Divergences. A detailed analysis of persisting divergences with regard to eurozone economic governance would be a pointless exercise in this column for three reasons: our publication reports on this issue regularly, positions evolve on a daily basis, and it would be misleading to put aspects, whose importance varies significantly, on the same level. I think it is more useful that just before the informal eurozone summit on Friday and a few weeks away from the European Council session at the end of the month (which we are hoping will prove decisive) we should return to two examples highlighting these persisting differences (and which our publication has already explored).
Technical criteria or ethical evaluation? The first example covers a disagreement between the institutions. It involves the firm opposition of the president of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the idea that private creditors should be included in categories cited in possible banking failures in eurozone countries. Jean-Claude Trichet considers that such a provision would be counter-productive because it would be a disadvantage to the EU in its relationship with other international players and could make professionals in this sector go elsewhere. This is why the president of the ECB has specifically called on the European Parliament to take this aspect into account when it speaks out on the question of the stability and growth pact. Chancellor Merkel, however, is sticking to her guns and is continuing to demand that individuals or private undertakings that have purchased treasury bonds at a high rate of interest from the eurozone country experiencing difficulty, cannot be exempt from exposure to risk. If the country issuing bonds has to renegotiate its debts, private creditors also have to make an effort in this respect too. Mr Trichet undoubtedly has his own reasons for advising against this but from an ethical point of view, I consider that the purchase of treasury bonds at rates that could not be described as anything but those of the usurer, cannot be justified unless the purchaser agrees to accept the risk implicit in the given operation. If this acceptance is not forthcoming, usury, which has its own place reserved in Dante's Hell, would become legitimate.
Should private debt be taken into account? The second example involves divergences between member states with regard to the modalities and timeframe required for reducing euro zone countries' national debt (and partly, even for countries outside of the zone). The vast majority of eurozone governments support a quantitative mechanism: if debt is 60% above gross national product, it has to be reduced by 5% a year (even if this rule cannot be immediately applied). Greece is requesting that this mechanism is not applied as long as it is respecting the economic adjustment programme it is involved in as part of the international financial assistance granted to the country.
Italy's reservations about this question are even more far-reaching because they focus on criteria in the rules: Rome is demanding that the timeframe for eradicating public debt is not only based on the level of this debt but that it also takes into account private debt. If private debt is low, reduction of public debt would be less automatic. Other member states are opposed to this additional evaluation factor and consider that no method exists that would allow to scientifically quantify private debt.
Greece - inevitable restructuring of the country's debt? The case involving Greece requires a few additional comments: this country is determined to remain in the eurozone but everything appears to suggest that it will have to restructure its debt. The decision by the rating notation agency, Moody's, to downgrade its bonds by three points is based on three areas on which Greece has been criticised: a non-credible budgetary stabilisation programme; an even more inefficient system for collecting taxes and uncertainties regarding the new EU stability fund. The European Commissioner, Olli Rehn, took a position that overtly supported the revision of the lending conditions granted to Greece and Ireland (EUROPE 10330). It should not be forgotten that Ireland will also at least have to accept harmonisation of the required corporate tax band. It is also obvious that the demands of the Social Affairs Council and the Party of European Socialists will also have to be taken into account on European economic governance with regard to employment, wages and social security. Even Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the Eurogroup has looked at this matter. Nonetheless, respect for rules governing the euro remains the basis for the whole project, including social questions.
Should other aspects that appear to have been rather neglected recently, such as the tax on financial transactions, also be highlighted? It is true that the EU cannot look at this question alone and the president of the G20 is undoubtedly thinking about it. Isn't he called Nicolas Sarkozy? (F.R./transl.fl)