Avoiding courting popularity. On the subject of Kosovo, it would be relatively easy to be ironical about the lack of any uniform EU position on a number of essential aspects. There is no European approach when it comes to recognising the new state. That may be true but we ought to know that there is not yet a common foreign policy and that, for the moment, there cannot be one. This may be plaintively deplored by the indignant ones among us who even call for majority decisions to be taken in this field - but that is purely courting popularity. Those who recommend an EU foreign policy decided by the majority are willing to accept the results of such a policy … on condition that they are in line with their own views. We must not forget the war in Iraq - would those who refused to take part have agreed to send their soldiers if that had been the result of a European vote? And those who wanted to be on the side of the United States, would they have discarded the idea if results had gone the other way? If the EU had had a foreign and defence policy decided by majority vote, such a policy would have splintered. Furthermore, for as long as the EU does not have military responsibilities or an army, decisions on which war and peace depend as well as the sending of young people into battle at the risk of their lives remain in the hands of the national parliaments and governments. This is inevitable.
In debates on this subject, I always come back to Jacques Delors. We are fully aware of what European unity owes to him, and we know he liked challenges and daring - but, when it comes to foreign and defence policy, he rejected playing up to the people. He stressed in his Mémoires that there are instances when the political interests of member states coincide and it is then possible to act together, but each country has its own traditions, its own history and its own preferential relations. The EU must get used to “building common actions every time analyses, interests and the resolve to take action converge”, and gradually work to bring about uniform positions, but “one can only move forward through clearly defined joint actions for which consensus is possible”.
A European “protectorate”. This is exactly what the EU is doing for Kosovo. There is no unanimous recognition of the new State. Our bulletin yesterday set out the reasons and the positions of each but there is unanimity (with abstention from Cyprus) over the initiatives to take. While guaranteeing a “European future” not only for Serbia but also for Kosovo, the EU will take on, in Kosovo, responsibilities of a kind that have caused some commentators to speak of a “protectorate” (without UN mandate). The civil mission under ESDP (2,000 police officers, lawyers and customs officials) will be composed of nationals from member states that do not recognise the new state. One should not forget that Kosovo will not have a real army, or a Defence Ministry, or a Foreign Ministry, or a seat at the UN.
Differences in national positions on recognition of the new State are determined by the fear that the gesture made by the Kosovars will set an example and a legal or political precedent for other situations elsewhere. According to the Council, Kosovo is a specific case which does not question the principles of international law, especially those of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States.
A special case, except that it is in the same area. It would indeed be illogical and dangerous to liken the case of Kosovo to others. But I doubt that its specific nature would be possible in the same region and for the population that is today invited to accept Kosovo's secession, that is, the Serbian population. If the official borders (which make Kosovo a region within Serbia) are no longer valid, then they cannot be valid either for neighbouring areas where the population of Serb origin is in the overwhelming majority, whether this be in part of the new Kosovar state or in the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These populations must have the right to choose between autonomy or accession to Serbia. No legal wrangling can challenge this obvious fact: if in this zone the internationally recognised borders are no longer valid in one way, then they cannot be valid in the other either.
Dignity of a state. Once the initial period is over, the new state will no doubt set about giving concrete proof that it is able to live by its own means. It is a question of credibility and dignity. The EU will provide its support and cooperation, but an independent state must show determination and the ability to exist by itself. Some very similar cases cannot and must not constitute a precedent. (F.R.)