Brexit just got even weirder. The UK government is now voting against its own policies, while hardline Brexiteer tactics have actually made a softer exit – and a later one – more likely.
It’s back to the drawing board next week for a third “meaningful vote”. It will follow mad scenes this week in Westminster, where the government lost a second “meaningful vote” on the draft EU-UK exit deal (though the margin narrowed by 81 votes compared to January’s attempt) (see EUROPE 12212/1).
The following day, during a vote on whether to rule out a ‘no deal’ exit, the government ordered Conservative MPs to keep the option on the table (see EUROPE 12213/1). And on Thursday, Brexit secretary Stephen Barclay actually voted against a motion from his own government to delay Brexit day beyond 29 March (see EUROPE 12214/1).
So where do things stand?
Brexit delay
First, it is almost certain the UK will remain an EU member after the Article 50 deadline of 29 March. British bookmakers believe a June exit is the most likely scenario, though a March exit is still the default in UK law.
The EU would prefer a longer extension, even if it interferes with the European elections this May. Irish foreign minister Simon Coveney floated a 21-month period, while European Council president Donald Tusk urged EU leaders “to be open to a long extension” to allow time for the UK to “rethink its Brexit strategy” (ie a softer Brexit) (see EUROPE 12214/2). Meanwhile, French and Dutch leaders say they will only agree to a Brexit delay for a good reason. They’ll all have a chance to air their views when they meet next Thursday for their regular European summit.
The summit takes place just after prime minister Theresa May will try, for the third time, to get the draft withdrawal agreement through the UK Parliament (probably on 20 March). Her main argument is: support my deal or risk a long Brexit delay, or even no Brexit. The EU’s stance is working in her favour here, and she is even using the upcoming EU elections as a scare tactic: an official document published this week admitted EU elections will have to be held if a Brexit extension goes beyond 1 July.
The government needs to persuade the 75 Conservatives and 10 Democratic Unionist MPs who voted against the deal on Tuesday (given that Mrs May’s attempt to woo Labour MPs has failed miserably). The focus is on the DUP, with talks continuing over the weekend, and on a potential statement or addendum from attorney general Geoffrey Cox to clarify his legal advice on the Irish backstop (based on the Vienna Convention, according to reports).
But even if Mrs May wins the backing of enough MPs next week for her deal (which is unlikely), the UK will still require more time to approve the 600 or so pieces of Brexit-related legislation (on visas, customs, etc…) that need to be approved before exit day.
Soft Brexit
The second thing this week’s drama has changed is the kind of Brexit likely to come about. Analysts at the Eurasia Group now put the chances of a softer Brexit more likely than the current deal (with a 30% probability), though they say May’s chances of getting her deal through have improved (25%). A general election is the next most likely scenario (20%), followed by a second referendum (15%), with a 10% chance of no deal. Oh, and Mrs May hasn’t ruled out a fourth “meaningful” vote before 29 March if next week’s attempt fails.
However, MPs shot down an amendment in favour of a second referendum in one of the series of votes this week, and also rejected amendments in favour of remaining a part of the European Economic Area (at least temporarily).
And no deal is still very much on the table, as the government explicitly stated in its motion on Wednesday’s ‘no deal’ vote. In fact, the UK published further no-deal contingency plans this week, including a Northern Ireland-specific customs regime that would remove all tariffs and checks on goods travelling between Dublin and Belfast, and between Belfast and the UK mainland (see EUROPE 12213/2).
The plan is not “workable”, Dublin says however. Not only would it encourage smuggling (via Dublin and Belfast) but it seems to run completely counter to the UK’s argument (and the DUP’s) that there should be no separate customs regime for Northern Ireland. It’s the Brexit conundrum that has dogged talks over the Irish border backstop, which was altered to take account of the DUP’s red line.
What all this shows is what has been obvious to many from the very beginning: Brexit, by definition, creates a border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, wherever you do regulatory checks or customs clearance. And no “alternative arrangements” yet exist to avoid it. (Sarah Collins)