The problem of the ratifications is an immediate priority. Now that the new European treaty exists, the focus of attention is now the next phase, that of the national applications. This will help us to see whether the populations can support what their governments have agreed, as each head of government claims that their essential demands have been met. There are many other aspects, however, which need to be clarified and broadened out, such as the finer details of the decision on the division of seats in the European Parliament or the wise and democratically correct provisions on the appointment of the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Vice-President of the Commission. This will be done over the next few days. The business of the ratifications deserves to take priority, because the difficulties which this may meet with in various member states are already creating a lot of noise and, due to its close connection with the vital but delicate dossier of the birth, in whatever form, of a Europe of more than one speed.
Guaranteeing its entry into force, even in the absence of unanimity. It is understandable, and even logical, that the Community and national authorities alike are virtually keeping silent, at least on an official level, on the difficulties of ratification, because it would not be appropriate to voice any doubt about getting a “yes” in any given member state. But the scale of the concerns and doubts becomes obvious once you move away from the circle of those with formal responsibilities, and it would be naïve to pass over this in silence; in any case, it will be everybody's problem in the next few months. In various cases, the debate on the ratification method is a lively one, particularly in the United Kingdom.
This column has already stated (see our previous edition) that Jacques Delors and Etienne Davignon have seen fit to stress the need for provisions which would allow the new treaty to enter into force between those member states which ratify it, even if a small minority of countries should fail to do so. Sentences like this do not get written at random when your name is Delors or Davignon, but they respond to a genuine concern, based on two things: a) the certainty that the European Union, as exists now, would not be able to resist a second rejection of its reform, negotiated freely and at such length; b) the impression that, in a few member states, the ratification is not yet in the bag.
It is, therefore, vital that the new treaty does not meet the same end as did the Constitutional Treaty, if a clear majority of member states approves it. You will remember that no less an observer than Philippe de Schoutheete raised this question last month, on what would have been Altiero Spinelli's birthday (see this column in our bulletin 9499), and nobody has forgotten that the “Penelope” draft, drawn up at the same time under the aegis of François Lamoureux (and taken up by Romano Prodi when he was the president of the European Commission)gave a lot of attention to this problem and indeed sketched out a solution, before it could have been known that the nails in the coffin of the Constitutional Treaty would have been hammered in by two founding member states.
Differences between national situations. The statements made by various political personalities, the analyses by specialists and the press, and a number of opinion polls (most notably in the United Kingdom) explain the scale of concern. In a few cases, the clouds darkening the sky of the unanimous ratification are looking threatening.
It is true that in France and Germany, the authorities at the highest level have voiced their hopes of ratifying before the end of the year, which may be a little too ambitious, given that the new treaty will not be signed until 13 December. It might be better to interpret this intention as meaning that in December, the new treaty will be put to the parliaments of both countries, and for ratification we may borrow the symbolic plan suggested by Jo Leinen: a simultaneous ratification in Germany and France on 9 May 2008, Europe Day. The main thing is, ultimately, that there should be no ratification problems in either of these two countries, nor in Italy, Spain, or even Poland, where the pro-European about-face in favour of public opinion was acknowledged by the former government.
There may, on the other hand, be problems in the Czech Republic, in member states in which a parliamentary majority of three fifths is required, and, of course, in a few member states in which a referendum is planned or likely, because experience shows that you can never rule out a nasty surprise, when the text is not clearly legible for the general public, thus potentially leading to inaccurate interpretations (as we saw in France). In Belgium, the timescale may be a problem. The country is such a great respecter of regional and local autonomy that clearly national political choices, concerning the country as a whole, need to be approved at all levels: seven parliamentary assemblies must take position in order for the new European treaty to be ratified, which will take a lot of time, because each of these assemblies jealously guards its prerogatives.
The British problem. But the main problem, the country which every political decision-maker and commentator has in mind - even if they don't say so - is, of course, the United Kingdom. The prime minister is sticking to the line he has set for himself. The famous “red lines” which he laid down to safeguard what he considers to be the “sovereignty” of his country - foreign policy and defence, taxation, social security, Charter of fundamental rights, to say nothing of monetary autonomy - have been respected, and the symbols which, in his view, would have made the EU look like a superstate, have been removed. As a result, a referendum - which had been planned for the old draft Constitutional Treaty - is no longer justified; his country will ratify the new treaty via the parliamentary method. However, three obstacles still stand in the way of Gordon Brown's plans: a) the virulent campaign of the Tory Party calling for a referendum; b) the aggressively anti-European attitude of a broad swathe of the press; c) the fringes of a considerable fraction of his own party (some 40 Labour MPs are in favour of a referendum). However, all surveys indicate that if there was a referendum, the new European treaty would almost certainly be rejected. According to a recent survey, 47% of Britons would vote against it; 29% took position in favour, and the rest were undecided or indifferent.
Gordon Brown, therefore, is a man under intense political and media pressure. How do you stick to your anti-referendum guns in the country which taught the world democracy, which is the leading light of liberty? The fundamental question goes even further: to what extent can it be justified to wish to force into European integration a country whose general public is reluctant, whose press is firmly against, and in which support from the political classes is sincere yet very much in the minority? I feel that Tony Blair's attempt to tackle the situation was sincere and based on conviction, but it failed: is this not something to take note of?
A perfectly legitimate choice. Whenever I have the opportunity to express myself on the British problem, I feel I should hold back, because I get the impression that my discourse on Euroscepticism can be taken as an overall criticism of the United Kingdom. This is absolutely not the case. I feel that European integration is vital and that all countries which feel the same must be free to achieve it, completely and under the best conditions. But there is nothing obligatory about European integration! Any country preferring to stay on the sidelines is quite within its rights to do so; the EU works fairly and closely with all countries which have chosen this path, as examples of Norway and Switzerland prove, but these countries have nothing to do with the institutions and cannot prevent the EU from stepping up its integration in any area it sees fit. These are basic considerations, valid for all the countries of continental Europe.
Observing is not the same as criticising. The case of the large islands is a more complicated one. Ireland is clearly committed to integration; the United Kingdom is not. It is not a question of criticising the British choice, but of pointing out that it does not correspond to what the continent demands. Do the citizens of the United Kingdom consider that their link with the United States is stronger than their link with the continent? Do they feel that in case of conflict, the safety of their country depends first and foremost on the Americans? We can see the point of the historical precedent; last century, Great Britain came under attack twice: both times, the threat came from the continent, and salvation from the United States. In my view, the evidence goes to prove that the best way of permanently ruling out such horrors is the political, economic and military integration of Europe. But it is entirely legitimate not to share this point of view and to prefer the path of intergovernmental cooperation in Europe.
An attentive observer has resurrected the comments of Jean Monnet, made at the time of the birth of the first Community (ECSC, covering coal and steel), to which the United Kingdom was inclined to accede, but with a “special position”. Jean Monnet wrote (our translation): “Allowing British participation under the terms of the special position is to resign ourselves in advance to an organisation which would be no more than a caricature” of the original plans. He explained: “Soon we would have no more common rules and no more independence of the High Authority, the kind of OECD”. And on the two subsequent treaties, that of the EEC and of Euratom, he said: “I have never wondered whether the Treaties of the Common Market and of Euratom could have been different and better. I believe that they represent all that is possible at the moment, and, without doubt, the wisdom of the time for which they were conceived”- which you could apply just as well to the new treaty.
If a country rejects this treaty, there must be an exit in place so that it can be applied between the countries and populations which want it. If it is approved unanimously, we must use the opportunities it offers to move integration forward. In any case, differentiation between the member states already exists.
(F.R.)