Nairobi, 17/12/2015 (Agence Europe) - At the time of EUROPE going to press on Thursday 17 December, a night of hard discussions was awaiting the trade ministers of the 162 member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Nairobi for the 10th WTO ministerial conference. The delegations were due to try and reach a partial agreement on the thorny agricultural section of the Doha round and to find common ground on the post-Nairobi work - in other words, to decide on the future of the laborious Doha round that was launched in 2001.
The talks on the second part of the ministerial draft statement from Nairobi, focusing on concrete deliverables from the conference, were continuing on Thursday, with a view to a partial agreement on the agricultural section along with a package of measures for the least developed countries (LDCs), including the total exemption from customs duties for their products, an easing of the rules of origin, preferential treatment on services, and the cotton issue.
On the basis of a negotiation text tabled at dawn on Thursday by the agricultural facilitator, Lesotho's Trade Minister Joshua Setipa, and the chair of the WTO agricultural negotiations, New Zealand's Ambassador to the WTO, Vangelis Vitalis, the 162 member countries were expected to reach a consensus by the end of the conference at midday on Friday. The text was broken down into three sections relating to the three key issues raised by the different groups of member countries.
On the special safeguard mechanism, a mechanism wanted by the G33 developing countries led by India, Indonesia and China, and which would enable this category of countries to increase their customs duties temporarily in cases of a sudden rise in agricultural imports, the negotiation text said that “the work on the SSM [should] be continued” after the conference “in the broader context of access to the agricultural market”.
As regards the exemptions for public stockholding for food security purposes, a mechanism also wanted by the G33 developing countries, the negotiation text confirmed that the provisional mechanism set up at the Bali conference “[would remain] in force until a permanent solution on [this] issue is concluded and adopted”.
In addition, as regards the export competition pillar, the negotiation text provided for the progressive end to export subsidies by the end of 2020 for the developed countries (as opposed to the end of 2018 in the proposal from the EU and Brazil), on the basis of budgetary outlay commitments being reduced by 50% by the end of 2017, then by 100% by the end of 2020. A note at the end of the page nevertheless said that this measure would not apply progressively to processed products and dairy products, but in one go at the end of 2020, for the member countries that have notified export subsidies for such products, as Switzerland wants.
The developing countries would remove their export subsidies by the end of 2023 (as opposed to the end of 2021 in the proposal from the EU and Brazil) and they would have more flexibility.
With regard to cotton, the negotiation text provided that “disciplines and commitments contained in this decision shall be implemented by developed members not later than 1 January 2016 and by developing members not later than 1 January 2017”.
By contrast, while it proposed deadlines for the removal of export subsidies, the negotiation text was reportedly very modest on the dismantling of equivalent effect measures (export credits, state trading enterprises and food aid), demanded by the EU and Brazil.
On export credits, the negotiation text is in line with that of the USA, with a maximum repayment limit of 18 months (as opposed to 180 days in the proposal from the EU and Brazil).
For state trading enterprises (STE) which export agricultural products, the negotiation text provided only that the members “[would] ensure that they do not work in a way that bypasses all the other disciplines contained in the decision [from Nairobi]”. It also provided that “the member countries try to guarantee that the use of powers of export monopoly by these STE be exercised in a way that minimises the effects of trade distortion and does not lead to displacing or hindering exports from another member country”. The proposal from the EU and Brazil provided for the dismantling of these export monopolies by 2020.
On Thursday evening, the 162 delegations also had to deal with another terrible conundrum, “a highly political discussion”, according to a WTO source, with the examination of the third part of the Nairobi statement, focusing on the future of the Doha round and the post-Nairobi multilateral work programme.
This would be a discussion especially dealing with the issue of knowing whether the talks should continue, after Nairobi, on the subjects provided for in the mandate of the Doha round other than the agricultural section - in other words, industrial products, services and rules (some member countries even wanted to discuss new subjects, such as investment, public procurement and energy), as well as the thorny issue of special and differential treatment, and less than full reciprocity for developing countries - an issue that pitches the developed countries head on against the big emerging economies, China and India. (Original version in French by Emmanuel Hagry)