's serious, because the virus is affecting democracy. We already know this: crises can be exploited politically and sometimes they are used to move things forward, but in the Hungarian case, in the face of this health crisis, as during the migration crisis and the financial crisis, Viktor Orbán used them each time to strengthen his power.
He came to power in 2010 and it was the banking crisis. He began to concentrate powers to protect people from the effects of this crisis; with the migration crisis (of 2015), he accentuated this by building a 'fence', which was very much appreciated by the population and helped to reinforce his victory later (elections of 2018).
And, each time, he abandons a little more of the traits of political liberalism, everything that constitutes it, the independence of the media, the independence of the judiciary and here, with the health crisis, he grants himself full powers for an undefined period. As long as he has a two-thirds majority (in Parliament), he is safe.
The measure on fake news is the third phase of this exercise, already underway on the media, after the creation of a commission to oversee media objectivity and progressive indirect measures to limit the media.
This raises a general question for all democracies: under what conditions can full powers be decreed?
Hungary points out that other Member States have also introduced extraordinary measures.
In France, the president has indeed spoken of a health war; special powers are given, but there is a constitutional framework and a 2-month time limit. In the United Kingdom, too, Boris Johnson has been given special powers for 6 months, but with the assistance of Parliament; there are more counter-powers.
In Hungary, the Constitutional Court is no longer a counter-power since 2011, since the Parliament has been given the capacity to repeal previous decisions of the Constitutional Council. This institution was already being abused and now we are taking it a step further. We are no longer just in an illiberal democracy and one wonders when we shall switch to an authoritarian regime. It is a continuum between the liberal democracy that we know and authoritarian regimes such as those of Putin or Erdogan.
There is quite a shift, but it is also affecting Central Europe; Poland is not far behind. At the beginning, we were in an illiberal democracy with an emphasis on the democratic mandate received, which enabled them to free themselves from certain principles of the European rule of law. This is another step forward in a context where everyone is looking elsewhere. Viktor Orbán is taking advantage of this.
So how can we describe the current regime?
It is difficult to name, but we are very close to an authoritarian regime that legitimises itself through elections. They are not completely free and transparent, because access to the media is not the same, but there are still opportunities to oppose.
The proof is that Fidesz has lost big cities in the last municipal elections. So, maybe the next general election in 2 years will be a test of reversibility?
We are in a kind of competitive authoritarianism: a political life exists, but with conditions of access to the media and to voting that are not the same.
But with the state of emergency, full powers and official censorship, we are clearly leaning towards authoritarianism with a function of legitimisation through elections, closer to Putin or Erdogan than to the European Union.
How can we describe this personal drift by the Prime Minister? And who can stop him?
Viktor Orbán plays on his political instincts, he takes advantage of a situation. He always has. He was a Liberal and then moved to a national Conservative party. He lost two elections in the early 2000s; any party leader would have been ousted.
Today, he says that the cost of his measures will be very limited, because everyone is forced to take them. A few Member States have reacted (see EUROPE 12460/20), but not all Member States and the Netherlands, signatories, are not very supportive either.
The only thing that can worry him, in my opinion, is his place in the EPP, because belonging to this political family gives him a framework; the EPP has so far been his best protector and has enabled him to take advantage of it, for example in the budget negotiations, while at the same time limiting the excesses.
What would be the cost and what would be the recomposition, if he were no longer part of it? Would he go to the Conservative Party with the Polish PiS, which has been weakened since leaving the UK? Would he become an 'outsider'? It's really at the EPP that it's happening.