At the Berlin Congress of 1878, the principal powers agreed that the Balkans would be comprised mainly of small States, rivals but weak and with a large ethnic spread, each of which to be dependent on one of these powers. This deliberate fragmentation, known as Balkanisation, would turn the region into a powder keg; the two Balkan Wars in the early years of the 20th century, followed by the initial theatre of the triggering of the First World War (the conclusion of which held the seeds of the second). The accumulation of ancient grudges got the better of the post-Tito Yugoslavia and the European Union watched in dismay as the atrocities of the 1990s unfolded. All of this needs to be borne in mind when deciding on the future of the Peninsula. The vital statistics of the issue have obviously changed much since the aforementioned Congress, but the principal powers of the Union, to shore up their electoral support or acting blindly, would have to bear the consequences of turning their backs on a situation in which unimaginable tension lies dormant.
For these poor populations, who have been treated so badly by History and who still live in political instability, Europe represents a horizon. It represents hope. To deprive them of it would force them down other roads, to other leaders and other powers, ever on the lookout.
The huge wave of enlargement (2004-2007) was likened to a ‘big bang’; the metaphor of a regatta was used to refer to future accessions: the most deserving will get there first. This was not a ridiculous concept: it provided an incentive to move towards democracy, the rule of law, economic and administrative modernisation. Programmes paid for by the EU, experts providing advice and monitoring, would consolidate the process. Furthermore, neighbouring Slovenia set the example for all the rest. On this basis, after six years of negotiations, it was Croatia’s turn to become a member of the EU in 2013. At the time, negotiations with Montenegro had been going for a year. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now North Macedonia) has had official candidate status for eight years, Serbia for one; Albania obtained it in June 2014. Only Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina were still at the potential candidate stage.
In autumn 2014, the new President of the Commission formally announced that there would be no enlargement in the five years of its mandate. It was perhaps realistic, but it certainly ran counter to the spirit of the ‘regatta’: what would have happened if, during that period, a candidate, more specifically Montenegro, had met all the conditions required for accession off its own back? Then, all efforts went into ensuring that there was no mention of enlargement in the Balkans during the European election campaign. It was not, therefore, until 29 May (three days after the voting) that the Commission published its communication on the subject, with numerous appendices, all of which constitutes the most important ‘package’ of the year (see EUROPE 12266/3).
All this document does is update the Commission’s line of argument and reiterate its recommendation of June 2018, which is to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania without delay, a recommendation that the Council has not taken up, as it promised to start them in June 2019. At its most recent meeting, the Council decided to postpone his decision until October (see EUROPE 12277/6), arguing that there was not enough time available to analyse the reports and thereby letting the Bundestag set the pace…
This calls for three comments. The Union is losing some of its credibility among the Balkan leaders and general public and to an extent, it is selling the Commission out. One wonders whether certain parties are not deliberately engendering the – incorrect – view among EU citizens that opening negotiations leads automatically – and probably instantly – to accession. Finally, in an attempt to disguise their attempts to deploy the parachute, some are arguing that the need to deepen the EU is more pressing than the need to enlarge it, or even that the two are incompatible.
History, yet again, can enlighten us here. From 1980-90, three successive waves of enlargement involving six important countries did not prevent major progress towards deepening (Single European Act, Treaty on European Union, doubling the structural funds, new Community competences, completion of the single market and the first steps towards monetary union). At the start of this century, the many future members had all assimilated not just the acquis, but also the constitutional treaty and the commitment to adopt the euro.
If the 27 governments decided to act, the compromise would no doubt consist of separating North Macedonia from Albania, opening talks with the former and postponing them for the latter, regarding which there are more misgivings. At the same time, it would be a good idea to speed up the work (32 chapters out of 35 opened) with Montenegro, which is already using the euro.
If a serious positive signal is not sent out to the six countries which aspire to join the EU, not only will the Union lose some of its political credibility, but it will undermine the efforts underway in each of these countries, indirectly encouraging local anti-democratic and nationalistic forces and giving external powers greater room for manoeuvre in the region. That will be the cost to history of the wait-and-see strategy.
Renaud Denuit