In my attempts to describe objectively different viewpoints on the new European treaty, I would not want to give the impression that most of the obstacles have been overcome and a general compromise was starting to emerge. It is true, however, that vital progress has been made in two areas:
a) The idea of having a new treaty, different from the draft constitution signed in 2004, has now been accepted. Even the initiatives sticking closest to the draft constitution, like that of Jo Leinen, accept that the Constitutional Treaty (despite being signed by all governments) cannot be kept in its current form;
b) A timetable has been drawn up. On 22 June, the European Council will decide to hold an intergovernmental conference (IGC) and will decide on its mandate. The IGC will complete its task before the end of the year. In 2008 (or at the start of 2009 at the latest) the new treaty will have to be ratified by all member states.
No negotiations would be possible without progress in these two areas but that does not mean that a compromise is beginning to emerge on the content of the new treaty. I continue to believe that an overall, unanimous agreement is practically impossible unless 'differentiation' is made explicit, in other words, the option for some member states to make progress even if other member states do not follow. If this is accepted, the problem will be to decide on formulae and 'Community' procedures for differentiation, to be included in the new treaty, leaving the door open to all. Failing which, strengthened cooperation would not be included in the treaty and the Community method (the right of initiative and role of the Commission, codecision at the European Parliament and qualified majority voting) would not apply to fundamental aspects of the European project like economic governance in the eurozone.
Objective demands of the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. We haven't got there yet. For the moment, disagreements over the content of the new treaty are clearer than ever. As ever, there is some tactical posturing, of course. Before entering negotiations of this level of importance, everyone tries to consolidate their starting point. But there are also objective divergences, some of which reflect real demands. In France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, it is practically impossible for politicians not to agree domestically that the constitutional draft as such is dead, or has been set aside at least. In 2004, Tony Blair talked about organising a referendum precisely because of the 'constitutional' nature of the deal, and in order to abandon a referendum he has to prove that it is no longer the same kind of treaty. The Tories still want a referendum despite the fact that Tony Blair has announced the dropping of the Preamble, symbols and other measures that seem 'constitutional', and Neil O'Brien, Director of Open Europe, has invited Gordon Brown to be cautious and make sure no 'dodgy' measures have slipped through. We can rely on most of the British press to take this task carefully on board.
In France, the situation is even starker because people have expressed their views (even though the president of the European Movement - France, Sylvie Goulard, noted that 45% of the French voted yes and many of those who voted no were 'abused'), so the new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has said that the debate is now closed - the constitution has been rejected and will not be returned to. Something else is being prepared. The situation in the Netherlands is similar. I do not believe that the Dutch have necessarily become eurosceptics (see my column in issue 9399), but the authorities cannot ignore the result of the referendum and the Dutch prime minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, has lined up with Tony Blair's position. There are various moves in the same direction in Sweden.
The Czech Republic has to make its mind up. The situation in the Czech Republic and Poland is quite different from the above-mentioned countries because the reservations have been chosen by the authorities. There is no Tony Blair there who has done all he could to get his country into the heart of the EU but was forced to accept that most of his fellow countrymen and most of the media would not follow him, and there is no Nicolas Sarkozy expressing a desire to breathe new life into the European project but having to take account of the repercussions of the past (the no vote). In the Czech Republic, the head of state never misses an opportunity to express hostility to European integration and his desire for his country to remain on the fringes. This means the situation looks quite simple - either the Czech people do not follow him and show through voting that they want to remain part of the European Union, or the people agree with the Czech president and the Czech Republic will have to negotiate its way out of the EU. The European Union does not force anyone to be a member. Any country that does not like it can leave.
The Polish people support European integration. The situation in Poland is a little more complex but similar issues are at stake - either the population backs the current position of Lech Kaczynski, in which case Poland will not remain in the EU such as it is at present, and such as people want it to be, or when the population gets a chance to express its views, when the population gets the chance for a democratic vote, the Poles will demonstrate their attachment to the European project and the Kaczynski twins will have to act accordingly. According to what he has said (and despite a few vague phrases of support for European unity his way), Lech Kaczinski's ideas seem clear - he agrees to the parts of the EU that suit him but rejects the rest. He calls for European solidarity when he feels it is necessary (like for energy) and calls for EU funding and support, but it never seems to enter his head that there are associated rights and responsibilities.
I have taken note of a comment by Mr. Barroso, the president of the European Commission, that of all member states, the Poles are among the people the most attached to the European project - as the most recent Eurobarometer poll demonstrated. Opinion polls in Poland reveal above all a U-turn by farmers, who have started to see how their gradual involvement in the CAP is changing their lives and future prospects. Over and above transfers of money, it is the European pricing policy that guarantees them a suitable income (and last week the European Parliament called for additional support for red fruit farmers - Poland grows most of the EU berry harvest). Poland is also the biggest beneficiary of the EU Structural Funds, and rightly so in line with EU solidarity. Italy and Spain in the past were also top of the Structural Fund recipient table, and Ireland also hugely benefitted from the EU's structural policy, but these three countries never failed to supply political backing for the European project. EU funding has also made a huge contribution to the restoration and renaissance of religious buildings in towns and, to an even greater extent, in villages in Poland. Poland has to understand that while it is of course totally free to make its own ethical and family choices (abortion, family policy, divorce, etc), it has no right to force those choices on Europe.
Jo Leinen's ideas. The above ideas on the situation in some countries do not mean that for the rest, everything is going slowly but surely in the direction of overall agreements. Far from it. I recently reported on a massive selection of, at times, lively reactions to concessions described as going too far ahead of the 21-22 June summit (see my column in issue 9422). This includes the 'Jo Leinen Plan' which partly reproduces ideas already put forward by Andrew Duff for example, and actually suggests a hierarchy of legal texts - a fundamental treaty including all the institutional aspects of the draft Constitutional Treaty and, in parallel, texts on policies in the form of amendments to the Nice Treaty or additional protocols, both of which would be easier to modify (see issue 9424). Jo Leinen reacted strongly to the accusation of having adopted the idea of a mini-treaty - he is proposing a 'maxi-treaty', keeping all the institutional reforms and the beefing up of common policies, both in terms of number and in terms of content.
Radical differences. Over and above the split between those who want to save the substance of the draft as penned by the Convention, and those who are prepared to make a considerable number of cuts and omissions (or who recommend them), there is an additional consideration which I believe is vital - among those who believe it is essential to scrap measures which smack of 'constitutionalism', there are radically different views on the directions to be decided upon for the various European policies. Both the United Kingdom and France, for slightly different reasons, back the scrapping of constitutional measures, but views on what should be kept and developed even in the new treaty diverge radically. Nicolas Sarkozy's ideas announcing France's 'return' to the European stage, often go in the opposite direction from what is recommended elsewhere. Sarkozy explicitly argues that it is necessary to consolidate the European identity, return to effective application of the Community preference, keep the idea of a Common Agricultural Policy (but revising it) and implement a more active euro exchange rate policy. These are certainly not the ideas of Gordon Brown or of other governments. It is not enough to simply say that Europe has to become more flexible and abandon constitutional dreams to focus on the demands and expectations of its citizens - a direction has to be chosen. We are nowhere near that choice.
(F.R.)