The European Council “conclusions” don't usually figure in my list of favourite things to read and those from last week no more so than the conclusions from previous European Councils. In my rather heated column on Saturday, I indicated two points that reveal, in my opinion, the importance of the summit that has just been concluded: a) the determination to safeguard the Lisbon Treaty by inviting Ireland to move to a rapid reflection on how it can participate in it; b) the refusal to look on the EU as being blocked in the meantime, by indicating, on the contrary, the areas of action and next set of initiatives and targets. The 25 pages of the conclusions are not in fact very explicit or clear. The summit language and affirmations are bland or vague, and often simple rewrites of known objectives. In some cases, the imprecise nature of the language is a result of the lack of an agreement, for example, on the EU's subsequent enlargement or oil product taxation.
The reports and analyses published in our previous newsletter reveal much more than the text of the conclusions because they look at the sub-text and divergences. We might need to ask ourselves what lay behind certain misgivings, for example, on the impact of financial speculation on oil prices, given that some governments have already openly spoken about it. A reading of the conclusions should in my opinion particularly take into account the following comments:
1. Ireland is in practice faced with a clear choice: either it is able to ratify the Lisbon Treaty as it stands, leading at least to “declarations” about it, or it agrees to member states that want to, moving forward on their own.
2. The comment made by the Czech Republic on the compliance of the new treaty with its own constitutional order is, in my opinion, pointless and therefore, inopportune. Other member states are experiencing similar constraints (France, for example, or Ireland on the question of the obligatory referendum) and have to tackle them if they want to participate in the Lisbon Treaty. There is no Czech exception.
3. There is no agreement on the repercussions of the Irish vote on further EU enlargement. Some member states think everything is blocked, while others believe that Croatia is a different case. Still other countries think that the ongoing process should continue with regard to the ongoing and future negotiations. This divergence is very important.
4. The “conclusions” on the Doha round don't mean anything because they are limited to the usual affirmation of support for a “final result that is both ambitious and balanced”. Nicolas Sarkozy described the draft being discussed in Geneva as being totally imbalanced and bitterly criticised Commissioner Peter Mandelson (to the point of suggesting that another commissioner be chosen for the final phase of the round). He affirmed that the draft in question would lead to a 20% reduction in European agricultural production while 800 million people die of hunger. This is a barely disguised rejection.
5. The suggestion of introducing tax measures to reduce the impact of oil price hikes was greeted very coldly. It was not formally rejected, because the next Presidency (France) is being called on to examine the feasibility of cooperation with the Commission and report back on it in October. The French formula will not in fact go through as it is (unanimity will be necessary) but national short term and targeted measures on the poorest sections of society could be envisaged. This column will come back to the oil dossier as a whole, later.
6. Conclusions chapter on “freedom, security and justice” warrants detailed and attentive reading (paragraphs 6-24) because it illustrates explicit orientations and targeted objectives covering illegal immigration, asylum, border management etc. Coming from the European Council, these indications resemble directives for the different Council groupings.
7. Many paragraphs on external relations are sometimes quite detailed (for the Balkans, for example) but just repeat what we already knew about the Union for the Mediterranean or the Millennium Objective commitments. In some cases, however, the confirmation of commitments and known objectives can provide a useful impetus.
Overall, the 25 pages of the conclusions affirm that the Union should not consider the vote of the Irish people as being paralysing and that the French Presidency will be able to work on the priorities it has already announced, even if the institutional section in its programme will definitely disappear.
(F.R./transl.rh)