An error of judgement? I have been accused, even in high places, of being over-severe in my assessment of the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland. It is obviously not the Irish people who are the subject of my rage. Everyone is free to make their own choices, and every choice is respectable. The EU and the EU institutions are the not the sole holders of wisdom and good action, far from it. But I do believe it is essential to make the consequences of what one decides clear. In the past, Norwegians chose to stay outside the European Union. This choice is no less respectable, admirable even. Virtually all member states believe that the Lisbon Treaty will advance the European project, boosting democracy, and it is essential for the EU to be able to expand further. One is perfectly entitled not to share this view. But if the others confirm their determination to move forward, one either has to change one's mind or remain on the margins. This has to be made clear and I have attempted to make it so.
The results of a Eurobarometer opinion poll from after the Irish referendum show that: a) 80% of the Irish who voted no want Ireland to remain within the EU and: b) 78% believe that Ireland could demand exemptions and derogations. Does this mean that their vote arose from an error of judgement? The European Council decided that the Lisbon Treaty is still alive in the current form, that ratifications will continue and that the treaty's content cannot be renegotiated. If Ireland so desires, “statements” or clarifications are possible, but not changes that would force other member states to start the ratification process again. It is for Ireland to indicate which path it is planning to follow; if it doesn't ratify the treaty, it will have to indicate how it sees itself with regard to the EU without preventing the Lisbon Treaty coming into force and being applied by the others.
What should be avoided. Studies show that the vital concerns of the Irish have all been taken into consideration in the Lisbon Treaty (see my column in the day before yesterday's newsletter on Professor Jacqué's comments), and that most voters did not know what was in the treaty (which adds to questions about whether a referendum should have been held in the first place). The Irish were subject to a battery of myths and lies, along with obscure manoeuvring funded from who knows where. Pat Cox, an Irishman who was the president of the European Parliament from 2002 to 2004, followed the referendum campaign and gave some edifying examples, including that of a grandmother who after listening to an “expert” on the radio, thought that her grandson could be conscripted into the European army. Dermot Keogh, Director of European Studies at Cork University, explained that Ireland's neutrality had been guaranteed ever since Ireland joined the EU and would remain so. He added that one could even argue that Ireland's neutrality had been strengthened by joining the EU. That is clear. But what can one say if Irish farmers say that without EU subsidies, they could not make a profit from farming but who then go on to explain why they voted no - because of over-complicated rules that have to be followed? The traceability of beef makes farmers subject, they say, to far too many rules and too much red tape. There are too many restrictions, making it impossible to freely exercise the profession of farmer, they explain. These farmers are disappointed about the way their professional organisation called for a yes vote, and they voted no, explaining that they would not have been more likely to vote yes even if the Catholic Church had asked them to. These farmers do not know that the scrapping of farm aid is being called for by several political forces and the funding of the common agricultural policy (CAP) is only ensured for the next few years. This red tape might be reduced, but the policy that enables them to make a business as farmers might disappear if Eurosceptics win the day.
Lack of agreement about the next step. People are free to choose but they have to accept the consequences of their choice. We do not yet know what path Ireland will choose. Meanwhile, many suggestions have been put forward about how to solve the current situation of a treaty being blocked by someone after it has been negotiated and renegotiated for several years and signed by all. How to avoid the delicate balance - struck after complex bargaining, compromises and mutual concessions - evaporating because a few thousand people do not agree or did not understand? Their choice has to be respected, but so does the choice of the vast majority.
Several observers have come up with a simple rule: that a European treaty should come into force when a large percentage (well above half) of member states have ratified it. This exists in international law where treaties can come into force once a certain number of countries have ratified them, explains Sylvie Goulard, President of 'Mouvement Européen/France'. Ideas of this ilk were studied in the Penelope programme but were not adopted. Former EU commissioner, Mario Monti, said that if only one country votes no, the country concerned should hold a new referendum asking a single question - “Do you want your country to remain in the EU with the new rules that the overwhelming majority have agreed to?”
Socialist MEP Robert Goebbels of Luxembourg has expanded upon Monti's idea. In a democracy, he explains, the majority is right, even if based on irrational arguments. The 27 member states will not be able to avoid asking their populations the following question: Do you want to remain in the European Union? Member states where the no vote wins should act in consequence and decide, perhaps, to sign an association treaty with the EU. The other countries would form a hard core that could move forward with a true, more integrating and more socially-minded European policy. Such a variable geometry Europe could take one further in defending the common interests of the peoples of Europe. The force of attraction of a hard core would be greater for people than these cobbled-together treaties that have been the typical indigestible menu of EU summits since Nice. The Schengen Area arose from a common initiative by 5 member states. The euro started off as the common currency of 11 countries, explains Goebbels.
This view is not shared in the slightest by former Polish foreign affairs minister, Bronislaw Geremek, who has expressed strong opposition to a two-speed Europe, which would mean a division into first and second class countries. The EU is a strong unifying factor and should not be reduced to little more than a monetary community. The principle of solidarity is vital in various domains, like energy security and foreign policy, he explains. But what if countries that break with solidarity are the countries refusing to move forwards? Geremek understands this argument and replies that nothing stands in the way of the EU continuing with the Nice Treaty. But organising a new referendum in Ireland would damage the EU's credibility. After the final ratification, various changes could be made, which would be possible though intergovernmental conferences. This is Geremek's preferred solution. Former chair of the Convention that drew up the draft constitution, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, believes on the contrary that it would be a good idea to immediately put the idea of a two-speed European on the negotiating table, with the aim of applying it if anyone refuses to move forwards. The chair of the 'Association des Juristes Européens', Jean-Luc Sauron, commented that one had to stop wanting to force the same speed on everyone. Everything that is now solid was started by a handful of countries. The EU has to be given the resources to manage diversity within itself. He added that if Ireland refuses to hold another referendum or if it votes no in a new referendum, the matter would be resolved by creating a second division Europe alongside a Europe operating under the Lisbon Treaty rules.
Responsibility. Some political forces believe that the Irish are not responsible for what happened because “the deliberate decision to present the Lisbon Treaty in a totally illegible form is a spectacular illustration of an ivory tower syndrome that has a devastating impact. Such is the view of the president of the GUE/NGL Group at the European Parliament, Francis Wurtz, who, one might remind, called for a no vote on the Constitutional Treaty (which was far simpler and more rational), and that the response to the current problem consists of trusting representative democracy, in other words a parliamentary vote. Or does Wurtz, an MEP himself, believe this would be undemocratic?
The Socialist Group at the European Parliament and the Secretary General of the European Trade Union Confederation, John Monks, call for a social protocol to be added to the new treaty. But one has to ensure that adding such a treaty would make it necessary to organise a new ratification of the treaty itself by all the member states, which would be unthinkable. Italy's foreign minister, Franco Frattini, the former vice-president of the European Commission, has written that a pick-and-choose Europe, being able to say 'yes' to the Cohesion Fund and farm aid and 'No' to the big energy and common foreign policy challenges, is over. Europe is a historic, geographical and cultural entity, a driver of solidarity and development, upon which are contingent decisions and developments internationally, well beyond the EU's borders. Researcher Sebastian Kurpas commented that if one is prepared to give up big ambitions, one can continue like this. But the new treaty would change a lot of things and make Europe more effective vis-à-vis energy, foreign policy, security policy and immigration, he explains.
As we can see, the discussion has moved beyond Ireland itself and become a reflection on the functioning of a European Union that could one day increase to well more than 30 member states. The Irish question is making it necessary to define principles and rules but the raft of suggestions I have quoted shows that for the moment, there is no meeting of minds. On top of this, the additional phenomenon I have already discussed in my column, that of the splintering of large countries into several smaller states (what was once Serbia is now three different countries - Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo), simply complicates the institutional questions still further. This is just the start of the debate. (F.R.)